DOES IT PAY TO PAY MORE TO NEW HIRES? THE COST AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NEW CEOS

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William Bosworth, Anil Gulati ORCID logo, Sharon Lee

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i1c3p1

Abstract

Compensation and the post succession performance of 207 newly hired CEOs is examined to determine if there is any evidence that higher initial levels of compensation lead to superior firm performance. Using industry adjusted Tobin’s q as a measure of firm performance this study finds that there is no evidence that either higher initial total compensation levels or greater portions of equity based pay lead to superior firm performance. Increases in levels of compensation do anticipate improvements in firm performance one year in advance. Improved performance leads to increased levels of compensation for up to two subsequent years.

Keywords: Compensation, CEO, Firm Performance

How to cite this paper: Bosworth, W., Gulati, A., & Lee, S. (2008). Does it pay to pay more to new hires? The cost and effectiveness of new CEOs. Corporate Ownership & Control, 6(1-3), 338-346. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i1c3p1