SELF-INTEREST OR WIN-WIN: DETERMINANTS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN CHINA

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Abstract

This paper studies the determinants of executive compensation in listed firms in China between 2002 and 2005. There is significantly positive elasticity of compensation to scale. Moreover, corporate performance is positively related to the elasticity of compensation to scale. We find that both agency theory and managerialism hold true in Chinese listed companies. Compensation contract is the result of the game by stockholders and managers.

Keywords: Managerialism, Agency Executive Compensation Contract, Chinese Firms, Firm Size

How to cite this paper: Chen, Z., & Guo, F. (2013). Self-interest or win-win: Determinants of executive compensation in China. Corporate Ownership & Control, 10(2), 121-127. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv10i2art10