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THE AGENCY DILEMMA OF INVESTMENT FUND MANAGEMENT
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Daniel Kohlert, Andreas Oehler 
, Stefan Wendt
Abstract
The currently observable flight of investors out of investment funds is counterintuitive even in a crisis situation, because they forego the benefits of the collective investment offered by the funds. In order to unveil the reasons for this development we analyze the internal governance structure of German investment funds from a principal-agent perspective. We find that investment companies face severe governance problems because they are agents to at least two groups of principals with potentially conflicting interests. One group of principals consists of the shareholders of the investment company itself, the other group of principals consists of the actual fund investors.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Contractual-Type Funds, Statutory-Type Funds, PrincipalAgent Theory
How to cite this paper: Kohlert, D., Oehler, A., & Wendt, S. (2009). The agency dilemma of investment fund management. Corporate Ownership & Control, 6(3-2), 283-292. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i3c2p3
