THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE SHARI’A SUPERVISORY BOARD IN THE ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE GCC COUNTRIES

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Samy Nathan Garas ORCID logo, Chris Pierce

https://doi.org/10.22495/cbv6i2art2

Abstract

Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) are governed by two boards: the Board of Directors (BoD) and the Shari’a Supervisory Board (SSB). The SSB is a panel of Shari’a scholars who act independently from other governance organs. This paper discriminates between dependent SSBs and independent SSBs by using twenty one variables, which are classified into three groups: the implementation of governance best practices, the recruitment of SSB members, and the relationship between the SSB members and other governance organs. This study is one of the first studies that provide empirical results about the SSB independence. Nevertheless, the research focuses exclusively on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and excludes the other countries where Shari’a supervision might have different forms. The study has developed a hypothesis, which was tested by a questionnaire. Data was collected from 76 Shari’a Supervisory Boards, 73 Boards of Directors, and 59 shareholders of IFIs in the GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) during 2009. The discriminant analysis has been used in identifying both dependent and independent SSBs. The paper finds five variables relevant in discriminating the two groups. These variables are the incentives provided to the SSB; the average remuneration to the SSB members; the existence of the policy of penalties for violating the code of conduct; the relation between the SSB members and the BoD; and the role of executive management in recruiting SSB members.

Keywords: Shari’a Supervisory Board, Islamic Financial Institutions, Board Independence, Recruitment, Governance Structure

How to cite this paper: Garas, S. N., & Pierce, C. (2010). The independence of the Shari’a supervisory board in the Islamic financial institutions of the GCC countries. Corporate Board: role, duties and composition, 6(2), 20-34. https://doi.org/10.22495/cbv6i2art2