IMPACT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: THE CASE OF LISTED WAREHOUSE TRANSPORTATION FIRMS IN EMERGING ECONOMY

Duc Tai Do [*], Thi Thuy Hang Pham [**], Binh Minh Tran [***], Manh Dung Tran [****]

* University of Labor and Social Affairs, Hanoi, Vietnam
** *Corresponding author*, Vinh University, Vinh, Vietnam
Contact details: Vinh University, 182, Le Duan, Truong Thi, Vinh City, Nghe An province, Vietnam
*** Lund University, Lund, Sweden
**** National Economics University, Hanoi, Vietnam

How to cite this paper: Do, D. T., Pham, T. T. H., Tran, B. M., & Tran, M. D. (2021). Impact of corporate governance on financial performance: The case of listed warehouse transportation firms in emerging economy. *Corporate Governance and Organizational Behavior Review, 5*(2), 32–43. https://doi.org/10.22495/cgobrv5i2p3

ISSN Online: 2521-1889
ISSN Print: 2521-1870

Received: 17.06.2021
Accepted: 10.09.2021

JEL Classification: G30, M41, L25
DOI: 10.22495/cgobrv5i2p3

Abstract

Corporate governance structures are expected to help a firm have better financial performance through giving proper decision-making (Shivani, Jain, & Yadav, 2017). In recent years, along with the completing process of the business environment, the corporate governance framework in Vietnam has also been gradually built and implemented. However, corporate governance in Vietnam still has some limitations. This study is conducted to investigate the impact level of corporate governance on the financial performance of warehouse transportation firms listed on the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) of Vietnam. We employ both qualitative and quantitative methods for processing data collected from twenty-two listed firms. The results reveal that determinant of corporate governance including the nationality of the board (NB), board composition (BC) has a negative relationship with financial performance; the remaining determinants, such as board size (BS), professional qualifications of the board (BE), the proportion of women (PW), the average age of the board (AA), general director concurrently of the board chairman (PO), do not influence financial performance. However, this impact level changes when we put some controlled variables in the model. In addition, the controlled variable of enterprise continuous uptime (COT) also has a negative impact on financial performance. Based on the findings, some recommendations are proposed relating to corporate governance for enhancing the financial performance of listed warehouse transportation firms in Vietnam.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Financial Performance, Warehouse Transportation Firms, Finance

Authors' individual contribution: Conceptualization — D.T.D.; Methodology — T.T.H.P.; Resources — B.M.T.; Writing — Review & Editing — M.D.T.; Visualization — D.T.D.; Funding Acquisition — M.D.T.

Declaration of conflicting interests: The Authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

1. INTRODUCTION

Corporate governance is viewed as the internal measures to run and control a company, relating to the relationships between the board of directors, shareholders, and stakeholders. Corporate governance also creates a structure for setting goals and identifying the means to achieve the goals, as well as for monitoring firm performance (OECD, 2004). Corporate governance is regarded as a means to reduce agency costs, thereby improving management transparency and increasing firm performance (Bruno & Claessens, 2010). Good corporate governance practices will have a positive impact on the firm's performance.

Corporate governance functions include both external and internal determinants. The internal determinant is the establishment of a structure to control the behavior of preparing and disclosing financial statements. If this structure works well, it will result in high-quality information on financial statements. According to Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright (2004), internal determinants include board of directors (size, independent members, authority, experts, frequency of meetings); audit committee (independent, experienced, and specialized members; the presence of internal audit in the corporate structure).

In recent years, the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance has been investigated extensively. There are many views stating that good corporate governance leads to better firm financial performance (Chong & Lopez-de-Silanes, 2006; Hodgson, Lhaopadchan, & Buakes, 2011; Luo & Salterio, 2014). However, the others also confirm that corporate governance negatively affects financial performance (Bauer, Guenster, & Otten, 2004; Loc & Trang, 2015). Therefore, it is necessary to test and measure the influence and extent of corporate governance on financial performance and Vietnamese logistics firms are regarded as case studies.

In the context of Vietnam, the financial market in general and the stock market in particular, develop remarkably. This development not only has an impact on the number of listed firms but also increases the number of people using financial statements. Although the Vietnamese government has tried to introduce many relevant legal frameworks to enhance the efficiency of the stock market, especially related to the financial performance of firms and corporate governance. However, these regulations are, to some extent, too general. Therefore, implementation in each firm is too different, and the financial performance improvement of each firm is different too.

In recent years, along with the completing process of the business environment, the corporate governance framework in Vietnam has also been gradually designed and fulfilled. Up to now, the corporate governance framework has been evaluated to be quite consistent with popular governance principles prevailed in the world. However, corporate governance in Vietnam still has some limitations. Weak corporate governance can be an important factor influencing financial performance.

There are 22 warehouse transportation firms listed on Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) in Vietnam, contributing to the development of the transportation and warehousing industry. The warehouse transportation industry has a great role in the economy, such as playing an important role in the distribution and circulation process, contributing to the general development of the economy, creating jobs for millions of people, and maintaining security and order. Besides, transportation services also play a big role in mobilizing large capital for investment. However, the financial performance of some transportation firms is still weak; the human resources of logistics firms are still weak too and lacking compared to those of other industries. Logistics firms are mainly providing single service, whose main market is domestic. Therefore, it is necessary to scrutinize the impact of corporate governance on the financial performance of the logistics firms listed on HNX as case studies in Vietnam, an emerging country.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and theoretical framework. Section 3 analyses the methodology that has been employed to conduct empirical research. Section 4 presents results, and Section 5 gives some conclusions.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Financial performance

Indicators reflecting the financial performance of firms are the rate of return on assets (Zeitun & Tian, 2007; Agha, 2014; Iqbal & Zhuquan, 2015; Chi, 2018). It is also both the rate of return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) (Onaolapo & Kajola, 2010; Pouraghajan & Malekian, 2012; Pouraghajan & Malekian, 2012). Can (2017) said that ROA and return on sales (ROS) were mainly employed to evaluate the financial performance of firms. Based on the above points of view, Trang and Anh (2018) believe that financial performance is one of the important contents of business performance and the indicators commonly used to evaluate financial performance are: ROA, ROE. Financial performance is a very important issue, and a premise to attract capital and minimize the cost of capital of firms. A firm with high financial performance will create credibility with investors (Lan & Anh, 2019). In addition, the firm financial performance with the proxy of ROE was measured by Nguyen, Nguyen, and Nguyen (2016).

2.2. Corporate governance

In one of the research papers, it was issued that there are various forms of corporate governance (CG) and these are based upon the different structures of ownership and large variations were observed from the angles of the cultural background, legal frameworks, political climates, and economic conditions (Krajnak, 2019). Corporate governance influences firm financial performance in different levels and characteristics. In different markets, this relationship is also different.

Ameer, Ramli, and Zakaria (2009) look into the effect of board composition on the financial performance of listed firms in Malaysia. They use tabular data collected from listed 227 firms excluding firms in the financial sector, with data collected in the period from 2002 to 2007. The results show that a board of directors with a high proportion of independent members and foreign members affects firm performance better than the board of directors with a low independent membership and the council has an insider who is not executive concurrently. The study shows that in publicly owned firms, it seems that a high proportion of outsiders join the board of directors, minimizing investment and representation problems. The drawback of the research is the lack of attention paid to the individual characteristics of the board members in order to understand their adaptability to various board roles.

Rashid, De Zoysa, Lodh, and Rudkin (2010) investigate the effects of board composition on the financial performance of firms in the context of Bangladesh. The corporate board composition in the form of independent members has an impact on the economic performance of firms in Bangladesh. Two hypotheses have been developed to examine the relationship between the independent member of the board of directors and the firm's performance: 1) there is a significant positive relationship between board composition and financial performance; 2) there is a significant inverse relationship between board size and financial performance. The study used 274 observations of Bangladeshi firms from 2005 to 2009. Linear regression analysis was used to test research hypotheses. The results show that independent board members cannot add potential value to a firm's economic performance. The drawback of the research is that the inability to consider cultural and institutional differences in an emerging economy like Bangladesh may result in the inability of independent board members to create economic value for the firm.

Lawal (2012) examines the research history on corporate governance and its impact on firm financial performance. The aspect of corporate governance in Lawal's (2012) study highlights board dynamics including board composition, the board size, board diversity, and general director concurrently of the board chairman. However, the study only used qualitative research and did not seek empirical evidence on firms in any particular market.

Many researchers have scrutinized the impact of corporate governance in different business lines. There is a significant impact of corporate governance on firm performance in the textile sector (Ashraf, Bashir, & Asghar, 2017) and in the banking and financial services sector (Arif & Syed, 2015). Palaniappan and Rao (2016) conclude the significant impact of corporate governance disclosures on firm performance for manufacturing firms in the context of India. Corporate governance structures are expected to help firms perform better through quality decision-making (Shivani, Jain, & Yadav, 2017). Corporate governance aims at facilitating effective monitoring and efficient control of the business. Its essence lies in fairness and transparency in operations and enhances disclosures for protecting the interests of different stakeholders (Arora & Bodhanwala, 2018).

Berķe-Berga and Dovladbekova (2019) survey 799 listed firms in nine Eastern European countries. The results reveal a negative relationship between corporate governance index and market leverage, which means the higher level of corporate governance is, the lower level of debt is.

Hamidah and Arisukma (2020) examine the relationship of three characteristics of the board of directors (board size, board independence, and CEO duality) as part of a good corporate governance mechanism and its effects on the level of sustainability report disclosure with moderating effect of the audit committee. He used 106 samples that were taken from 35 firms listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange. The results reveal that board size and board independence were found to have a significant negative relationship with the level of sustainability report disclosure.

In the context of Vietnam, Quynh (2012) conducted a study on the relationship between corporate governance through characteristics of administration council and performance of joint-stock firms. Research data were collected from 100 joint-stock firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange of Vietnam from 2007 to 2011. The results indicate that:

1) there is an inverse correlation between board size and performance in a group of firms with less debt to equity ratio 1;

2) there are no conclusions about the inverse relationship concurrently between the director/ general director and the chairman and firm performance;

3) there is no basis to confirm the correlation between the ratio of independent members with firm performance;

4) the proportion of female members is positively correlated with performance in the group of firms with market capitalization from 10,000 billion VND (Vietnamese dong) to 100,000 billion VND;

5) there is no basis to confirm the correlation between the average age of the board of directors and performance in the Vietnamese environment and the variable of financial performance is the rate of ROA;

6) there is no basis to confirm the correlation between share ownership in administration council with firm performance;

7) state ownership represented by a member of the board of directors is positively correlated with firm performance (ROA and ROE) in the Vietnamese environment;

8) there is no basis to confirm the correlation between foreign ownership represented by a member of the board of directors and firm performance;

9) domestic private ownership represented by a board member is positively correlated with firm performance (ROA and ROE) in the Vietnamese environment.

Besides, agency theory by Jensen and Meckling (1976) laid the foundation and development in the field of corporate finance. The agency theory clearly shows that members in the administration council try to maximize their interests, but make decisions that harm shareholders. They do for the sake of their interests rather than the interests of shareholders. Managers' motivation is unduly tied to short-term returns. In addition, managers are urged to focus on stock prices to seek large sums of

money in case stock price rises. While increasing the entrepreneurial spirit of the managers and bringing a little bit of efficiency to the company, this has also resulted in some firms behaving poorly with their employees and customers.

In a joint-stock firm, the principal is the owners (shareholders) who hire representatives (managers) through a contract, and then the shareholder authorizes the firm to the managers. The reason is transferred to the right to make economic decisions that affect the firm's operations. It is the responsibility of managers to maximize the value of the owners. In many cases, however, a manager may run a firm in a way that benefits himself rather than the owners, especially if the manager is the one being paid and has no associated interests, causing agency costs. The higher the percentage of capital the manager holds, the more they tend to maximize their benefits.

Stakeholder theory was first introduced by Freeman (1984). Accordingly, the central idea is that the success of an organization depends on the relationship between managers and stakeholders, such as customers, suppliers, employees, the State, and others. Administration council discloses information of an entity including financial information disclosure, firm performance, non-financial information, such as the firm's operating goals, ownership ratio, remuneration policy, related risks, party transactions related to stakeholder interests, corporate governance policies. Conducting transactions with related parties has to be appropriate, not make prejudicial business decisions or change the capital structure in favor of major shareholders. The policy of the administration council should be fully aware of the responsibilities of the firm to related parties as well as reporting on the relationship with related parties.

Asymmetric information theory reveals that asymmetric information is the result of parties trading in the stock market having different levels of information when one is a supplier and another is a receiver. In the stock market, a joint-stock firm represented by the executive board is the information provider, while investors and stakeholders are the receivers of the information. Information asymmetry includes asymmetry in the amount, in the quality (the truthfulness), and in the timeliness of the information. In order to reduce information asymmetry in joint-stock firms, on the one hand, the board of management of listed firms have to provide useful information to investors, on the other hand, it is necessary to establish a monitoring mechanism including representatives of shareholders of the board of directors and the supervisory board. This theory also offers suggestions to reduce asymmetry through signaling and monitoring mechanisms. Therefore, a listed firm needs to establish an effective monitoring mechanism through internal factors including the board of directors, supervisory board, and internal audit.

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study employs both research methods of qualitative and quantitative research approaches. In employing qualitative research methods, we use techniques of synthesis, analysis, comparison to evaluate the financial performance of the logistics firms, to measure the effects of corporate governance on financial performance. In addition to collecting previous studies, we interviewed experts. Qualitative research methods orientated and refined the research results of previous studies; from there, this study inherited and applied. Then, we use quantitative methods basing on table data that are aggregated over five years, from 2015 to 2019. We used Stata 13 software in the quantitative research method.

The list of 22 logistics firms listed on the HNX is collected from the website *cophieu68.vn*. In order to understand, analyze, evaluate and measure the financial performance of logistics firms, we use the data and information of financial statements that have been audited, approved, and published on reputable websites, such as *https://finance.vietstock.vn/* and *cafef.vn*. In addition, they also refer to the analysis and comments of experts in the media, specialized magazines.

To analyze, evaluate, and measure corporate governance factors, data were collected from literature and semi-structured interviews. First of all, previous papers are reviewed to examine similar studies and get an overview of key discussions. After that, we interviewed chief accountants, management boards from three listed logistics firms, and two lecturers who have much experience in corporate governance in logistics firms in top economic universities in Vietnam. All recorded interviews create a large data to analyze and evaluate the attributes of characteristics of corporate governance of logistics firms. All interviewed individuals have experience in the field of research. Respondents are guaranteed the confidentials of the information they provide.

We design construct of corporate governance and observed variables based on previous studies and interview results. Table 1 was officially sent to the data collection in 2020. We collected and calculated the actual level of the seven (7) observed variables of corporate governance in listed logistics firms in the period from 2015 to 2019. Meanwhile, the shortcomings of data processing will be overcome, and the study will be more convincing for a long time.

Data collection results received 22 responses from 22 listed logistics firms. Of which, there were no invalid responses and all 22 responses of 22 firms were retained, meeting the required sample to reach 95% of the statistical results (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 2006).

Table 1. Independent and control variables

Code	*Attributes*	*Measurement*	*Sources*
Independent variables			
BC	Board composition	Independent members in the board/Members in the board	Tricker (2009), Lawal (2012)
BS	Board size	Members in the board	Lawal (2012), Ujunwa (2012), Quynh (2012)
BE	Professional qualifications of the board	Members with master's degrees in the board/Members in the board	Simons, Pelled, and Smith (1999), Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003), Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader (2003), Ujunwa (2012)
PW	Proportion of women	Members women in the board/Members in the board	Adams and Ferreira (2002), Carter et al. (2003), Quynh (2012), Duc and Thuy (2013)
AA	The average age of the board	$\sum ai.fi/\sum fi\ (i = 1 - n)$	Quynh (2012)
NB	Nationality of the board	Foreign members in the board/Members in the board	Ameer et al. (2009), Ujunwa (2012)
PO	General director concurrently of the board chairman	It is 0 if not concurrently, otherwise it is 1	Lawal (2012), Ujunwa (2012), Quynh (2012)
Controlled variables			
SC	Firm size	Total assets	Thuy (2015)
CS	Capital structure	Total liabilities/Total assets	Proposed by the authors
COT	Firm continuous uptime	Firm initial public offering (IPO) up to the time of collection	Chi (2018)

The collected data will be checked for compliance information, then cleaned, synthesized, and analyzed according to the following steps:

Step 1: Encrypt data, declare and import data on Excel files.

Step 2: Data processing using Stata 13 software including descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, scale regression, regression model testing.

Inheriting previous researches and based on expert interviews, we design a research model as follows:

Figure 1. Proposed research model



4. RESULTS

4.1. Descriptive analysis

Table 2 shows that the dependent variable includes two observed variables; the independent variable includes seven observed variables; controlled variables include three observed variables. Each observed variable is described by 110 observations. Basic indicators, such as mean, max, min, standard deviation (SD), variance, skewness coefficient of variation, the sum of variables, range, coefficient of variation (p50), coefficient of variation of each observed variable (CV) has been identified and these basic indices accurately reflect the current state of financial performance and the impact of corporate governance on the financial performance of listed logistics firms.

Table 2a. General descriptive statistics

Variable	*Observations*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min*	*Max*
Dependent variables					
ROE	110	.1044218	.0956682	- .2481	.3717
ROA	110	.0618045	.0688578	- .1945	.273
Independent variables					
BC	110	.5019589	.10737	.3333333	.8
BS	110	5.518182	1.046899	3	8
BE	110	.1423918	.2020666	0	.8
PW	110	.0875758	.1069149	0	.4
NB	110	.0294805	.1318467	0	.8
AA	110	47.35573	4.489771	34	56
PO	110	.4454545	.4992906	0	1
Control variables					
SC	110	723931.5	1167980	46399	5254567
CS	110	.760818	4.071217	.0149	43
COT	110	13.77273	4.836139	0	26

Table 2b. Detail descriptive statistics

Dependent variables							
Stats	***ROE***				***ROA***		
N	110				110		
Sum	11.4864				6.7985		
Range	.6198				.4675		
Variance	.0091524				.0047414		
CV	.9161702				1.114122		
Skewness	- .3479766				.0663464		
Kurtosis	5.35797				6.627057		
p50	.09475				.05985		
Independent variables							
Stats	***BC***	***BS***	***BE***	***PW***	***NB***	***AA***	***PO***
N	110	110	110	110	110	110	110
Sum	55.21548	607	15.6631	9.633333	3.242857	5209.13	49
Range	.4666667	5	.8	.4	.8	22	1
Variance	.0115283	1.095997	.0408309	.0114308	.0173836	20.15805	.2492911
CV	.213902	.189718	1.419089	1.220828	4.472333	.0948095	1.120856
Skewness	.5861204	.2408351	1.539408	.7066649	4.49369	- .4941965	.2194918
Kurtosis	2.113663	2.547046	4.778884	2.268663	22.04639	3.195653	1.048177
p50	.4285714	5	0	0	0	47.55	0
Controlled variables							
Stats	***SC***			***CS***		***COT***	
N	110			110		110	
Sum	7.960007			83.68998		1515	
Range	5208168			42.9851		26	
Variance	1.360012			16.57481		23.38824	
CV	1.613385			5.351104		.3511388	
Skewness	2.725736			10.29098		- .6889719	
Kurtosis	9.676431			107.2768		4.268401	
p50	283741.5			.345		14	

4.2. Correlation analysis results

Correlation analysis results of independent and controlled variables are presented in the tables below.

Table 3 illustrates the results of correlation analysis, also known as multicollinearity analysis. The results show that the absolute value of each correlation coefficient between two independent variables is less than 0.8; therefore, no multicollinearity occurs (Bryman & Cramer, 2001). The remaining regression model has one independent variable with seven observed variables, one dependent variable with two observed variables.

Table 3. Correlation analysis results of the independent variable

	BC	***BS***	***BE***	***PW***	***NB***	***AA***	***PO***
BC	1						
BS	0.0254	1					
BE	0.0448	0.0246	1				
PW	-0.0378	-0.3409	-0.0624	1			
NB	0.2382	-0.0595	-0.0946	0.0649	1		
AA	-0.2975	0.1389	-0.0881	0.1979	-0.4899	1	
PO	0.1720	0.2389	-0.1927	-0.1245	0.2307	-0.1495	1

Table 4. Correlation analysis results of independent and controlled variables

	BC	***BS***	***BE***	***PW***	***NB***	***AA***	***PO***	***SC***	***CS***	***COT***
BC	1									
BS	0.0254	1								
BE	0.0448	0.0246	1							
PW	-0.0378	-0.3409	-0.0624	1						
NB	0.2382	-0.0595	-0.0946	0.0649	1					
AA	-0.2975	0.1389	-0.0881	0.1979	-0.4899	1				
PO	0.1720	0.2389	-0.1927	-0.1245	0.2307	-0.1495	1			
SC	-0.0372	0.1180	0.0694	0.1953	-0.1107	-0.1470	-0.0848	1		
CS	-0.0256	0.0364	-0.0836	-0.0792	-0.0357	0.0315	0.1119	-0.0013	1	
COT	-0.3554	0.0307	-0.3594	0.3120	-0.0583	-0.0492	0.1905	0.3402	0.0412	1

When analyzing the correlation between the independent and controlled variables, data in Table 4 reveal that between the independent and controlled variables and between controlled variables, the absolute value of each correlation coefficient between two variables is less than 0.8; therefore, there is no multicollinearity between the independent and controlled variables and between controlled variables. Thus, it is possible to include controlled variables in the research model.

4.3. Regression results

4.3.1. Regression results without controlled variables

With 95% confidence degree, Table 5 shows:

1. *For observed variable ROA of the dependent variable:* The value of F is equal to 4.21 (> 1.96) and the value of Prob. is greater than the value of F by 0.0004 (< 0.05). Thus, the model is consistent and statistically significant (Bryman & Cramer, 2001).

R-squared is 0.2240, meaning that the independent variables in the research model explain 22.4% of the influence of the independent variable on the dependent variable. Therefore, the results are accepted temporarily but need to test the suitability of the model (Bryman & Cramer, 2001).

2. *For observed variable ROE of the dependent variable:* F = 4.27 > 1.96 and Prob. > F = 0.0004 < 0.05. Thus, the model is consistent and statistically significant (Bryman & Cramer, 2001). R-squared is 0.2268, meaning that the independent variables in the research model explain 22.68% of the impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable. Therefore, the findings are accepted temporarily but need to test the suitability of the model (Bryman & Cramer, 2001).

Table 6 shows that all the observed variables of the independent variables have VIF coefficients < 2, so it can be confirmed that 100% of all independent variables do not have autocorrelation (Bryman & Cramer, 2001).

Table 5. OLS regression results

OLS regression results for observed variable ROA of the dependent variable						
Source	***SS***	***df***	***MS***	Number of observations = 110		
				F (7, 102) = 4.21		
Model	.115764891	7	.016537842	Prob. > F = 0.0004		
Residual	.401047657	102	.00393184	R-squared = 0.2240		
Total	.516812548	109	.0047414	Adj. R-squared = 0.1707		
				Root MSE = .0627		
ROA	***Coef.***	***Std. Err.***	***t***	***P > |t|***	***[95% Conf. Interval]***	
BC	- .0045447	.059551	-0.08	0.939	- .1226638	.1135744
BS	.0036293	.0064979	0.56	0.578	- .0092593	.0165179
BE	.0565722	.0309455	1.83	0.070	- .0048079	.1179524
PW	.0274416	.063425	0.43	0.666	- .0983617	.1532448
NB	- .1390991	.0550154	-2.53	0.013	- .2482218	- .0299765
AA	.0027283	.0016986	1.61	0.111	- .000641	.0060975
PO	- .014167	.0132136	-1.07	0.286	- .0403762	.0120421
_cons	- .0851874	.0900709	-0.95	0.346	- .2638426	.0934677
OLS regression results for observed variable ROE of the dependent variable						
Source	***SS***	***df***	***MS***	Number of observations = 110		
				F (7, 102) = 4.27		
Model	.226246803	7	.032320972	Prob. > F = 0.0004		
Residual	.771364485	102	.007562397	R-squared = 0.2268		
Total	.997611288	109	.009152397	Adj. R-squared = 0.1737		
				Root MSE = .08696		
ROE	***Coef.***	***Std. Err.***	***t***	***P > |t|***	***[95% Conf. Interval]***	
BC	- .1778154	.0825887	-2.15	0.034	- .3416297	- .014001
BS	.0003174	.0090117	0.04	0.972	- .0175572	.0181921
BE	.0396114	.0429169	0.92	0.358	- .0455141	.1247369
PW	- .0409274	.0879615	-0.47	0.643	- .2153986	.1335437
NB	- .2078606	.0762985	-2.72	0.008	- .3591982	- .0565229
AA	.002945	.0023558	1.25	0.214	- .0017276	.0076176
PO	.0049394	.0183254	0.27	0.788	- .031409	.0412877
_cons	.0543341	.1249154	0.43	0.665	- .1934351	.3021033

Table 6. Result of the autocorrelation by VIF coefficient (*estat vif*) of ROA, ROE

Variables	**VIF**	**1/VIF**
AA	1.61	0.620189
NB	1.46	0.685588
BS	1.28	0.779490
PW	1.27	0.784461
PO	1.21	0.828743
BC	1.13	0.882319
BE	1.08	0.922543
Mean VIF	1.29	

Table 7. Results of heteroskedascity (*estat hottest*)

ROA	***ROE***
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity	Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
H_0: Constant variance	*H_0: Constant variance*
Variables: fitted values of ROA	Variables: fitted values of ROE
$Chi^2(1) = 0.51$	$Chi^2(1) = 0.04$
Prob. > $Chi^2 = 0.4755$	Prob. > $Chi^2 = 0.8494$

Table 7 reveals that Prob. > Chi^2 > 0.05. Thus, there is no phenomenon of variable variance, i.e., the research model is consistent with the input data. Therefore, there is no need to use the model at a higher level (Bryman & Cramer, 2001).

With a significance level of 95%:

The regression equation of CG affects ROA as below:

$$ROA = -0.1390991 * NB \quad (1)$$

The observed variable *NB* has a negative impact on ROA, while other observed variables do not affect ROA.

The regression equation of CG affects ROE as below:

$$ROE = -0.1778154 * BC - 0.2078606 * NB \quad (2)$$

The observed variables *BC* and *NB* negatively affect ROE, while other observed variables do not affect ROE.

4.3.2. Regression results with more controlled variables

With 95% confidence, Table 8 illustrates that:

1. *For observed variable ROA of the dependent variable with more controlled variables:* F = 3.6 > 1.96 and Prob. > F = 0.0004 < 0.05. Thus, the model is consistent and statistically significant (Bryman & Cramer, 2001). R-squared is 0.2665 meaning that the independent variables and the observed variable explain 26.65% of the influence of the independent variable and the observed variable on the dependent variable. Therefore, the results are accepted temporarily but need to test the suitability of the model.

2. *For observed variable ROE of the dependent variable with more controlled variables:* F = 3.67 > 1.96 and Prob. > F = 0.0003 < 0.05. Thus, the model is consistent and statistically significant (Bryman & Cramer, 2001). R-squared = 0.2706 implying that the independent variables and the observed variable explain 27.06% of the influence of the independent variable and the observed variable on the dependent variable. Therefore, the findings are accepted temporarily but need to test the suitability of the model.

Table 8. OLS regression results with more controlled variables

OLS regression results with more controlled variables for observed variable ROA of the dependent variable						
Source	***SS***	***df***	***MS***	Number of observations = 110		
				F (10, 99) = 3.6		
Model	.137732353	10	.013773235	Prob > F = 0.0004		
Residual	.379080195	99	.003829093	R-squared = 0.2665		
Total	.516812548	109	.0047414	Adj. R-squared = 0.1924		
				Root MSE = .06188		
ROA	***Coef.***	***Std. Err.***	***t***	***P > |t|***	***[95% Conf. Interval]***	
BC	- .0793899	.0677097	-1.17	0.244	- .2137407	.0549608
BS	.008271	.0068481	1.21	0.230	- .0053171	.0218591
BE	.0267147	.0338917	0.79	0.432	- .0405339	.0939633
PW	.122701	.0748038	1.64	0.104	- .025726	.271128
NB	- .1819172	.0579733	-3.14	0.002	- .2969489	- .0668856
AA	.0006418	.0019237	0.33	0.739	- .0031752	.0044588
PO	- .0078901	.0137493	-0.57	0.567	- .0351716	.0193915
SC	-2.64e-09	5.97e-09	-0.44	0.659	-1.45e-08	9.21e-09
CS	.0007585	.001477	0.51	0.609	- .0021722	.0036892
COT	- .0038118	.0017961	-2.12	0.036	- .0073756	- .000248
_cons	.0737818	.1117817	0.66	0.511	- .1480174	.295581
OLS regression results with more controlled variables for observed variable ROE of the dependent variable						
Source	***SS***	***df***	***MS***	Number of observations = 110		
				F (10, 99) = 3.67		
Model	.269946086	10	.026994609	Prob. > F = 0.0003		
Residual	.727665202	99	.007350154	R-squared = 0.2706		
Total	.997611288	109	.009152397	Adj. R-squared = 0.1969		
				Root MSE = .08573		
ROE	***Coef.***	***Std. Err.***	***t***	***P > |t|***	***[95% Conf. Interval]***	
BC	- .2887604	.0938105	-3.08	0.003	- .4749006	- .1026201
BS	.0053911	.0094879	0.57	0.571	- .0134349	.0242172
BE	- .0068805	.0469563	-0.15	0.884	- .1000521	.086291
PW	.0804447	.1036392	0.78	0.439	- .125198	.2860873
NB	- .2591386	.0803209	-3.23	0.002	- .4185126	- .0997646
AA	.0004071	.0026652	0.15	0.879	- .0048813	.0056955
PO	.0161487	.0190493	0.85	0.399	- .0216493	.0539467
SC	1.63e-09	8.28e-09	0.20	0.844	-1.48e-08	1.81e-08
CS	.000942	.0020464	0.46	0.646	- .0031184	.0050024
COT	- .0058856	.0024884	-2.37	0.020	- .0108233	- .000948
_cons	.273886	.1548714	1.77	0.080	- .0334124	.5811844

Table 9. Result of the autocorrelation by VIF coefficient (*estat vif*) of ROA, ROE with more controlled variables

Variables	***VIF***	***1/VIF***
COT	2.15	0.465605
AA	2.12	0.470927
PW	1.82	0.549219
NB	1.66	0.601277
BC	1.50	0.664663
BS	1.46	0.683471
SC	1.39	0.721428
PO	1.34	0.745425
BE	1.34	0.749019
CS	1.03	0.971534
Mean VIF	1.58	

Data in the Table 9 denote that 6 observed variables of the independent variable and 2 observed variables of the control variable have a VIF coefficient < 2, so it can be confirmed 100% of 6 observed variables of the independent variable and 2 variables of the control variables have no autocorrelation phenomenon (Bryman & Cramer, 2001). There is 1 observed variable of the independent variable and 1 observed variable of the control variable has 2 < VIF < 5, so there is no autocorrelation occurring between these observed variables.

Table 10. Results of heteroskedascity (*estat hottest*) with more controlled variables

ROA	***ROE***
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity	Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
H_0: Constant variance	*H_0: Constant variance*
Variables: fitted values of ROA	Variables: fitted values of ROE
$Chi^2(1) = 1.35$	$Chi^2(1) = 0.22$
Prob. > $Chi^2 = 0.2454$	Prob. > $Chi^2 = 0.6381$

Table 10 illustrates the value of Prob. > Chi^2 > 0.05. Thus, there is no phenomenon of variable variance, i.e., the research model is consistent with the input data (Bryman & Cramer, 2001).

The regression equation of factors affecting ROA with more controlled variables is below:

$$ROA = -0.1819172 * NB - 0.0038118 * COT \quad (3)$$

The observed variable *NB* of CG factors has a negative impact on ROA; controlled variable *COT* has an opposite effect on ROA, the rest of the other observed variables of CG and two controlled variables do not affect ROA. When there are controlled variables in the research model, there is a difference in the impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable (ROA) in comparison with the model without controlled variables.

The regression equation of determinants influencing ROE with more controlled variables is below:

$$ROE = -0.2887604 * BC - 0.2591386 * NB - 0.0058856 * COT \quad (4)$$

The observed variables *BC* and *NB* have a negative impact on ROE; controlled variable *COT* has a negative impact on ROE.

5. CONCLUSION

This study is done for investigating the impact level of corporate governance on financial performance in logistics firms listed on the HNX in the context of Vietnam. The observed variables *NB, BC,* and *COT* have a negative impact on financial performance in logistics firms listed on the HNX.

Nationality of the board (NB)

The observed variables *NB* have a negative impact on ROA and ROE. The number of members in administration council with foreign nationality shows that members of the board of directors come from many countries with diverse ethnicities, while members of the board of directors have diversified knowledge, ideas and experiences through a wide range of sources of information from different cultural and civilized backgrounds among the board members. Firms with cultural diversity in management will have more ideas, helping to make the final decision more accurate and appropriate. Therefore, it will improve management performance through mutual consensus among teams. An organization with a degree of cultural diversity in management will have more ideas and choices, making the final decision more accurate and relevant (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996).

Board composition (BC)

The observed variables *BC* have a negative impact on ROE. The independence of the board of directors is related to the proportion of independent members. The independent members are often experts in each field, who can use their expertise to advise decision-making managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Independent board members are believed to provide shareholder protection in overseeing manager's activities because they are independent of management (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). Many logistics firms have a number of independent members, accounting for less than 50% of the total members of the board of directors.

Enterprise with continuous doing business (COT)

The observed variables *COT* have a negative impact on ROA and ROE. It proves that the form and method of a public offering of securities by logistics firms are inappropriate. Therefore, logistics firms need to change the form and method immediately.

The picture of corporate governance in Vietnam is still in its infancy and needs to be improved. The improvement of corporate governance quality must come from the foundational factors that world standards are aiming at, and the purpose of improving corporate governance quality is the optimization of business performance. This completion has to come from all members of the board of directors, the executive board, the supervisory board, the shareholders as well as the parties related. The control and risk management mechanisms also need to be completed quickly, in which the diversity of the board of directors should be further strengthened, the role of the independent members of the board of directors in order to promote their roles, as well as acquiring objective experiences and knowledge in corporate governance activities.

According to Tricker (2009), it is necessary to distinguish the concept that a member of the board of directors participating in the executive is both a member of the board of directors and an executive director. In contrast, a non-executive board member does not hold any executive positions in the company.

The proportion of board of directors in firms is quite high, but the contribution of independent opinion and expertise is limited. On the other hand, firms have not clearly differentiated between independent board members and non-executive members (Ministry of Finance, 2012). The interviewed experts support that it is necessary to enhance

the independence and professional qualifications of the logistics listed firms. Although the rate of independent members is, in fact, quite high, however, their opinions will not be approved if the remaining members do not share the same opinion. As a result, the logistics firms need to ensure that the number of independent members is over 50%. Independent members with expertise in financial accounting have the strongest impact, contributing to the quality of financial statements. Therefore, there should be a few members with experience and expertise in financial accounting who have the ability to criticize as well as propose the activities in the establishment, maintenance, and improvement of the internal control. In addition, the higher qualifications the members have, the more access to specialized knowledge, the more well-trained members, leading to a better ability to handle work and make decisions. Therefore, logistics firms need to have policies to encourage the board of directors to improve their qualifications, such as doctoral level, master's degree at prestigious training institutions.

Ensure the independence of the independent members. The State issued the regulations on company governance, which clearly states the conditions for independent members. Therefore, independent members need a commitment not to violate the independence requirements.

In terms of nationality of the board of directors: most of the logistics firms do not have members of the board of directors who have foreign nationality, so other members and the chairman of the board of directors can consider development direction to make appropriate decisions to increase the number of foreign members.

Currently, many firms apply model charter in a stereotyped manner, with no adjustment to suit the specifics of each firm, firms are not aware of the provisions of the law on corporate governance. At a minimum, depending on their characteristics, companies need to make further adjustments to increase benefits for the company and its shareholders. The company's shareholders have full basic rights to the company's operations, as well as the responsibilities of the board of directors, but the shareholders have not used up their rights to request clear and timely complete information time over. Information related to independent audit, internal control, corporate risk management system, management assessment, and supervision should also be improved. This information should be provided for shareholders fully and promptly.

The working mechanism and the role of the supervisory board also need to improve transparency. The coordination mechanism between the independent auditor and the supervisory board should also be encouraged more closely, especially since shareholders are changing their role in choosing their own audit company for the board of directors.

The agency theory shows that in a joint-stock company, there is always a problem of representation conflict due to the sharing of interests between shareholders and the managers. The board of directors is considered to be the most important control mechanism in the governance structure to handle this relationship (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The main characteristics of an effective board of directors are its independence, the presence of independent members through their decisions and oversight (Koerniadi & Tourani, 2012). Therefore, corporate governance rules or principles apply to listed firms in many countries around the world, such as the USA, Australia, the UK, Japan, Canada, Hong Kong, Israel, Malaysia, etc., and even in Vietnam. Therefore, logistics firms need to maintain and strengthen independent members.

According to the Ministry of Finance (2012), government regulations show that corporate governance in Vietnam has given certain attention to the role of independent members through the minimum rate regulation in the board of directors. However, practically not all companies comply with this regulation. In addition, the disclosure of information about the independent criteria of members upon appointment is not sufficient for the external shareholders to assess compliance. Therefore, in order to promote the role of the independent members, it is necessary to introduce stronger regulations that require listed firms to comply with the minimum rate of independent members. Besides, the agency must also have regulations on the standard announcement of the independent members appointed in the listed firms.

Separating chairman of the board of directors and general director: although the company governance regulation (Ministry of Finance, 2012) require listed firms to separate two functions if approved by the general meeting of shareholders which some enterprises still hold two positions concurrently. This duality is difficult to avoid concentration of power and leads to abuse of power. Therefore, the regulations are edited to separate the two functions such as a required element in listed firms.

This study is not only meaningful for logistics firms in formulating measures to improve financial performance and expand business scale; but also useful for researchers when they investigate finance and accounting. However, this study has some limitations, such as the sample research is rather small. If the sample size increases, the reliability of the findings enhances.

REFERENCES

1. Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2002). *Diversity and incentives in teams: Evidence from corporate boards* (Unpublished working paper).
2. Agha, H. (2014). Impact of working capital management on profitability. *European Scientific Journal (ESJ), 10*(1), 374–341. Retrieved from https://eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/view/2568
3. Amason, A. C. (1996). Distinguishing the effects of functional and dysfunctional conflict on strategic decision making: Resolving a paradox for top management teams. *The Academy of Management Journal, 39*(1), 123–148. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/256633
4. Ameer, R., Ramli, F., & Zakaria, H. (2009). A new perspective on board composition and firm performance in an emerging market. *Corporate Governance, 10*(5), 647–661. https://doi.org/10.1108/14720701011085607

5. Arif, K., & Syed, N. (2015). Impact of corporate governance on performance of a firm: A comparison between commercial banks and financial services companies of Pakistan. *European Journal of Business and Management, 7*(10), 54–60. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301886917_Impact_of_Corporate_Governance_on_Performance_of_a_Firm_A_Comparison_between_Commercial_Banks_and_Financial_Services_Companies_of_Pakistan
6. Arora, A., & Bodhanwala, S. (2018). Relationship between corporate governance index and firm performance: Indian evidence. *Global Business Review, 19*(3), 675–689. https://doi.org/10.1177/0972150917713812
7. Ashraf, M., Bashir, A., & Asghar, N. (2017). Impact of corporate governance on firms' financial performance: Textile sector of Pakistan. *International Journal of Business and Management Invention, 6*(5), 13–19. Retrieved from http://www.ijbmi.org/papers/Vol(6)5/version-2/B0605021319.pdf
8. Bauer, R., Guenster, N., & Otten, R. (2004). Empirical evidence on corporate governance in Europe: The effect on stock returns, firm value and performance. *Journal of Asset Management, 5,* 91–104. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jam.2240131
9. Berķe-Berga, A., & Dovladbekova, I. (2019). Capital structure and corporate governance: Evidence from eastern European listed companies. *Polish Journal of Management Studies, 20*(2), 161–173. https://doi.org/10.17512/pjms.2019.20.2.14
10. Bruno, V., & Claessens, S. (2010). Corporate governance and regulation: Can there be too much of a good thing? *Journal of Financial Intermediation, 19*(4), 461–482. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2009.10.001
11. Bryman, A., & Cramer, D. (2001). *Quantitative data analysis with SPSS release 10 for Windows: A guide for social scientists* (1st ed.). https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203471548
12. Can, V. V. (2017). Factors affect performance of the FDI seafood firms in Khanh Hoa province. *Journal of Banking Technology, 139,* 86–97.
13. Carter, D. A., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2003). Corporate governance, board diversity, and firm value. *The Financial Review, 38*(1), 33–53. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6288.00034
14. Chi, N. T. D. (2018). The impact of debt structure on financial performance: The case study of service firms in Vietnam. *Vietnam Journal of Science, Technology and Engineering, 11,* 1–5.
15. Chong, A., & Lopez-de-Silanes, F. (2006). *Corporate governance and firm value in Mexico* (IDB Working Paper No. 470). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1820043
16. Cohen, J., Krishnamoorthy, G., & Wright, A. (2004). The corporate governance mosaic and financial quality. *Journal of Accounting Literature,* 87–152. Advance online publication. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086743
17. Dagsson, S., & Larsson, E. (2011). *How age diversity on the board of directors affects firm performance* (Master's thesis in Business Administration, Blekinge Institute of Technology School of Management). Retrieved from https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:831952/FULLTEXT01.pdf
18. Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Ellstrand, A. E., & Johnson, J. L. (1998). Meta-analytic reviews of board composition, leadership structure and financial performance. *Strategic Management Journal, 19*(3), 269–290. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199803)19:3<269::AID-SMJ950>3.0.CO;2-K
19. Dam, T. T. (2015). Applying econometric model to analyze the factors affecting profitability of firms listed in Vietnam's stock market. *Journal of Finance and Accounting, 11*(148), 38–41.
20. Duc, V. H., & Thuy, P. B. G. (2013). The impact of board characteristics on firm performance: Evidence from Vietnam. *Journal of Economy & Development, 188*(2), 68–75.
21. Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., & Wells, M. T. (1998). Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms. *Journal of Financial Economics, 48*(1), 35–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00003-8
22. Erhardt, N., Werbel, J. D., & Shrader, C. B. (2003). Board of director diversity and firm financial performance. *Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11*(2), 102–111. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00011
23. Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Agency problems and residual claims. *Journal of Law and Economics, 26*(2), 327–349. https://doi.org/10.1086/467038
24. Freeman, R. E. (1984). *Strategic management: A stakeholder approach.* Boston, MA: Pitman.
25. Hair, J. F., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L., & Black, W. C. (2006). *Multivariate data analysis.* Hoboken, NJ: Prentice-Hall, International, Inc.
26. Hambrick, D., Cho, T. S., & Chen, M. J. (1996). The influence of top management team heterogeneity on firms' competitive moves. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 41*(4), 659–684. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393871
27. Hamidah, A. A., & Arisukma, A. (2020). The influence of corporate governance on sustainability report management: The moderating role of audit committee. *Polish Journal of Management Studies, 21*(1), 146–157. https://doi.org/10.17512/pjms.2020.21.1.11
28. Hodgson, A., Lhaopadchan, S., & Buakes, S. (2011). How informative is the Thai corporate governance index? A financial approach. *International Journal of Accounting and Information Management, 19*(1), 53–79. https://doi.org/10.1108/18347641111105935
29. Iqbal, A., & Zhuquan, W. (2015). Working capital management and profitability evidence from firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange. *International Journal of Business and Management, 10*(2), 231–235. https://doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v10n2p231
30. Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. *The Journal of Finance, 48*(3), 831–880. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x
31. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. *Journal of Financial Economics, 3*(4), 305–360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
32. Jensen, M. C., & Zajac, E. J. (2004). Corporate elites and corporate strategy: How demographic preferences and structural position shape the scope of the firm. *Strategic Management Journal, 25*(6), 507–524. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.393
33. Koerniadi, H., & Tourani-Rad, A. (2012). Does board independence matter? Evidence from New Zealand. *Australasian Accounting, Business, and Finance Journal, 6*(2), 3–18. Retrieved from https://ro.uow.edu.au/aabfj/vol6/iss2/2/
34. Krajnak, M. (2019). Do selected tax advantages affect tax revenue from the personal income tax? *Journal of Competitiveness, 11*(4), 73–88. https://doi.org/10.7441/joc.2019.04.05
35. Lan, N. T. N., & Anh, N. H. (2019). Impacts of audit quality on financial performance of industrial enterprises in the Red River Delta. *Industry and Trade Magazine, 18,* 296–301.

36. Lawal, B. (2012). Board dynamics and corporate performance: Review of literature, and empirical challenges. *International Journal of Economics and Finance, 4*(1), 22–35. https://doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v4n1p22
37. Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W. (1992). A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. *Business Lawyer, 48*(1), 59–77.
38. Loc, T. D., & Trang, T. T. K. (2015). Corporate governance and firm performance of companies listed on the Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange. *Journal of Commerce Science, 82–83,* 71–80.
39. Luo, Y., & Salterio, S. (2014). Governance quality in a "comply or explain" governance disclosure regime. *Corporate Governance an International Review, 22*(6), 460–481. https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12072
40. Ministry of Finance. (2012). *Circular No. 121/2012/TT-BTC: Corporate governance regulations applicable to public firms.*
41. Nguyen, T. P. H., Nguyen, T. T., & Nguyen, T. N. H. (2016). *Applying econometric model to evaluate the impact of factors on profitability of textile enterprises of Vietnam Textile and Garment Group.*
42. OECD. (2004). *The Corporate Governance Principles of OECD.* Retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf
43. Onaolapo, A. A., & Kajola, S. O. (2010). Capital structure and firm performance: Evidence from Nigeria. *European Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Sciences, 25,* 70–82.
44. Palaniappan, G., & Rao, S. (2016). Relationship between corporate governance practices and firms performance of Indian context. *International Research Journal of Engineering and Technology, 3*(3), 1–5. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324942871_Relationship_between_Corporate_Governance_Practices_and_Firms_Performance_of_Indian_Context
45. Perryman, A. A., Fernando, G. D., & Tripathy, A. (2016). Do gender differences persist? An examination of gender diversity on firm performance, risk, and executive compensation. *Journal of Business Research, 69*(2), 579–586. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.05.013
46. Pouraghajan, A., & Malekian, E. (2012). The relationship between capital structure and firm performance evaluation measures: Evidence from the Tehran Stock Exchange. *International Journal of Business and Commerce, 1*(9), 166–181. Retrieved from https://ijbcnet.com/1-9/IJBC-12-1915.pdf
47. Quynh, D. T. N. (2012). *Study the relationship between corporate governance through the characteristics of the board of directors and the performance of joint stock companies* (Master's thesis, University of Economics Ho Chi Minh City).
48. Rashid, A., De Zoysa, A., Lodh, S. C., & Rudkin, K. (2010). Board composition and firm performance: Evidence from Bangladesh. *Australasian Accounting Business and Finance Journal, 4*(1), 76–95. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fbj.2017.11.003
49. Sanda, A., Mikailu, A. S., & Garba, T. (2005). *Corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial performance in Nigeria* (AERC Research Paper No. 149). Retrieved from https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/2258/RP%20149.pdf?sequence=
50. Shivani, M. V., Jain, P. K., & Yadav, S. S. (2017). Governance structure and accounting returns: Study of NIFTY500 corporates. *Business Analyst, 37*(2), 179–194. Retrieved from https://www.srcc.edu/system/files/Article-No10-GOVERNANCE-STRUCTURE-AND-ACCOUNTING-RETURNS.pdf
51. Simons, T., Pelled, L. H., & Smith, K. A. (1999). Making use of difference: Diversity debate and decision comprehensiveness in top management teams. *The Academy of Management Journal, 42*(6), 662–673. https://doi.org/10.5465/256987
52. Thuy, C. T. T. (2015). The effect of foreign ownership ratio and accounting information on stock price. *Journal of Finance.* Retrieved April 3, 2020, from http://tapchitaichinh.vn/nghien-cuu--trao-doi/trao-doi-binh-luan/anh-huong-cua-ty-le-so-huu-nuoc-ngoai-va-thong-tin-ke-toan-den-gia-co-phieu-71219.html
53. Trang, P. T., & Anh, N. T. N. (2018). Discussing the concept of business performance to determine criteria for evaluating business performance of enterprises. *Industry and Trade Magazine, 7,* 288–293.
54. Tricker, R. I. (2009). *Corporate governance: Principles, policies and practices.* Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
55. Ujunwa, A. (2012). Board characteristics and the financial performance of Nigerian quoted firms. *Corporate Governance, 12*(5), 656–674. https://doi.org/10.1108/14720701211275587
56. Vinh, V. X. (2014). Ownership structure and capital structure: An empirical study on Vietnam's stock market. *Journal of Banking Technology, 101,* 32–40.
57. Watson, E., Kumar, K., & Michaelsen, L. K. (1993). Cultural diversity's impact on interaction process and performance: Comparing homogeneous and diverse task groups. *The Academy of Management Journal, 36*(3), 590–603. https://doi.org/10.5465/256593
58. Wiersema, M. F., & Bantel, K. A. (1992). Top management team demography and corporate strategic change. *Academy of Management Journal, 35*(1), 91–121. https://doi.org/10.5465/256474
59. Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. *Journal of Financial Economics, 40*(2), 185–211. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(95)00844-5
60. Zeitun, R., & Tian, G. G. (2007). Capital structure and corporate performance: Evidence from Jordan. *Australasian Accounting Business and Finance Journal, 1*(4), 40–61. https://doi.org/10.14453/aabfj.v1i4.3