

## **EDITORIAL: Corporate law and governance fundamental issues and peculiarities**

*Dear readers!*

We are pleased to present the first issue of the journal introduced in 2019.

The first issue of the journal “Corporate Law & Governance Review” is devoted to the issues of convergence of corporate governance towards intrinsic value, the impact of 4.0. innovation and regulations in the labour market, the effects of law and regulation on Italian corporate board practices in Italy and the board specificities in listed Portuguese firms.

In the study “Evolution of corporate governance towards intrinsic value” the authors analyse the traditional shareholder versus stakeholder focus, contributing to the previous research by Grove and Clouse (2018), Apreda (2006), Donaldson and Preston (1995), Evan and Freeman (1983) and explaining how we can move towards the more comprehensive stakeholder approach, exploiting fundamental analysis as a value driving pattern. The classic trade-off between market value and intrinsic (fundamental) value is considered with a technological approach nurtured by artificial intelligence.

Innovation is the inspiring driver of another paper about the impact of Industry 4.0. on the Italian labour market. The effect that technology has on key stakeholders represented by employees is currently under investigated despite the research undertaken by Blair and Roe (1999), Westphal and Zajac (1998), Hunter (1998), Lewis, Machold, Oxtoby, Ahmed (2004). In particular, corporate governance literature has seldom considered the implications of technology on new and old professions that reshape the internal organization of the firm, with deep governance consequences. Trade unions represent an external stakeholder, linked to affiliated employees, and they representation within the firm is deeply affected by the governance implications of unprecedented innovation. The Italian case is considered as a living lab, with geographical analogies applicable to other industrialized countries.

The labour market in the U.S. is analyzed in a further study that considers another under investigated topic, concerning new educational requirements for childcare workers. Regulations pertaining to childcare workers’ qualifications and staff-child ratio affecting the childcare market in the District of Columbia are analyzed. Working mothers represent a key stakeholder, again under investigated by traditional corporate governance, and this paper fills a gap in the literature, considering the impact of legislation on these sensitive issues.

Board models are the inspiring source of two other papers that consider, respectively, the impact of law and regulations on corporate board composition and working in Italy, or the Two-Tier model applied by the majority of listed Portuguese firms. This paper contributes remarkably to the previous papers by Sahore and Verma (2019), Basyith, Fauzi and Idris (2015), Giovinco (2014), Guerra, Fischmann, and Machado Filho (2008), Kostyuk (2005).

The study focused on Italy considers the impact of corporate board models under the classic/traditional, dualistic or monistic system, where directors and statutory auditors interact in different ways. Gender issues reshape the board composition and represent a complementary trendy issue in the governance debate, in Italy and abroad. Previous research in the Italian context of corporate governance by Napoli (2019), Rizzato, Busso, Devalle, and Zerbetto (2018), Colli (2009) and international context too by Zeitun (2009), Rogers, Dami, de Sousa Ribeiro, and de Sousa (2008), can be taken for a solid fundament for this paper.

Portuguese listed firms show specificities in the composition of the board, showing that executive members still prevail over non-executives. Gender issues are considered also in Portugal, with limited representation of women in the boardroom. International best practices that have long debated over these issues may represent a model for catching up countries (Chidiac El Hajj, 2018; John & Senbet, 1998).

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