
FORENSIC ACCOUNTING: A STRATEGIC TOOL TO STRENGTHEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AGAINST FRAUD

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Abstract

Various economic scandals involving fraud of all kinds hurt both developed and developing economies due to their negative economic impact (Bhasin, 2013). Companies in public and private sectors operate in an environment that is not free of fraud. Until 2010, the most pressing issues in the corporate world were the theft of physical assets, misuse of data due to untrue accounting reports and financial misreporting (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2014). Today corporate fraud became more sophisticated and the biggest threat is fraudulent activities connected to technology and the internet. The technological evolution changes rapidly the nature of the modern economy and its digital transformation created great vulnerability to the economic environment (Ernst & Young [E&Y], 2018). All companies face a certain level of digital fraud which has become an essential cost of doing business (Deloitte, 2021c). According to PwC's Global Fraud Survey (PwC, 2022), cybercrime, customer fraud and asset misappropriation are the most prevalent types of fraud. As result companies began paying more attention to the effectiveness of their internal control system and corporate risk management. The need to

avoid creating opportunities for fraudsters compels them to implement risk elimination and fraud detection measures.

Corporate leaders prioritize the establishment of preventive measures and contingency plans in order to protect the company from fraudulent activities, preserve its integrity, safeguard the company's assets and ensure the efficient operation of the business. They start taking compliance with anti-corruption legislation more seriously and alter their antifraud policies in response to it. The increased concerns about the control environment effectiveness and anti-fraud policies in order to eliminate and mitigate fraud affect the quality of corporate governance. Good corporate governance yields increased investment, improved capital market access, increased asset value, job creation, economic growth and sustainable development (Inairat, 2015).

The lack of honesty, accountability and transparency in governance is one of the primary reasons for the emergence of criminal activities (Farber, 2005). Fraudulent behavior damages business financially influences negatively the decision-making process of investors and governance bodies and undermines public trust in them. The major component of dependable corporate governance to combat fraud is the implementation of an effective internal control system that includes external audit activities, internal audit function, fraud risk assessment and forensic accounting (FA) services (Rehman & Hashim, 2018). Efficient audit activities ensure the consistency of the financial reporting process, guarantee its credibility and enable companies to achieve their profitability objectives (Bhasin, 2017).

Governance bodies' commitment to control mechanisms determines the level of corporate fraud and their willingness to fight it (Eko et al., 2020). In order for a business organization to remain competitive and survive, its structure must be based on all its members' ethical and moral conduct and ensure ethical standards through its oversight activities (He et al., 2009). The structure of governance bodies affects the company's effectiveness and financial integrity concerning fraud. According to numerous studies, the occurrence of fraudulent activities is significantly related to ownership structure, board of director's and audit committee's composition and characteristics and the role of chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) (Beasley, 1996; Farber, 2005; Smaili & Labell, 2007; Sharma, 2004; Chen et al., 2006; Klein, 2002; Vafeas, 2000; Persons, 2009; Owens-Jackson et al., 2009; Mustafa & Meir, 2006; Alwi et al., 2013).

FA is the best audit option for controlling, eliminating and mitigating fraud (Rehman & Hashim, 2020). It has a proactive role in identifying deficiencies and internal control weaknesses and can successfully adopt and implement a corruption prevention plan (Siregar & Tenoyo, 2015). The use of FA techniques to analyze accounting and financial data improves the quality of the financial reporting system and strengthens audit independence (Eyisi et al., 2014). It guarantees the

reliability of economic data by identifying patterns and suspicious transactions, detecting and minimizing accounting frauds and eliminating their existence. It is responsible to oversee and conduct investigations in the business environment in order to improve governance procedures' qualities concerning fraud. Corporate leaders rely on FA to develop a consistent corporate governance system because it ensures that their policies and objectives are intertwined with the internal control system. FA is a strategic tool to strengthen corporate governance against fraud.

The aim of the present study is to highlight the framework of FA implementation to combat fraud risks and crimes and improve corporate governance's effectiveness in fraud defense. It examines the techniques, knowledge and skills and the interaction of FA and corporate governance in eliminating fraudulent activities. FA guarantees the reliability of financial reports, enhances their accountability and thus has a significant positive impact on corporate governance accountability.

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