

ANALYSIS OF THE BUDGET FORMULATION PROCESS THROUGH THE MULTIPLE STREAMS APPROACH

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Abstract

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This study aims to explain the causes of congestion and the network of budget policy actors (Harden & Kirkland, 2021; Kirkland & Phillips, 2018) in Riau Province in 2014 and 2016 using the multiple streams approach from Kingdon (1984). This article illustrates the results of a qualitative descriptive analysis review by analyzing primary and secondary data from the results of documentation and interviews with informants who are directly involved in the budget preparation process in Riau Province, which includes explanations regarding the factors that cause gridlock in budgetary policies and the network of actors that influence the budget policy process. The results of this study indicate that various factors causing budgetary policy gridlock in Riau Province can be seen from three multiple streams approach, namely problem stream, policy stream and politic stream, which still have dynamics in the process. Then, the network of actors who can influence the budget policy process in Riau Province can be seen from the existence of a policy gridlock in the process of preparing the budget in Riau Province which occurs due to cross-policy interests, each of which seeks to accommodate the interests of two government actors, namely the governor (executive) and the council local people's representatives (legislature). Each actor has a role and a way to propose and combine their interests. However, even though the actor's preference can be accommodated in budget policy, in essence, this does not represent as a whole that the budget policy implementation process in Riau Province has been carried out optimally. Our findings provide benefits for each stakeholder in improving the budget policy formulation process through the multiple-stream method. This study encourages the growing awareness of stakeholders that budgeting policies require systematic improvement in implementation aspects in an area.

Keywords: Budget Formulation, Budget Policy, Multiple Stream

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1. INTRODUCTION

In understanding the dynamics of public policy, the budget policy formation process is a process with fascinating dynamics about the relationship between actors involved in policy creation (Koenig & Troeger, 2005). The budget policy process is the determination of resource allocation through interactions between political actors or political processes with various priorities. As the most significant aspect of policymaking, budget actors will negotiate to establish agreements and solutions to public concerns (Chen & Lu, 2020). Due to preference rivalry and political competition, however, there will inevitably be conflicts in budget formulation (Andersen et al., 2020). The conflict will affect the impasse in political bargaining, which will have repercussions for the occurrence of a fiscal policy impasse. This study related to budget policy gridlock is crucial to explore because of the link between fiscal policy and government operations, including public services. Therefore, if congestion occurs, many public services will stop (Leachman et al., 2015; Thom & Randazzo, 2015; Vidyattama et al., 2022; Yang, 2020) and have an impact on high political costs including high costs of resources used (Andersen et al., 2020; Kirkland & Phillips, 2018; Klarner et al., 2012).

Several studies that have been conducted previously still reveal differences of opinion regarding the causes of policy gridlock from ideological differences, political views, and party polarization between branches of government with a bicameral government system. Previous research has not been able to answer the problem of the occurrence of policy gridlock from the process of policy formulation and the dynamics that occur in this process. Differences in the government system from previous studies to the multiparty presidential system that exists in Indonesia will lead to different findings on the phenomenon of budget policy formulation. Furthermore, studies that have been conducted in Indonesia using several approaches have not been able to reveal the problem of relations between actors and the dynamics of the policy formulation process. Therefore, this research will fill the gap in knowledge and publication about gridlock that occurs in setting budgetary policies. Unlike previous studies, this study will analyze the budget policy formulation process using the multiple streams approach described by Kingdon (1984, as cited in Khayesi & Amekudzi, 2011; Koebele, 2021; Shephard et al., 2020). This approach was used because the multiple streams model can better understand the network and the dynamics of setting the policy agenda so that it can reveal who is involved in the process, the phenomena that occur, and how they can shape the debate on certain issues (Blomkamp et al., 2017).

In the process, a multi-party presidential system like Indonesia will often experience policy gridlock because it is faced with a constitutionally strong executive, while on the other hand, the legislature tends to oppose the government. To create government stability, the next work is to build a multi-party coalition supporting the government (Farhan, 2018). However, coalition instability is still common (Chaisty et al., 2014). Then, governmental instability that leads to policy gridlock can be seen in the process of formulating and stipulating regional budget revenue (*Anggaran*

Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah — APBD) policies, where there are still many regions experiencing delays in the ratification of Regional Regulations on APBD. Based on this, this study will focus on analyzing the dynamics of the agenda-setting process and budget policy determination using the multiple streams method based on Kingdon's theory to examine the position of actors in their role as determinants of budget policy approval. Therefore, this study aims to explain the factors that cause budget policy gridlock and the network of actors that can influence the budget policy process in Riau Province.

Based on the background that has been explained, the research questions of this study are:

RQ1: What causes policy gridlock?

RQ2: Who are the actors who can influence the budget policy process in Riau Province?

To answer the research questions, the results of documentation and interviews with key informants who were directly involved in the budgeting process in Riau Province with adjustments to questions based on Kingdon's theory of agenda-setting budgetary policies will be systematically reviewed. Then added and strengthened with relevant secondary databases. To visualize the results of a study on the analysis of the budget formulation process using a multiple streams approach, this article illustrates the results of a budget policy study by conducting a qualitative analysis which includes the factors that cause gridlock in budgetary policy and the network of actors that can influence the budget policy process.

This is a review of qualitative data analysis that addresses the deeper context of aspects of regional budget policy formulation through a multiple streams approach that seeks to provide policy alternatives for the evolution of budget policy research in the future.

The selection of the study period in 2014 and 2016 was based on a case involving the local government (Riau Province) with delays in discussing and ratifying the regional income and expenditure budget. This case affects almost all regions because the interests of the executive and legislature do not meet, which has an impact on the stagnation of discussion and ratification of the regional revenue and expenditure budget. The consequences of this stagnation are far-reaching, such as programs that are slow to implement, delayed development, and a wider impact on people's welfare.

The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the conceptual background of the research by introducing the literature that underlies the description of budget policy formulation and the multiple streams approach in budget policy. Section 3 outlines the research methodology, and Section 4 presents the results and answers the research questions. Meanwhile, Section 5 will conclude the research findings, contributions, and relevance.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Budget policy formulation

In several pieces of literature and studies related to policy formulation, especially budgetary policies, gridlock is one of the outputs resulting from the failure of policy-making actors or institutions

(Suardi & Kurian, 2015; Speer, 2016; Yang, 2020). Speer (2016), in his dissertation, explained that the gridlock concept is the inability of the state to reach political decisions, namely making laws that are influenced by the state of the political institutions themselves as policy-making actors. On the other hand, Austen-Smith et al. (2019) stated that the concept of gridlock in policy formulation is the inability of policy-making actors to commit to completing policies. In terms of completing the policy, compromise is an important step that must be taken (Melusky, 2020; Osborne, 1998). According to Binder (1999), several conditions cause gridlock dynamics, namely partisanship, institutions, and policies. The partisan aspect relates to divided government and ideological polarization. On the institutional aspect, related to the bicameral system. Meanwhile, the influencing policy aspect is public opinion. Chiou and Rothenberg (2008) challenged Binder's (1999) opinion by criticizing the use of the method and arguing that Binder's (1999) results did not affect the occurrence of policy gridlock. Apart from Chiou and Rothenberg (2008), several other scientists also disagree with Binder (1999) regarding divided government as a cause of policy gridlock (Birkhead, 2016; Bowling & Ferguson, 2001; Farhan, 2018; Kousser, 2010), although, on the other hand, several studies agree with Binder's (1999) findings on divided governance (Cummins, 2012; Hicks, 2015; Howell et al., 2000; Kirkland & Phillips, 2018; Rogers, 2005).

The budget policy gridlock in previous studies is also related to relations between branches of government. In deciding budget policy, it is faced with different program objectives and preferences between the executive and the legislature (Kousser & Phillips, 2009), as well as the internal legislature or the internal branches of the government itself (Kirkland & Phillips, 2018; Kousser, 2010). Meanwhile, Farhan (2018) explains that making budgetary policy decisions is influenced by the need for the legislature to secure its patronage and the need for the executive to advance its budget agenda. As explained by several experts, the structure of power forms political conflict (Jones et al., 1997; Peterson, 1994), where conflict and failure of bargaining are the results of a problem of commitment that is not yet optimal from authority (Fearon, 2004; Powell, 2004; Schwarz & Sonin, 2007).

Then, studies on budget policy gridlock are also often carried out in the United States and its sub-nationals (Chen & Lu, 2020; Harden & Kirkland, 2021; Melusky, 2020; Speer, 2016). Apart from the United States, several studies related to delays in the Regional Revenue Expenditure Budget (APBD) have also been carried out in Indonesia (Silvia & Lutfi, 2022). According to Kirkland and Phillips (2018), a divided government is the cause of budget policy delays and is more likely to cause budget delays. Then, this is in line with the conventional wisdom that a divided government will not help improve governance (Harden & Kirkland, 2021). Thus, public policymakers must refine the design of budget policies before the implementation stage (Mousavian et al., 2020).

2.2. Multiple stream approach in budget policy

Fundamentally, Kingdon (1984) identifies and defines three multiple streams for understanding issues, policies, and politics. *First*, the problem stream is

related to why a condition occurs so that a policy response is needed (Ruvalcaba-Gomez et al., 2020). This concerns how policymakers, the public, or other institutions define what problems are seen and the limits of policy solutions (Koebele, 2021). *Second*, policy stream is related to the alternatives that are generated and selected. In this stream, all policy alternatives meet one another to form combinations or recombinations and present alternative solutions that will solve problems in the form of action. Ideas for policy solutions must first go through the discussion and discussion stages with the support of science and technology and must get public support because of the similarity of problems and solutions (Hadna, 2021). The role of the policy specialist group will then discuss options for available policy solutions (James et al., 2020). *Third*, political stream refers to the dynamics of relations between political institutions, internal government, and the public involved in the policy formulation process. Political stream as described by Kingdon (1984) consists of many factors, such as changes in government, changes in parliament, changes in administration, and campaigns of interest groups, including political parties (Hawkins & McCambridge, 2020; Koebele, 2021; Novotny et al., 2015).

In this stream, the consensus is reached by bargaining, where politicians have conflicting interests so that policy decisions are expected to be made (James et al., 2020). In the political stream, it is important to reach an agreement through coalitions that are formed through power concessions that are useful for the interests of stakeholders (Ruvalcaba-Gomez et al., 2020). These three independent streams are conceptualized together with other elements such as windows of opportunity, and policy entrepreneurs, who seize the moment to put a topic on the public agenda (Gallego et al., 2016; Ruvalcaba-Gomez et al., 2020). Various studies have used Kingdon's theoretical framework as an analytical approach that allows considering the dynamics of the policy process in observing a phenomenon. In this sense, the multiple streams approach can be used to analyze various elements in the agenda-setting process (Ackrill et al., 2013; Chow, 2014; Gallego et al., 2016; Howlett, 2019; Zhou & Feng, 2014). Other studies have used this approach in the local government sector (Copus, 2006; Hadna, 2021; Khayesi & Amekudzi, 2011; Lieberman, 2002). According to Ruvalcaba-Gomez et al. (2020), this model is fully compatible with local dynamics or very useful for analyzing policies at the local level. Therefore, the dynamics of the elements mentioned above will be used to explain how the budget policy process works.

Multiple streams (MS) are theorized at a systemic level that combines the entire system or individual decisions as the unit of analysis. It sees decisions as collective outcomes shaped by the push and pull of multiple influences, much like systems theory. Unlike other lenses that rely on reason or persuasion, MS uses the logic of political manipulation (Zahariadis, 2019). As the cyclical model sometimes suggests, policy development in the process does not happen automatically or spontaneously in response to social problems but rather comes about as a result of the interaction and intersection of the three problem-causing streams. Certain individuals who can set their agenda and future activities are appointed by the government and not by others (Howlett, 2019). Therefore, policy

analysis can give researchers effective tools to comprehend the application of research evidence in policymaking and result in a greater comprehension of the principles, motivations, and political environment that underlie policy decisions (Browne et al., 2019).

3. METHODOLOGY

This study uses a qualitative research methodology, therefore, this study does not calculate statistical data as a quantitative study and does not use statistical data tools in data analysis. According to Monique et al. (2020), qualitative research is a method for exploring and understanding the meaning of social problems. Then, the data sources in this study consist of primary data and secondary data (Mohajan, 2018). The primary data in question is the result of interviews with informants who are directly involved in the budget formulation process in Riau Province with adjustments to questions based on Kingdon's theory of setting the policy agenda. While secondary data includes documents from the government, regulations, media articles, and national and international article publications. Data collection techniques in this study were carried out through documentation techniques and interview techniques with relevant sources and informants. To analyze the collected data, the authors use a qualitative descriptive analysis which includes a description of the reality that has occurred, the constraints faced, and the strategic opportunities that can be found by each stakeholder which can then be concluded inductively (Busetto et al., 2020; John & Creswell, 2016; Monique et al., 2020). Therefore, this study will explain the budget formulation process in Riau Province through a multiple streams approach.

To analyze the first and second research questions regarding the factors that cause gridlock in budgetary policy and the network of actors that influence the budget policy process, the authors present interview data from key actors to provide evidence about the factors that cause gridlock in budgetary policy and the network of actors that


influence the budget policy process in the Riau Province. Then, after knowing the crucial questions from the focus of this research, the authors explain the findings that each actor has a role and a way to propose and combine their interests, so that in the end the actor's preferences can be accommodated in budget policy, but does not represent comprehensively that the implementation process has been carried out optimally.

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The study of gridlock policy has long been studied by observing inefficiencies in government. According to Binder (1999), there are several causes for the occurrence of a policy gridlock which include the existence of a divided government, ideological polarization, and a bicameral system. Then, the multi-party presidential system adopted by Indonesia and its sub-governments has had an impact on the government (executive) which is not supported by the legislature (Farhan, 2018). This condition was later experienced by Riau Province, where during the leadership period of Governor Rusli Zainal-Mambang Mit (2009-2013) only supported 41.8% of the Regional People's Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah* — DPRD) seats, Anas Maamun-Arsyadjuliandi Rahman (2014-2018) supported 21.5% of DPRD seats, and Syamsuar-Edi Natar (2019-2023) supported by 24.65% of the seats in the DPRD (General Election Commission (KPU) of Riau Province, 2023). Empirical facts that occurred in the formulation of policies, especially the regional expenditure budget (APBD) policy from 2014 to 2020, were still experiencing two delays in determining the APBD in Riau Province (Table 1).

According to data from the Directorate General of Fiscal Balance of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia, the average delay in ratifying regional regulations on regional budgets from 2014 to 2020 is 15.7%. In 2020, 38 local governments are still late in setting their APBD, as shown in Figure 1:

Figure 1. Delays in determining budgets per region in Indonesia for 2014-2020



Source: Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia, 2021.

Figure 1 illustrates that there are delays in determining the APBD and it moves dynamically from year to year. The delay in establishing the APBD in the process was caused by a gridlock during the policy formulation process between the executive and legislature. Then, one of the regions in Indonesia that are still experiencing delays in

determining the APBD is Riau Province. Based on data from the Regional Development Planning Agency (*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah — Bappeda*) of Riau Province, it is known that the determination of the 2014 and 2016 APBD has experienced delays in its stipulation as shown in Table 1:

Table 1. Schedule for the stages of the process of formulating and determining the regional budget of Riau Province for 2014–2020

No.	Stages	Schedule according to regulation	Executed schedule					Schedule according to regulation	Executed schedule	
			2014	2015	2016	2017	2018		2019	2020
1	Determination of Local Government Work Plans (RKPD)	Late of May	20-05-2013	20-05-2014	29-05-2015	20-05-2016	26-05-2017	Late of June	28-06-2018	05-07-2019
2	Submission of APBD General Policy (KUA) and Provisional Budget Ceiling Priority (PPAS) to the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD)	Week 2 (June)	15-11-2013	02-08-2014	15-06-2015	15-06-2016	12-06-2017	Week 2 (July)	13-07-2018	11-07-2019
3	APBD General Policy Agreement (KUA) and Temporary Budget Ceiling Priorities (PPAS)	Late of July	19-12-2013	02-08-2014	02-12-2015	23-11-2016	18-06-2017	Week 1 (August)	21-11-2018	There is no any
4	Submission of Draft Regional Regulations (RANPERDA) to the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD)	Late of Sept.	20-12-2013	03-08-2014	07-12-2015	25-11-2016	29-11-2017	Late of Sept	19-11-2018	06-09-2019
5	Joint Approval of Draft Regional Regulations (RANPERDA)	Late of Nov.	09-01-2014	04-08-2014	16-12-2015	05-12-2016	29-11-2017	Late of Nov.	28-11-2018	27-11-2019
6	Determination of Regional Regulations	Late of Dec.	27-01-2014	23-12-2014	12-01-2016	28-12-2016	22-12-2017	Late of Dec.	26-12-2018	27-12-2019

Note: ■ Late execution.

Source: Regional Development Planning Agency Riau Province, 2021.

Table 1 shows that in the 2014–2020 range, the determination of the APBD in Riau Province experienced delays in 2014 and 2016. In the 2014 local budget (APBD), there was a delay in the stage of submitting the Temporary Budget Priority Ceiling Public Policy (KUA PPAS) to the DPRD. Furthermore, in the 2016 APBD, there was a delay in the APBD General Policy Approval (KUA) and Temporary Budget Ceiling Priority (PPAS) stages. In the process, the cause of the stalemate on budget setting policy in Riau Province was caused by court cases in budget policy in Riau Province, as well as the empirical fact that the Governor who served in Riau Province was never supported by a majority of seats (legislature) in the DPRD.

Based on this, this study will focus on analyzing the dynamics of the agenda-setting process and APBD determination using the multiple streams methods by Kingdon (1984) to examine the position of actors in their role as determinants of budget policy approval in Riau Province in 2014 and 2016. Thus, this study aims to explain factors that cause budget policy gridlock and actor networks that can affect the budget policy process in Riau Province. The various factors that cause budget gridlock and the network of actors that influence the budget policy process in Riau Province in 2014 and 2016 will be further described systematically because during this period various gridlock dynamics of regional expenditure budget (APBD) policies in Riau Province were dominant, such as congestion in KUA PPAS to the DPRD and delays in the APBD KUA and PPAS approval stages caused by a court case in budget policy in Riau Province as well as the existence of empirical facts related to the Governor who served in Riau Province was never supported by a majority of seats (legislative) in the DPRD.

4.1. Factors causing gridlock of budget policy in Riau Province

Various factors causing the gridlock of budgetary policies in Riau Province can be seen from three multiple-stream approaches, namely problem stream, policy stream and politic stream. *First*, in the problem stream process, APBD policy is a long chain process consisting of the formulation of planning and budgeting policies. At the planning stage, local government work plan documents (RKPD) are prepared. Preparing the initial draft of the RKPD includes an analysis of the regional economic framework, development issues, performance evaluation, review of medium-term planning targets (National Mid-Term Development Plan, *Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah — RPJMD*), main points of view of the DPRD, and analysis of the national government policies. This is by Article 107 paragraph 1 of the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation (*Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri — PMDN*) Number 54 of 2010 concerning Implementing Government Regulation Number 8 of 2008 concerning Stages, Procedures for Preparation, Control, and Evaluation of the Implementation of Regional Development Plans.

In the technocratic analysis compiled in the initial draft of the RKPD, it is a problem that must be found in a policy solution. The problem stream in preparing the APBD policy is then described in the planning policy. The RKPD document will then become the basis for compiling the activity program in the APBD document. Thus, the budget list that has been prepared in the APBD should be a solution to solving regional development problems. The technocratic review of the initial draft of the RKPD is based on evaluation and projection results. In preparing this technocratic analysis, it

was carried out by Bappeda as the person in charge of preparing the RKPD. This was stated by the former head of the Regional Government Budget Team (*Tim Anggaran Pemerintah Daerah — TAPD*) and Head of the Bappeda of Riau Province:

“The technocratic study was formulated and reviewed by sections in Bappeda” (Former Chairman of the Riau Provincial Government Budget Team).

“The initial draft of the RKPD started from the previous year’s evaluation process. Bappeda evaluates outstanding performance, development policies, and RPJMD achievements” (Former Head of Bappeda Riau Province).

In addition to this analysis, the main thoughts of the DPRD can also be included in the initial draft of the RKPD. According to Appendix V PMDN No. 54 of 2010, the main thoughts of the DPRD are the aspirations of the constituents based on the results of the recess or working visits of the DPRD to the constituents. Proposals for the main thoughts of the DPRD on the Riau Province RKPD in 2014 and 2016 have been submitted to the DPRD. As stated by the following former Head of Bappeda:

“In parallel with the initial draft of the RKPD, Bappeda asked for the main ideas resulting from the DPRD recess” (Former Head of Bappeda Riau Province).

In the process, the request was followed up by proposing the main thoughts of the DPRD. The proposals for these main ideas were then included in the discussion in the various stages of preparing the RKPD. The former Chairman of TAPD explained that in the discussion process, it turned out that DPRD had not used it optimally. As stated below:

“In the Regional Government Work Plan (RKPD), in essence, the DPRD does not have the same authority. In this case, the DPRD only has to propose, but in the existing discussion forums, we feel that the DPRD has not made optimal use of this momentum to propose its main ideas” (Former Chairman of the Riau Provincial Government Budget Team).

There are dynamics in proposing and discussing the main thoughts of the DPRD in the RKPD, caused by the absence of technical discussion of the main thoughts of the DPRD. The main ideas which are the issues and problems that exist in the DPRD constituents have not yet been accommodated in the RKPD document. The mechanism implemented is only in the proposal stage. No follow-up joint discussions were carried out to accommodate the main points of view of the DPRD. The next technocratic analysis is a review of the policies of the central government. The need for this policy analysis is so that there is the synchronization of overall problem-solving from the central level to the regions. This was disclosed by the following informants:

“The Main Thoughts (constituent proposals) from the DPRD have not yet been included in the RKPD, because previously we only proposed them. Then, in the previous process, we were only involved during the implementation of public consultations and planning meetings. But before that process, everything was centered on the executive. When talking about effectiveness during the implementation of the public consultation, not all DPRD members were invited. Implementation of 2 days, formally

cannot represent the discussion of all budget planning in Riau Province” (Former member of DPRD Riau Province).

“Essentially, the draft RKPD contains directives from the central government so that there is the synchronization of overall problem solving from the central level to the regions” (Former Head of Bappeda Riau Province).

Substantively, at the level of problem stream in the APBD policy formulation process in Riau Province, it has been stated in the RKPD document. This RKPD document will then become a guide in preparing budget policies, namely the KUA PPAS, and then become a Regional Regulation concerning the APBD. However, the main points of thought in the problem stream in the Riau Province RKPD document have not been accommodated, leading to the dynamics of relations between actors making budgetary policy decisions.

Second, in the policy stream process, the process of preparing the RKPD through the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 54 of 2010 was carried out through stages including the preparation of the initial draft of the RKPD, Public Consultation Forum, Draft RKPD, Deliberation on Development Planning, Final Draft of RKPD and Determination of RKPD. After the stages of the problem stream have been prepared go through stages and long discussions by various actors and stakeholders until the RKPD is determined. Discussion of development planning involves many parties such as the Bappeda as the leading sector, Agencies and Services as executors of activities, as well as the general public such as community representatives, non-governmental organizations, universities, and the private sector. Many actors in the discussions on development planning in Riau Province in 2014 and 2016 did not understand the existing substance as the basis for compiling the activity program in the RKPD. Then, the proposed program of activities that should be a solution to solving regional development problems will be decided by actors who have a direct role or have a direct interest in the implementation of APBD policies. In addition, even though it goes through a long process, the Governor can order Bappeda to make changes to the proposed program of activities, including accommodating the needs of the Governor. This was explained by the following former Secretary and Member of Bappeda:

“Many actors express their opinions but do not use technocratic analysis and tend not to understand the substance of budget policies” (Former Secretary of Bappeda Riau Province).

“Even though it went through a long process, the final result of the discussion was finalized by Bappeda to the Governor. The Governor can order Bappeda to make changes to the proposal so that it can accommodate the Governor’s needs” (Former Member of Bappeda Riau Province).

Furthermore, at the budgeting policy stage, namely the discussion of the KUA and PPAS which have entered the political realm between the legislature (DPRD Budget Agency) and the executive (APBD Team). This is by Article 129 paragraph 3 Permendagri No. 54 of 2010. However, when the KUA PPAS discussion was carried out, the process did not pay attention to the issues and problem stream in the RKPD but instead fought for problems and

issues based on the results of the DPRD recess which had not been accommodated in the RKPD. As expressed by a former official of the Regional Financial and Asset Management Agency (*Badan Pengelolaan Keuangan dan Aset Daerah* — BPKAD) and Member of the DPRD as follows:

"In substance, the Legislative Budget Agency (DPRD) in its discussion only thinks about the constituent proposals from their interests" (Former Official of the BPKAD, Riau Province).

"In the General Budget Policy (KUA) and the Temporary Budget Ceiling Priorities (PPAS) at that time, we only included constituent proposals that had become our promises in the public sector" (Former Member of DPRD Riau Province).

Based on this, it can be seen that in the policy stream, the problem stream resulting from the technocratic analysis of the previous RKPD draft has not been used as the basis for RKPD discussion. Nonetheless, the Bappeda of Riau Province, including the Governor of Riau, has the authority to determine the program of activities included in the RKPD according to their interests. The same thing happened when discussing KUA PPAS, the technocratic analysis of the RKPD was not fully used as the basis for discussing alternative policies. Several program activities were changed according to the needs of the DPRD which were obtained from problems in their respective constituencies. The policy stream in the APBD preparation process in Riau Province has two different policy alternatives. First, alternative policies listed in the RKPD are offered by the Governor. Second, namely, alternative policies proposed by the DPRD at the KUA PPAS discussion stage. Based on this, the process of changing the RKPD to KUA PPAS requires discussion or negotiation between the two actors making APBD policy decisions so that the alternative policies offered by each actor can be agreed upon.

Third, in the process of politic stream, the long process of formulating APBD policies has involved several important actors at each stage. At the planning stage, the discussion mechanism involves Bappeda as the person in charge of preparing the RKPD, the Agency as executor of the budget, and the Governor as the actor who stipulates Governor Regulations regarding the RKPD. In addition, the involvement of other parties outside the government, such as community leaders, non-governmental organizations, universities, and DPRD as actors who provide input into the discussion of the RKPD. The inclusion of these actors is carried out at the stages of public consultation forums and development planning meetings by Appendix V of PMDN No. 54 of 2010. In the process of compiling the RKPD document starting from the initial design stage and final design, Bappeda and the related agencies are the main actors who determine each stage. Furthermore, about the role of actors outside the government, they have played a role in discussions at the stages of public consultation and deliberations on development planning. This was explained by the former Secretary of Bappeda as follows:

"The actor who plays the role is Bappeda. Then the Regional Government Work Unit (SKPD) after the public consultation forum, returned to discussing, selecting, and coordinating proposals that had been

submitted by the public. In the process, the uploaded actors include district/city actors, community leaders, the press, private companies, and also banks. Thus, all components representing the community are present at the public consultation forum" (Former Secretary of Bappeda Riau Province).

Even so, this condition was criticized by the DPRD. The DPRD considers that the discussion is merely providing input and suggestions. The outcome of the RKPD remains the authority of the Riau Provincial Government because there is no means to evaluate proposals and input by actors outside the executive. The DPRD as an actor making APBD policy decisions in its role in preparing the RKPD is said to have not been maximized. The DPRD is involved in discussing public consultations and deliberations on development planning which involve many actors. However, there was no discussion between the Provincial Government of Riau and DPRD to follow up on all suggestions and input from the discussion. This was explained by members of the DPRD as follows:

"In the development planning meetings, we did not see any substance in the discussion. In essence, the finalization of budget policies is in the governor's regulation regarding the Regional Government Work Plan (RKPD), but the relevance of discussion of development planning meetings on the regional government work plan is not known with certainty" (Former Member of DPRD Riau Province).

Furthermore, in contrast to the DPRD, the Governor as the chief executive has a very large role in preparing the regional government work plan (RKPD). Governors can provide suggestions and input, including at the final draft stage of the RKPD before being determined according to their interests. After the RKPD has been established, the next stage is discussing budget policy, namely the KUA PPAS. The Provincial Government of Riau through the Budget Team led by the Regional Secretary submitted the KUA PPAS draft to the DPRD for joint discussion. At this stage, the DPRD through the DPRD budget committee or body has the authority to discuss in detail the budget policies that have been prepared by the Regional Government as explained by the former Secretary of Bappeda as follows:

"In the final design, only Bappeda and regional heads have a dominant role. Bappeda met with the Governor. So after the governor's input, then submit again to be determined as RKPD. However, after the KUA PPAS is in the DPRD, the DPRD chairman will form a budget committee. summoned the Regional Government Budget Team to discuss together" (Former Secretary of Bappeda Riau Province).

The complexity phenomenon that occurs in the KUA PPAS discussion can be seen from the budget agency which will again propose policy alternatives to the problems that exist in the constituents of each member of the DPRD. This was stated by the following former BPKAD official:

"Conditions that have occurred so far tend to be very complicated and chaotic in the process of deliberating KUA PPAS. This is because the legislative body forces them to enter certain activities" (Former Official of the BPKAD Riau Province).

Based on this, it can be seen that the long process and the involvement of many actors in the formulation of regional expenditure budget

(APBD) policies in Riau Province have led to various dynamics at the discussion stage. Each actor has a role and a way to propose and incorporate their interests. So, in the end, what is the actor's preference can be accommodated in the APBD policy, but does not represent comprehensively that the implementation process has been carried out optimally.

4.2. Network of actors influencing the budget policy process in Riau Province

In the process, the three stages of multiple streams in budget policy which consist of problem stream, policy stream and politic stream have given rise to a policy window. In this window, the three streams raised must be immediately resolved into a budget policy condition (Ruvalcaba-Gomez et al., 2020). However, the three existing stream stages still have dynamics in their implementation. *First*, in the problem stream, the problems faced by DPRD constituents have not been accommodated in the planning and budgeting documents. *Second*, in terms of policy stream, the Provincial Government of Riau and DPRD have different policy alternatives for solutions to policy problems depending on their respective preferences. *Third*, in politic stream, each actor has authority at different stages. When the policy window opens because of the three streams, policy actors must take advantage of opportunities so that policy changes can occur (Hawkins & McCambridge, 2020).

The policy window provides space for consolidation and bargaining so that it is possible to make changes to the policy. The process of consolidation and bargaining has become a separate dynamic in the process of formulating APBD policies in Riau Province. Differences occurred in the process of formulating budget policies in 2014 and 2016. At the 2014 stage, before the submission of the KUA PPAS, interests were accommodated first, such as the needs of the DPRD and the needs of the executive which had not been accommodated. However, during the 2014 KUA PPAS discussion, legal problems have befallen several DPRD members, as well as the Governor of Riau. This factor caused delays in the submission of the KUA PPAS to the DPRD, so it could only be submitted on 15 November 2013. Nonetheless, the agreements in the KUA and PPAS, as well as the accommodation of the main points of view of the DPRD, can be carried out with the permission of the Governor's official. This was because the previous Governor had ended his term of office and was also entangled in legal problems. Even though the KUA PPAS agreement was carried out in December, some steps must be carried out afterward, such as preparing a budget work plan (*Rencana Kerja dan Anggaran — RKA*), submission of draft regional regulations on APBD, approval of APBD at the Ministry of Home Affairs. Determination of the new APBD can be done in January 2014 (Table 1) late from the schedule which should be no later than 31 December 2013.

Differences occurred in the process of formulating APBD policies in 2016. If the main ideas of the DPRD in 2014 had been accommodated before the KUA PPAS was submitted to the DPRD, but for 2016 the main ideas have not been accommodated

in the KUA PPAS. According to the former chairman of the TAPD, the DPRD chiefs were not accommodated because of the Deputy Governor of Riau's caution because the aftermath of the case between the Governor of Riau and members of the DPRD regarding the ratification of the 2015 APBD occurred a year earlier. This raises concerns about accommodating interests outside of the priority policies already in the RKPD. The failure to accommodate the DPRD proposal has resulted in a protracted discussion of the KUA PPAS in the DPRD. This condition led to negotiations to speed up the discussion, bearing in mind that the KUA PPAS agreement was already late from the time set by the regulations (Table 1). The Chairperson of the TAPD then asked for input from the Governor and it was agreed to provide the main DPRD through financial assistance to the Regency/City. As explained by the former Chairman of TAPD:

"Every suggestion comes to us. Discussion postponed. For various reasons. Finally, I offered Mr. Governor. Finally, we also open our minds for financial assistance to their constituency areas" (Former Chairman of the TAPD for Riau Province).

In Table 1, it can be seen that the KUA and PPAS in the Province Riau agreement were finally implemented on December 2, 2015. This resulted in a delay in the subsequent process so that the 2016 APBD policymaking process could only be carried out on January 12, 2016. The dynamics of the three streams have an impact on the conditions for formulating APBD policies which creates friction between actors. Main idea accommodation or proposals from DPRD constituents are a requirement for smooth deliberations on APBD policies. With the enactment of the APBD policy, the administration of government can be carried out specifically the interests of the Governor can also be fulfilled. In the end, to ensure that this runs without any problems, the Governor acts as a policy entrepreneur and guarantees that the three streams can unite and be in harmony.

The findings that have been put forward in this study explain that the gridlock that occurs in the APBD policy is due to the non-accommodation of the interests of the DPRD in the APBD of Riau Province. So, it can be concluded that the gridlock of the APBD policy in Riau Province did not occur due to government fragmentation, but due to the accommodation of the interests of the policy-making actors. The approach using multiple streams also opens up the phenomenon that there is an initial cause for the occurrence of the APBD policy gridlock. *First*, there has not been any discussion of constituent issues resulting from the DPRD recess in the preparation of the RKPD. *Second*, the demand for policy proposals by the DPRD during the KUA PPAS discussion. *Third*, the difference in authority between policy-making actors. DPRD's role is limited to discussing planning documents, and vice versa DPRD has a big role in determining the progress of KUA PPAS deliberations. *Fourth*, the Governor acts as a policy entrepreneur so he has a role in accelerating APBD policy decision-making. These factors have not been disclosed in depth in previous studies regarding the delay in determining the APBD (Vidyattama et al., 2022; Wijayanti & Latifa, 2020).

The results of this study found empirical facts that the APBD policy in Riau Province was strongly

influenced by the accommodation of the interests of each of the two branches of government, namely the executive and the legislature. This finding corroborates the results of the research by Farhan (2018), which explains that the executive has accommodated his interests at the start of planning policy formulation. So, it has a big interest in launching the discussion agenda to the determination of the APBD. Furthermore, the legislature with its interests accommodates the demands of constituents to maintain electability when general elections are held again. In addition, this finding is in line with the findings of Barber et al. (2019), which explain that the possibility of the executive party acting unilaterally in a policy depends on the ability of the legislature to succeed or not to oppose it. When polarization is high and the majority is marginal, the executive is more free to act unilaterally given the difficulties the legislature has in responding to a law. Thus, public policymakers (executive and legislative) must refine the design of budget policies before the implementation stage (Mousavian et al., 2020).

5. CONCLUSION

This study concludes that various factors causing budgetary policy gridlock in Riau Province can be seen from three multiple-stream approaches, namely problem stream, policy stream and politic stream. *First*, in the problem stream, the non-accommodation of constituent issues through the main thoughts of the DPRD regarding planning policies has an impact on the dynamics of discussing the KUA and the PPAS, which are the authority of the DPRD. *Second*, in the policy stream, there are two alternative policy proposals, namely the RKPD submitted by the local government and the KUA PPAS discussion submitted by the DPRD, which still require discussion or

negotiation between the two APBDs so that they can be agreed upon collectively. *Third*, in the politic stream, the long process and the involvement of many actors in the formulation of APBD in Riau Province gave rise to various dynamics at the discussion stage. Each actor has a role and a way to propose and combine their interests. So, in the end, the actor's preference can be accommodated in the APBD policy, but it does not represent comprehensively that the implementation process has been carried out optimally.

Then, the network of actors who can influence the budget policy process in Riau Province can be seen from the gridlock in the APBD policy in Riau Province which occurred due to accommodation of the interests of policy-making actors, where there has been no discussion of constituent issues due to the DPRD recess in preparing the RKPD, there has been no request for policy proposals by the DPRD during the KUA PPAS discussion, as well as the empirical fact that the APBD policy in Riau Province is very heavy because it is influenced by the accommodation of the interests of each of the two branches of government, namely the executive (Governor) and the legislature (DPRD).

The limitations of this study are related to the unavailability of some of the primary and secondary data needed in this study. However, this analysis provides benefits for each stakeholder to improve the process of formulating budget policies through the multiple stream method. This study encourages the growing awareness of stakeholders that budgetary policies require systematic improvement in aspects of implementation in a region. Therefore, we recommend that further research be carried out in the public budget policy sector to make a better transition in the implementation of public policy concepts and public financial management in Indonesia.

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