

PUBLIC POLICY AND INTERNAL SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES: A SITUATIONAL STUDY OF SOME ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

Chris Iwejuo Nwagboso ^{*}, Chukwudi Charles Ezikeudu ^{**},
Nnenna Salome Nwagboso ^{*}, Uno Ijim Agbor ^{*},
Joseph Chidi Ebegbulem ^{*}, Chimaobi Okorie ^{*}, John Anyabe Adams ^{*},
Augustine Ugar Akah ^{*}, Ugo Samuel Basseyy ^{*}, Ndifon Neji Obi ^{*},
Stella-Odey Ekpo ^{***}, Okwu Augustina Onyema ^{*},
Veronica Joseph Egba ^{****}

^{*} University of Calabar, Calabar, Cross River State, Nigeria

^{**} Corresponding author, University of Calabar, Calabar, Cross River State, Nigeria

Contact details: Department of Sociology, University of Calabar, PMB 1115, Etabor, Calabar, Cross River State, Nigeria

^{***} Ministry of Local Government Affairs, Calabar, Cross River State, Nigeria

^{****} Ignatius Ajuru University of Education, Port Harcourt, Nigeria



Abstract

How to cite this paper: Nwagboso, C. I., Ezikeudu, C. C., Nwagboso, N. S., Agbor, U. I., Ebegbulem, J. C., Okorie, C., Adams, J. A., Akah, A. U., Basseyy, U. S., Obi, N. N., Ekpo, S.-O., Onyema, O. A., & Egba, V. J. (2024). Public policy and internal security sector governance challenges: A situational study of some economic development indicators [Special issue]. *Journal of Governance & Regulation*, 13(2), 317–326. <https://doi.org/10.22495/jgrv13i2siart8>

Copyright © 2024 The Authors

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0). <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>

ISSN Print: 2220-9352
ISSN Online: 2306-6784

Received: 17.07.2023
Accepted: 30.05.2024

JEL Classification: O1, O2, O4, I4, Z00
DOI: 10.22495/jgrv13i2siart8

Lately, public policy as a major political instrument has failed terribly in ensuring desirable internal security sector administration in Nigeria. This paper investigates the Nigerian public policy and internal security governance challenges using poverty, unemployment, gross domestic product (GDP), and foreign direct investment (FDI) as the baseline. The incident of poverty in Nigeria in 2020 reveals that the six geopolitical zones in Nigeria experience a severe rate of poverty, owing largely to an unprecedented rate of internal security problems (Olurounbi, 2021). The paper explores secondary research methods, secondary sources of data, and secondary data analysis (SDA) techniques. The paper reveals that Nigeria's crucial economic metrics, such as poverty, unemployment, GDP, and FDI, have been significantly aggravated by the country's poor internal security situation. As a result, residents are now experiencing significant economic hardship, negatively impacting Nigeria's current internal security governance situation. The paper concludes that Nigeria's internal security sector governance, particularly in the last ten years of democratic administration, has failed reasonably to meet Nigerians' expectations. Following the findings, the paper advocates, among others, for a genuine electoral process capable of bringing in skilled people to public policy decision-making and program execution in Nigeria.

Keywords: Public Policy, Internal Security Sector, Governance, Economic Development

Authors' individual contribution: Conceptualization — C.I.N., C.C.E., J.A.A., and V.J.E.; Methodology — N.S.N., C.O., and A.U.A.; Investigation — J.C.E., A.U.A., and V.J.E.; Resources — U.I.A., U.S.B., and S.-O.E.; Writing — Original Draft — C.I.N., C.C.E., and U.I.A.; Writing — Review & Editing — C.I.N., C.C.E., C.O., and J.A.A.; Visualization — N.S.N., N.N.O., and O.A.O.; Supervision — J.C.E., U.S.B., S.O.E., and O.A.O.

Declaration of conflicting interests: The Authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

1. INTRODUCTION

In both developed and developing nations, public policy has remained an important developmental instrument for attaining the wishes and ambitions of rational political actors. Hence, public policy is a course of action that is typically launched, planned, and implemented by relevant governmental organizations in order to accomplish desired outcomes, particularly in the public sector of the national economy. Dye (1972) notes that public policy is “what the government decides to do or not do” (p. 2). Several public policy researchers continue to be critical of Dye’s (1972) restricted notion of public policy. Some scholars define public policy as what the government does to solve societal issues such as Nigeria’s present internal security quagmires. It is the action plan of a political actor or group of political players in the state to address issues of public concern (Eminue, 2005; Nnoli, 2006).

Consequently, public policy is developed, established, and executed in every sector of society and the economy, including internal security and effective government. Certainly, the impacts of the government’s decisions and actions are felt throughout various sectors, and such decisions are often reflected in what are best defined as national policies in those areas. As a result, the basic basis of government policies and programs in these areas is to accomplish the desired economic development, which will benefit the general public. Yet, such economic development would be difficult to achieve unless effective public policies are devised and executed to promote internal security sector administration in the state. In this research, public policy is defined as acts conducted by the government as opposed to pronouncements of intent to act on topics that have caused friction in the state; such as internal security challenges. As such, in this paper, internal security refers to a broad range of activities done by the government through its security formations to safeguard the lives and property of all Nigerians, as well as suitable initiatives to encourage peaceful coexistence among diverse groups in the nation. As a result, public policy is seen as a real political tool for obtaining desired results in Nigeria’s security sub-sector. In a country whose governmental policies and programs are inadequately conceived, defined, and implemented, dangers cannot be eradicated and as such people and property cannot be protected. In Nigeria, for instance, there are doubts about the effectiveness of public policy in addressing socioeconomic problems which arise from a plethora of factors. A system theory of policy/decision-making was used as theoretical anchorage. A system comes to be when elements standing in interaction cooperate to achieve an end. It tends to show that public policies are not made from a vacuum, as they are products of the demand from the environment. The relevance of this theory to the study is that public policy is made to address the needs of the environment, and as such it should address the key economic indicators studied as this will help solve the problems associated with internal security sector governance. Therefore, this paper raises the following questions:

RQ1: Do poverty, unemployment, gross domestic product (GDP) and foreign direct investment (FDI) have a dialectic relationship with internal security sector governance?

RQ2: What are the factors that have impeded public policy measures to promote the internal security and development of the Nigerian state?

The research focuses on the period from 2009 to 2020, when the Boko-Haram insurgency began and progressed, as well as other threats such as banditry and kidnapping that caused instability in the country.

Over time, research has concentrated more on the explanation and performance of economic indicators only. A few studies have investigated the relationship between economic indicators and the governance of the internal security sector. This study is designed to fill this gap and contribute to knowledge in terms of broadening the scientific literature based on how some indicators studied, when not properly addressed via adequate, inclusive and evidence-based public policy can lead to internal security sector governance challenges: such as kidnapping, banditry, terrorism, internet fraud, armed robbery among others.

The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 analyses the methodology. Section 4 takes care of the results and discussion of findings. Section 5 presents the conclusion and recommendations.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Nigeria has the awful distinction of being the world capital of poverty, with 71 million people living in extreme poverty (Ubanagu, 2023). Consequently, 63% of persons living in Nigeria (133 million people) are multidimensional poor (OPHI News, 2022). In a related review, it was roughly stated that 60% of the world’s extreme poor in 2019 lived in Sub-Saharan Africa alone, while 81% of the global poor at the poverty line of \$3.65 lived in Sub-Saharan Africa or Asia (World Bank, 2021). In 2023, it was reported that around 12% of the world population in extreme poverty, with the poverty threshold at \$1.90 a day, lived in Nigeria (Statista, 2024b). According to the World Bank (2020), relative and absolute poverty rates in rural communities were 73.2% and 66.1%, respectively, in 2019, compared to 61.8% and 52.0% in urban areas. Poverty is higher in rural areas than in urban areas, supporting scholars’ claims that poverty and unemployment are major causes of insecurity (Urowoli & Alero, 2022). Poverty is a multifaceted phenomenon that is defined by the World Bank as a lack of opportunity, empowerment, and security for individuals in society. Ucha (2010) argues that the poor masses’ window of opportunity remains closed, limiting their options in almost every situation, and their lack of security exposes them to diseases, violence, and other threats.

Unemployment is generally defined as a situation in which a person does not have any work to do in order to earn a living. The unemployment rate was estimated using Nigeria’s definition, which is based on at least 39 hours of work per week, rather than the United Nations-International Labour Organization (UN-ILO) definition, which is based on one hour of work per week (Federal Office of Statistics, 2004). Consequently, as a result of a global phenomenon, unemployment in Africa’s largest economy (Nigeria) has risen to the second highest on a global list of countries in 2020 (OPHI News, 2022). Research has observed that public investment infrastructure

such as roads, communications networks, and energy sources help in raising the productivity of the private sector and creating new business opportunities that help to expand private investment, boost productivity, attract private capital and lower unemployment (Kinyanjui et al., 2022).

The National Planning Commission (NPC) presents a comparative analysis of the country's GDP in 2009, 2010, and 2011. The commission submits that: "The GDP at current basic prices stood at N33.98 trillion, equivalent to \$226.14 billion in 2010, compared to N24.7 trillion, or \$159.35 billion in 2009, and N24.29 trillion in 2008. In 2011, the GDP rose to \$415 billion, accounting for 7.8% growth, driven by non-oil production activities" (NPC, 2012, p. 153).

The preceding observation indicates that Nigeria's GDP increased at an unprecedented rate between 2008 and 2011. As a result, the GDP is defined as the total value of goods produced and services provided in a country in a given year. It is the total market value of all final goods and services produced in a specific country in a specific year (Jhingan, 2003). Furthermore, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) contends that GDP is the monetary value of goods and services produced in an economy over time, regardless of the nationality of those who produced the goods and services (CBN, 2011). It is a comprehensive approach to studying a country's economic activities over the course of a fiscal year.

The education sector, agricultural sector, building and construction, oil and gas, manufacturing services, mining, health, utilities, and telecommunications are all included in Nigeria's GDP composite (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2009). However, any serious investigation into the true performance of these sectors must include some macroeconomic indicators. According to Federal Office of Statistics (2004), the reason for this development is largely due to various policy reviews and reforms employed, but they also had a strategic impact on Nigeria's economic development. The above argument by the Federal Office of Statistic report raises yet another critical question about the government's sincerity in addressing the Nigerian state challenges. Thus, it is incredible that the internal security crisis that has ravaged Nigeria could have a negative impact on poverty, unemployment, and other critical socioeconomic indicators without affecting the country's GDP prior to the last administration.

More specifically, how could unemployment and poverty have been on the rise prior to this period, while the GDP rate remained stable? As a result, some observers contend that the Nigerian economy faced a number of challenges during the period under consideration. These had a negative impact on the country's GDP, unemployment, government revenue, and poverty rates (New Nigerian Politics, 2011; Ezirim, 2005). Indeed, the Nigerian economy is a middle-income, mixed economy with burgeoning manufacturing, financial, service, communications, technology, and entertainment sectors (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2024).

The FDI is regarded as a significant source of capital formation, technological knowledge employment creation, increasing tax revenues, promoting trade opportunities, and enhancing management and labour skills for least developed countries (Urama et al., 2022). Correspondingly, FDI

is also thought to be vulnerable to crisis. As a result, parties involved in developing economics typically assume that FDI inflow will bring the much-needed capital, new technologies, marketing strategies, management skills and reduction of poverty in a host of economies (Giwa et al., 2020). FDI is defined as net inflows of investment (inflow minus outflow) used to acquire a long-term management interest (10% or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than the investor's (Havranck & Irsova, 2011). The Nigerian government's efforts to attract FDI have been hampered by a number of factors and deficiencies. As a result, the shortcomings were primarily in areas of the corporate environment, such as corporate law, bankruptcy, and labour law, among others. There were also flaws stemming from institutional uncertainty and the rule of law (Oakley & Mackenzie, 2011). As a result, anti-corruption agencies such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) were expected to be more proactive in their efforts to improve the corporate environment and attract more foreign investment to Nigeria. Thus, between 2007 and 2020, Nigeria's political and economic environment was hostile, conflict-ridden, and relatively unsafe for foreign investors to invest in the country. However, both foreign countries and individual investors are hesitant to invest in an environment plagued by security issues.

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. Design and scope

The study deployed a secondary research method. This research method involves compiling existing data sources from varieties of sources. The justification for the use of this method is that it enables researchers to compare multiple sources and add up-to-date trends as this will aid the researcher(s) in confirming their research goals. This study on public policy and internal security sector governance problems was conducted in Nigeria using some selected economic development indicators such as poverty, unemployment, GDP, and FDI from 2009 to 2020.

3.2. Data collection

The method of data collection for this paper is literature sources. This involves the collection of data from already published text available in the public domain that addresses the issue under study. Literature sources include internet-based materials, textbooks, journal articles, and government periodicals among others. The justification for the utilization of this method is that it is inexpensive, not time-consuming, answer certain research questions, as well as helps identify key variables.

3.3. Data analysis

This paper utilizes secondary data analysis (SDA) studies. This involves the use of existing research data to find answers to a question(s) that was different from the original research work.

The justification for the utilization of the SDA technique is that the existing data can be analysed to generate new hypotheses or answer the critical research question(s), and also investigators use data that was collected to confirm the research goals. This saves a lot of time, money, and other resources.

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1. Factors influencing Nigeria's public policy and internal security sector governance

This paper noted that several factors influence public policy decisions in Nigeria. These factors also have an impact on Nigeria's effective internal security sector governance. Among the factors are:

- *Unemployment.* Unemployment is a global phenomenon in which a qualified workforce is unable to find work. There is no widely accepted definition, but different countries use definitions that are tailored to their specific needs. According to Adesina (2011), anyone who is physically fit and willing to work but cannot find work may be considered unemployed. Unemployment is not only a serious economic problem but also has social consequences that affect almost all countries and people. Okafor (2011) observes that unemployment is a major factor in the rising tide of crime, youth unrest, and unstable economic structures that have plagued countries around the world. Nigeria is facing serious challenges of unemployment and work deficits, which have the potential to exacerbate poverty and inequality. Morphy (2008) argues that the rising level of adult unemployment predisposes youths to violence and high-profile crimes such as kidnapping, smuggling of small arms and light weapons, drug trafficking, armed robbery, insurgencies, ethnic conflicts, and armed banditry among others. Nigeria's economic development has been hindered by violent crimes, property losses, and underutilized human resources. To achieve sustainable economic development, governmental institutions must implement a robust public policy to address the plethora of crimes and security threats that stem from the country's increasing unemployment.

- *The character of elites-domination in political power.* Political elites are the ruling class in any modern society, with their preeminent roles as policymakers and decision-makers giving them political power over who gets what, when, and how. Dogan and Higley (1912) define political elite as those who hold strategic positions in powerful organizations and movements, and who can influence national political outcomes on a regular and significant basis. Nigeria's elites are characterized by rascality, indiscipline, and dominance of the power tempo. The Nigerian power elites' kind of politics is perceived to be myopic, lacking in belief system content, domineering in nature, lacking in democratic ideals, and inept in building strong and resourceful institutions.

- *Poor leadership.* Nigeria's political independence has been largely unfulfilled due to internal security issues and leadership issues. Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu's 1966 coup speech broadcast (Vanguard, 2010) highlighted this issue: "...Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers [...] that seek bribes and demand 10 percent; those that seek to

keep the country divided permanently so that they can remain in office as ministers and VIPs of waste, the tribalists, the nepotists..." (para. 16).

Nigeria's leadership selection process is often based on tribal and ethnic lines, resulting in visionary leaders being overlooked and mediocre ones being chosen or imposed on the poor masses (Afegbua & Adejuwon, 2012). Improving leadership is a major political and economic challenge. The "de-ideologization" of Nigerian politics means that political leaders do not see a pressing need to articulate their country's macro-vision. This has led to a personalized and parochial nature of Nigerian leaders, leading to a lack of logical and empirical content in public policy making and weakened internal security sector governance (Hyden, 1992). However, effective leadership is essential for achieving economic development and social stability. The Nigerian state has been plagued by numerous problems due to ineffective leadership, lack of vision, and a transformational attitude to formulate and implement a strong public policy framework. These include ethnic and communal clashes, crime, drug trafficking, advanced fee fraud, economic crisis, Fulani Herdsmen, Boko Haram, and violent protests by members of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Chukwu and Anachunam (2019) argue that poor leadership has economic consequences, such as massive external debts. The past administration has accumulated more external debts than any other in history, leading to overhang, net capital flight, and disinvestment, the collapse of social and economic infrastructure, insecurity, currency devaluation, pervasive poverty, and poor formulation of public policies, poor governance of internal security sector among others.

- *Institutional crisis/weakness of the Nigerian police service.* The Nigerian Police Service's (NPS) inability to ensure adequate security for lives and property is a cause for concern. The sources of the country's security problems are numerous and cannot be blamed on a single component of the political system. The police, in particular, are tasked with the civil maintenance of law and order in society and may perform such military duties as may require of them. The police force in Nigeria is plagued by inadequacies and problems that impede its performance and undermine efforts to achieve effective internal security sector governance. Alafuro and Uhunmwangho (2011) observe that this problem stems from a horde of lazy, inefficient, corrupt uniformed men and women who contribute to the commission of crimes. The Nigerian Police Force stated that the police are handicapped and weak due to a combination of factors, such as inadequate resources and personnel, poor government support, poor service conditions, lack of appropriate and adequate training, and an ill-equipped workforce. Additionally, police extortion, corruption, and other vices contribute to their fragility and institutional weakness which further degenerate the system and put pressure on Nigeria's internal security sector governance. Police corruption is a serious challenge, as officers are expected to be socially sound as instruments of law and order. If they are corrupt, society will be at the mercy of criminals, thus, leading to an institutional crisis in the NPS.

- *Lack of credible electoral process.* The electoral process is a formal decision-making process in

which a population selects an individual to hold a public office. Kenneth (1963) believes it has been the standard mechanism for modern representative democracy since the 17th century. Nohlen (1996) observes that in order for suffrage to be truly practised, voters must be able to choose between different candidates or political parties with differing ideological perspectives and public policy programs.

In Nigeria, the electoral process that brought political officeholders to power lacks credibility and the electoral umpire, the Independence National Electoral Commission (INEC) is not independent of the political party in power. This has been demonstrated by poor planning, exclusion of the electorate from voting, and cases of election materials arriving late at polling stations and other election improprieties. Additionally, candidates who won electoral primaries have been replaced by candidates who never ran for office or were defeated during the election by the same electoral umpire. INEC lacks the credibility and independence to conduct free, fair, and credible elections in Nigeria, leading to unintended consequences such as destruction of lives and property, friction and political unrest, and breakdown of law and order (Omodia, 2009).

4.2. Nigerian internal security sector governance and poverty

Poverty is noted as one of the costly drivers of conflict. Civil and regional conflicts cost lives and property as well as devastate countries and economics and can also nurture virtually every national and transnational threat by creating the ideal lawless environment for external marauders. Poverty in Nigeria is caused by unemployment, corruption, non-diversification of the economy, income inequality, gender disparity, laziness, a poor education system, and internal security sector governance (Ucha, 2010; Gbosi, 2009; "Nigeria's rising interest rates", 2011). Poverty and security issues have a dialectical relationship, as poverty can lead to individuals engaging in violent crimes and security issues can cause hardship, including limited access to food, clothing, shelter, health care, education, and employment. Lack of access to these critical indicators for man's survival, leads to poverty, as evidenced by the 2018 statistics on the headcount ratio at \$1.9 PPP (purchasing power parity) per day shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.9 PPP a day

S/N	Date	Value	Change (%)
1	2018	39.1	-30.67%
2	2009	56.4	0.89%
3	2003	55.9	-13.87%
4	1996	64.9	10.75%
5	1992	58.6	5.59%

Source: Authors' elaboration.

Table 1 shows that in Nigeria, the abject poverty rate decreased between 1992 and 2018, but this has been contested by Nigerian economists due to internal security issues. Despite the establishment of the National Directorate of Employment (NDE), the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), and several agricultural development programs, a significant population of Nigerians still lives in

poverty. Different measurement approaches are used to study a country's poverty rate. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in Nigeria has relentlessly conducted studies or surveys on poverty rates across the country's political space.

The NBS used what it called the official measurement approach for Nigeria in its nationwide study on poverty rates in Nigeria (2004-2010); this is known as relative poverty measurement. As a result, household expenditure is the most important factor in calculating relative poverty. Expenditure, on the other hand, refers to all goods and services purchased for use by the household. It also includes all monetary transactions, such as donations and savings ("ESUSU") contributions. It is, therefore, important to note that, despite the fact that the Nigerian economy is paradoxically growing, as some observers, particularly those in positions of power, argue, the proportion of Nigerians living in poverty has increased year after year since the onset of internal security problems. Thus, additional data from Nigeria's NBS on poverty and inequality challenged the computation and arguments in Table 1.

"40 percent of the total population, or almost 83 million people, live below the country's poverty line of 137,430 naira (\$381.75) per year. The NBS Report is based on data from the latest round of the Nigerian Living Standards Survey, conducted in 2018-2019 with support from the World Bank's Poverty Global Practice and technical assistance from the LSMS program" (World Bank, 2020, paras. 2-3).

Poverty among Nigerians has become more pervasive and concerning when measured in terms of "dollars per day", particularly since the last administration took office. According to NBS data from 2019 (World Bank, 2020), the application of dollars per day via PPP in the World Bank's computation of poverty in Nigeria in 2020 alone shows a significant disparity between the naira and the dollar. In this case, \$1 was equivalent to N500. As a result, when this figure was adjusted further using the consumer price index (CPI) and the exchange rate, it yielded N61,2 to \$1. (World Bank, 2020). The NBS used a combination of critical variables such as very poor, absolute poor, relatively poor, and dollars per day to further demonstrate the prevailing rate among Nigerians, particularly between 2018 and 2020. As a result of this survey, Nigerians have an incredibly high rate of poverty. Aside from that, several studies on poverty rates in Nigeria focus on individuals and households. The zonal or geopolitical distribution of poverty in the country does not deviate completely from the household survey. Thus, the incidence of poverty in Nigeria in 2020 reveals that the six geopolitical zones in Nigeria experienced a severe rate of poverty, owing largely to an unprecedented rate of internal security problems (Olurounbi, 2021).

The preceding submission is necessary because the Federal Government developed the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) as part of the country's poverty reduction strategy. In addition, the Federal Government implemented other national programs to reduce poverty in Nigeria, such as Conditional Cash Transfer, Tradermoni, and numerous palliatives for farmers. According to the World Bank (2020), the goals of these policy strategies are to achieve

the following: wealth creation, job creation, poverty reduction, reduced insecurity, and value orientation. Unfortunately, all of these measures appear to be ineffective in addressing the level of poverty in Nigeria.

Poor governance in Nigeria is a major cause of poverty and insecurity, which can be traced back to corruption (Ucha, 2010). The government's income is primarily derived from natural resources, which is distributed among political officeholders and their cronies, leaving a large population of people in poverty. The preceding analysis suggests that aggressive rural development and economic emancipation of the rural populace in Nigeria are required. Nigeria's security issues, in the end, necessitate a robust internal security policy capable of identifying and incorporating a variety of factors that contribute to insecurity, such as poverty, unemployment, poor governance, corruption, and inequality, among others. These challenges must be effectively addressed in order to achieve long-term peace.

4.3. Governance of Nigeria's internal security sector and unemployment


Unemployment is another major factor that contributes to Nigeria's internal security problems. There is also a dialectical relationship between unemployment and a country's internal security problems. This interface is understandable given that a large number of youths who commit violent crimes and challenge the authority of the Nigerian State are mostly unemployed. From the analysis, it was observed that unemployment causes poverty and poverty in turn causes insecurity. This is because when a large number of people are unemployed in a country, they become poor and poverty will predispose them to crime and criminality because they are not meaningfully engaged in the country's economic as well as social activities. These unemployed individuals will innovate

to help them earn a living, and as they do this, they put more pressure on internal security sector governance. Thus, according to Nigeria's composite employment data, the unemployment rate increased from 14.90% in 2008 to 19.7% in 2009 and 21% in 2010 (NPC, 2012). As a result of a global phenomenon, unemployment in Africa's largest economy (Nigeria) has risen to the second highest on a global list of countries in 2020 (Olurounbi, 2021). Nwagboso (2012) argues that the failure of succeeding administrations in Nigeria to address problems of poverty, unemployment and inequitable distribution of wealth among ethnic nationalities is one the major reasons for insecurity in the country. According to the NBS analysis of employment data between 2010 and 2020, the rate of new entrants into the labour market has been unprecedented.

Lately, there has been an average of about 1,8 million new entrants into the active labour market per year. As NBS correctly points out, this development is largely due to the federal government's new policy initiatives in agriculture, manufacturing, and skill acquisition (World Bank, 2020). It is important to note that the national unemployment rate in Nigeria has been rising over the last few years during the last administration. Thus, prior to the election of the past administration, the national unemployment rate rose to 23.9% in 2011, up from 21.1% in 2010 and 19.7% in 2009 (NBS, 2011). Similarly, according to available statistics, the rate of unemployment in Nigeria is always higher in rural areas than in urban areas. According to the 2011 NBS survey, rural and urban unemployment rates were 25.6% and 17.1%, respectively. This heinous phenomenon is prevalent among those aged 15-64 years old, who are considered the economically active population.

Similarly, statistics show that the global unemployment rate increased between 2010 and 2020. This is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Global unemployment rate from 2010 to 2020



Source: Adapted from Statista (2024b).

According to Figure 1, global unemployment increased between 2010 and 2020. Thus, statistics in Figure 1 show that in 2010, 5.92% was recorded, followed by 5.78% in 2011, 5.78% in 2012, 5.63% in 2013, 5.63% in 2014, 5.63% in 2015, 5.66% in 2016, 5.55% in 2017, 5.37% in 2018, 5.37% in 2019, and 6.47% in 2020. Though unemployment rates fluctuated between 2011 and 2019, the years 2010 to 2020 saw the greatest increase, as shown by the data in Figure 1. However, unemployment, like poverty, is a worldwide occurrence. As a result, it has become

a major issue in the majority of the world's countries (New Nigerian Politics, 2011). In the United States (US), for example, the unemployment rate has risen from 5% in 2007 to 9% in 2011. Similarly, it increased from 8.6% to 21.52% in Spain, from 5.3% to 8.1% in the UK, from 4.8% to 14.3% in Ireland, from 5.4% to 16.5% in Latvia, from 8.07% to 18.4% in Greece, and from 6.7% to 8.3% in Italy (NBS, 2011). Despite several policy measures implemented by governments on the African continent, unemployment has persisted. Thus, in the period under

consideration, South Africa had a 25% higher unemployment rate than Nigeria (23.9%). Angola has a rate of 25%, Botswana has a rate of 17.5%, Egypt has a rate of 11.8%, Kenya has a rate of 51%, and Namibia has a rate of 51% (NBS, 2011). As an outcome, it is argued that government policies and programs designed to mitigate the harsh effects of unemployment on the Nigerian State economy in order to reduce the increasing spate of internal security appear ineffective. As a result, in order to reduce unemployment in the country, some experts (Autesserre, 2011) advocate expanding the activities of the informal sector in Nigeria. This is due to the fact that the informal sector employs the majority of workers in the country. Thus, the CBN's effective implementation of federal government policies in the areas of agricultural grants and loans is capable of reviving small and medium-scale agricultural outlets and enterprises in Nigeria. This would boost economic activity and have a multiplier effect on job creation in Nigeria's formal and informal sectors.

4.4. Internal security sector governance and Nigeria's GDP

It has the world's 27th-largest economy in terms of nominal GDP and the 24th-largest in terms of PPP. However, as of 2019, the debt-to-GDP ratio is 16.075% (CIA World Fact Book, 2021). Nigeria's GDP in 2020 was \$429.42 billion. The GDP increased from \$73.13 billion in 2001 to \$429.42 billion in 2020, growing at a 10.82% annual rate (CIA World Fact Book, 2021).

The above statistics are further elucidated in Table 2.

Table 2. GDP of Nigeria between 2009-2020

S/N	Date	Value	Change (%)
1	2020	429.42	-4.17%
2	2019	448.12	6.26%
3	2018	421.74	12.24%
4	2017	375.75	-7.14%
5	2016	404.65	17.83%
6	2015	492.44	13.38%
7	2014	568.50	10.40%
8	2013	514.97	11.72%
9	2012	460.95	11.32%
10	2011	414.10	12.20%
11	2010	369.06	24.07%
12	2009	297.46	-

Source: Adapted from CIA (2024).

According to Table 2, Nigeria's GDP growth fluctuated between 2007 and 2020. It was at its highest in 2014, with a growth value of 568.50, representing a 10.40% change in percentage, and at its lowest in 2009. It fell in 2020, with a growth value of 429.42 compared to 448.12 in 2019. Despite these inconsistencies, Nigeria's economic managers have continued to persuade Nigerians and the international community that the country will record an appreciable rate of GDP growth in 2020, despite the country experiencing the worst internal security problems in history.

Although the economy experienced respectable GDP growth rates during the examined period, as policymakers persuasively argued, this exaggerated


growth did not result in corresponding employment or a reduction in poverty (Ogbona & Ebimobowei, 2012). Furthermore, some other scholars believe that the Nigerian state economy is plagued by sustained underdevelopment, as evidenced by low human and economic indices. Poor income distribution, militancy and oil violence, endemic corruption, and second-rate relative poverty are all examples of this (Nwaezaku, 2010). This can be traced back to successive governments' failure to effectively use oil revenue to develop other sectors of the national economy (Nwaezaku, 2010). These situations, as correctly noted by some observers outside Nigeria's corridors of power, have had a negative impact on the country's economy. According to them, the Nigerian state economy is beleaguered by unemployment, widespread oil spillage, and an increasingly poor standard of living caused by declining GDP, per capita income, and a high rate of inflation (Nwaezaku, 2010).

4.5. Nigerian internal security sector governance and FDI

The incessant kidnapping of foreign nationals in some parts of Nigeria, such as the South-South (Niger Delta region) and South-East geopolitical zones, was the most pathetic internal security situation in Nigeria that may have had a negative impact on FDI in recent times. Kidnapping of foreign nationals, particularly "whites", was a recurring decimal in Nigeria's political history, particularly between 2007 and 2015. This dreadful trend has harmed FDI in Nigeria, which had been expected in the fields of oil and gas, solid mineral resources, information technology, and agriculture (Oakley & Mackenzie, 2011; Okotie, 2008).

During the review period, some foreign companies were forced to close due to Nigeria's poor security situation. As a result, as evidenced by available data, Nigeria's foreign economic relations revolve around oil and natural gas (Anyanwu, 1998). As a result, foreign companies interested in long-term investment and joint ventures, particularly those utilizing locally available raw materials, were discouraged by Nigeria's poor security environment. This is largely due to the fact that some investors have already been abducted by armed militia groups in various parts of the country (Macaulay, 2011). It is worth noting that Nigeria, after Angola and Egypt, is the third largest recipient of FDI in Africa (Macaulay, 2011). However, available data show that US FDI in Nigeria in 2010 was estimated to be \$6.1 billion, a 29% decrease from \$8.68 billion in 2009.

As a result, the decline in US FDI in 2010 was largely due to insecurity, uncertainties surrounding the proposed Petroleum Industry Bill (PTB), and political unrest in the Niger Delta region (Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs [EB], 2011). These dreadful security trends in Nigeria eventually reduced FDI, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Foreign direct investment performance in Nigeria between 2007 and 2011

Source: EB (2011).

According to the data in Figure 2, the rate of FDI in Nigeria in 2007 was not encouraging. FDI inflows into Nigeria were low in 2007, but increased slightly in 2008 and 2009, owing to the amnesty granted to militants in the Niger Delta region. Unfortunately, the FDI rate fell dramatically in 2010 and 2011. This is most likely due to the resurgence of Boko Haram and other violent crimes in Nigeria. FDI inflows to Nigeria are expected to reach \$2.4 billion in 2020. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic that distorted the global economy, this sharp increase appears to be better than the \$2.3 billion recorded in 2019 (Ugbodaga, 2021.) As a result, Nigeria has emerged as Africa's third-largest economy, alongside Ethiopia (\$2.4 billion), as the only country that has attracted FDI inflows in 2020.

As a direct consequence, it is argued that FDI in Nigeria cannot be celebrated in the face of rising internal security in the country. The modern Nigerian state has seen a slew of internal security issues that have defied all strategic frameworks previously put in place by managers of the country's security architecture.

5. CONCLUSION

This paper examined public policy and internal security sector governance in Nigeria with a fair degree of objectivity, using poverty, unemployment, GDP, and FDI as indicators. The study observed that Nigeria's internal security sector governance, particularly in the last ten years of democratic administration, has failed miserably to meet Nigerians' expectations. This pitiful situation had a negative impact on poverty, unemployment, GDP, and FDI, which were chosen as study tools. The study noted that, if these important indicators are not addressed via inclusive and evidence-based public policy it may be a harbinger of internal security crises such as; kidnapping, banditry, armed robbery, terrorism, and insurgency among others. The implication of the above is that Nigeria should aggressively pursue the quest for a credible electoral process; the electronic voting system should be adopted in all elections in the country. This will usher in highly competent Nigerians in public policy and decision-making positions in the country to help formulate policy to address the key economic indicators studied which is a pointer to internal security sector challenges. As a result, the study concludes that Nigeria's internal security sector governance, particularly in the last ten years of democratic administration, has failed miserably to meet Nigerians' expectations. The reason for

the failure the paper observed may not be unconnected to the following; elite dominance in political power, unemployment, poor leadership, institutional crisis, lack of credible and efficient nature of electoral process, high level of corruption, ethnicity, fiscal indiscipline, institutional crisis, lack of investors' confidence and debt servicing, economic growth impediments among others. The above anomalies ultimately predispose individuals to crime and criminality and put pressure on the internal security sector governance. The Nigerian economy has faced severe challenges due to an unprecedented level of insecurity, particularly since the return of democracy in 1999. This has negatively impacted certain critical economic indicators, resulting in untold hardship for Nigeria's already impoverished citizens. Nigeria's current security concerns and threat perception have come from a variety of sources, posing a significant threat to the country's internal security sector governance and implementation strategies. Thus, Nigeria requires a thorough review of its policymaker recruitment process. This will eventually usher in qualified and better equipped and intellectually competent personnel to oversee Nigeria's public policy decision-making apparatus to deal with the perennial problems confronting Nigeria's internal security sector governance.

Research in this area can help researchers and other critical stakeholders understand the relationship that exists between the key economic development indicators studied and the country's internal security sector challenges. This will ultimately allow for the formulation of adequate and inclusive public policy that will proactively address the challenges. It will also help researchers to measure current conditions and forecast financial trends and security issues. The major limitation of this study is that its scope is limited to public policy and the internal security sector challenges using selected indicators such as poverty, unemployment, GDP and FDI from 2009 to 2020. As a result, the data collected and analysed in this paper is based solely on information obtained from secondary sources. However, due to the focus on some selected economic indicators within a particular period as well as in a particular country, caution must be exercised when attempting to generalize the findings of this study outside the baseline indicators in Nigeria and beyond.

Based on our findings and analyses, the following recommendations were proffered to help Nigeria address persistent issues affecting internal security sector governance: The government should strengthen public-private partnerships as one of the best policy options and economic approaches. This will assist in the provision of employment to able youths across Nigeria. More so, the government should seriously demonstrate its commitment to fostering a conducive environment for business. This will include but not be limited to improving trade infrastructures, reducing trade tariffs, and enhancing licensing as well as regulatory processes to open the market and allow for FDI inflow. This will help to encourage local foreign investments as well as small and medium enterprises to scale thereby pooling people out of poverty and unemployment. The activities of anti-corruption agencies should be reviewed.

The EFCC Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission must be repositioned to play critical roles in issues relating to internal security sector governance. This will help to fish out those behind internal security problems in Nigeria. The Federal and State Ministries of Education in Nigeria should urgently review their tertiary and secondary school curricula to include internal security studies as an academic subject. This will assist students at these levels in acquiring basic knowledge about internal security challenges and their implications for the political and economic development of Nigeria. Governments at the federal,

state, and local levels should pursue aggressive rural development policies and program implementation in Nigeria. This will reduce rural-urban migration and as well help address internal security problems in Nigeria. Consequently, Governments at all levels should increase the activities of the informal sector of the economy by way of expanding their scope and roles in economic development. This will increase employment opportunities for the ultimate benefit of a large number of unemployed youths and will be a stepping stone toward the achievement of relative internal security in Nigeria.

REFERENCES

- Adesina, G. (2011, September 26). Graduate bandits on the prowl. *PM News*. <https://pmnewsnigeria.com/2011/09/21/graduate-bandits-on-the-prowl/>
- Afegbua, S., & Adejuwon, K. D. (2012). The challenges of leadership and governance in Africa. *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*, 2(9), 141-157. https://www.academia.edu/31913288/The_Challenges_of_Leadership_and_Governance_in_Africa
- Alafuro, E., & Uhumwuangho, S. (2011). Challenges and solutions to ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria: Case study of the Jos Crises. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, 13(5), 109-124. <https://tinyurl.com/5dayyxfw>
- Anyanwu, A. (1998). Governance and Africa politics. In C. E. Emezi & C. A. Ndoh (Eds.), *African politics*. Achugo Publications.
- Autesserre, S. (2010). *The trouble with Congo: Local violence and failure of international peacebuilding*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs (EB). (2011). *2011 Investment climate statement — Nigeria*. U.S. Department of State. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2011/157337.htm>
- Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). (2011). *CBN annual report 2011*. <https://www.cbn.gov.ng/ar2011/default.asp>
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (2024, May 22). *The world factbook: Nigeria*. <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/nigeria>
- Chukwu, C. J., & Anachunam, C. C. (2019). Security challenges and leadership in Africa, 1960-2019. *UJAH: Unizik Journal of Arts and Humanities*, 20(3), 272-292. <https://doi.org/10.4314/ujah.v20i3.15>
- Dogan, M., & Higley, J. (1912). Elites, crisis and regimes in comparative analysis [1998]. *Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung*, 37(1), 269-291. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41756461>
- Dye, T. R. (1972). *Understanding public policy* (5th ed.). Prentice Hall.
- Economy of Nigeria. (n.d.). In *Wikipedia*. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Nigeria
- Ekepebu, L. (2008). The state, oil companies and the Niger Delta: Keynote speech. In *International Conference on the Nigerian state, oil industry and Niger Delta proceedings* (pp. 4-11). Harey Publications Company. <http://eprints.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/3880/1/Untitled.pdf>
- Eminue, O. (2005). *Public policy analysis and decision-making*. Concept Publication.
- Ezirim, B. C. (2005). *Financial dynamics: Principles, techniques and application*. Markiwotz Centre for Research Development.
- Federal Office of Statistics. (2004). *Nigeria statistical fact sheets on economic & social development, 1999-2003*. <https://tinyurl.com/y4wf9n7d>
- Federal Republic of Nigeria. (2011). *2011 Annual socio-economic report: Access to ICT*. National Bureau of Statistics. <https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/pdfuploads/Social%20Economic%20survey%20-%20ICT.pdf>
- Flemes, D. (2009). India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) in the new global order: Interest, strategies and values of emerging coalition. *International Studies*, 46(4), 401-421. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002088171004600402>
- Gbosi, A. N. (2009). *Monetary economics and the Nigerian financial system*. Port Harcourt.
- Giwa, B. A., George, E. O., Okodua, H., Adediran, O. S., & Amoo, E. O. (2020). Empirical analysis of the effects of foreign direct investment inflows on Nigerian real economy: Implications for sustainable development goal-17. *Cogent Social Science*, 6(1), 21-38. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2020.1727621>
- Havranck, T., & Irsova, Z. (2011). Estimating vertical spillovers from FDI: Why results vary and what the true effect is. *Journal of International Economics*, 85(2), 234-244. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2011.07.004>
- Hyden, G. (1992). Governance and the study of politics. In G. Hyden & M. Bratton (Eds.), *Governance and politics in Africa* (pp. 1-26). Lynne Rienner Publishers. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781685853297-003>
- Jhingan, M. L. (2003). *Principles of economics*. Vrinda Publications.
- Kenneth, J. A. (1963). *Social choice and individual values* (2nd ed.). Yale University Press.
- Kinyanjui, M. W., Muturi, W., & Njeru, A. (2022). Government expenditure on infrastructure and growth of private domestic investment in Kenya. *African Journal of Emerging Issues*, 4(11), 40-50. <https://ajoeijournals.org/sys/index.php/ajoei/article/view/345>
- Macaulay, E. D. (2011). Foreign direct investment and the performance of the Nigerian economy. *Journal of Educational and Social Research*, 1(15), 31-34. <https://www.richtmann.org/journal/index.php/jesr/article/view/11758>
- Morphy, R. (2008, August 27). Nigeria: Youth unemployment, poverty — A time bomb for country. *AllAfrica*. <https://allafrica.com/stories/200808270547.html>
- National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). (2011). *2011 Annual socio-economic report: Access to ICT*. <https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/pdfuploads/2011%20Socio%20Economic%20Survey%20Access%20to%20ICT.pdf>
- National Planning Commission (NPC). (2012). *Annual performance of the Nigerian economy*.

- New Nigerian Politics. (2011, February 16). *Nigeria lost 1.9 million manufacturing jobs in seven years* — MAN. <https://newnigerianpolitics.com/nigeria-lost-1-9-million-manufacturing-jobs-in-seven-years-%E2%80%93-man/>
- Nigeria's rising interest rates and persistent inflation. (2011, February 13). *Oyibos OnLine*. <http://www.oyibosonline.com/nigerias-rising-interest-rate-and-persistent-inflation/>
- Nnoli, O. (2006). National security in Africa: A radical new perspective. *Socialscientia Journal of the Social Sciences and Humanities*, 2(4), 92–94. <https://journals.aphriapub.com/index.php/SS/article/download/613/595/1197>
- Nohlen, D. (1996). *Elections and electoral system*. Macmillan.
- Nwaezaku, N. C. (2010). *The impact of public sector financial management on the economics of Sub-Saharan-Africa*. <https://tinyurl.com/4ccn48dk>
- Nwagboso, C. I. (2012). Security challenges and economy of the Nigerian State (2007–2011). *American International Journal of Contemporary Research*, 2(6), 244–258. https://www.aijcrnet.com/journals/Vol_2_No_6_June_2012/28.pdf
- Oakley, D., & Mackenzie, M. (2011, January 10). Inflation fears put investors on the defensive. *CNN*. <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/BUSINESS/01/09/inflation/index.html>
- Ogbona, G. N., & Ebimobowei, A. (2012). Petroleum income and Nigerian economy: Empirical evidence. *Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review*, 1(9), 33–58. <https://doi.org/10.12816/0002159>
- Okafor, E. E. (2011). Youth unemployment and implications for stability of democracy in Nigeria. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, 13(1), 358–373. <https://tinyurl.com/2s3h5n27>
- Okotie, H. V. (2008). *Nigeria at a cross-road: Oil and the fragility of a multiethnic state*. Honey Publications.
- Olurounbi, R. (2021, March 15). Nigeria unemployment rate rises to 33%, second highest on global list. *Bloomberg*. <https://tinyurl.com/4bk9tndn>
- Omodia, S. M. (2009). Elections and democratic survival in the fourth republic of Nigeria. *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, 3(3), 35–56. <https://www.jpnafrican.org/docs/vol3no3/3.3Elections.pdf>
- OPHI News. (2022, November 17). *Nigeria launches its most extensive national measure of multidimensional poverty*. <https://ophi.org.uk/news/nigeria-launches-its-most-extensive-national-measure-multidimensional-poverty-date>
- Statista. (2024a). *African countries with the highest share of global population living below the extreme poverty line in 2024*. <https://tinyurl.com/548ebz27>
- Statista. (2024b). *Global unemployment rate from 2004 to 2023*. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/279777/global-unemployment-rate/statisticsContainer>
- Ubanagu, M. (2023, June 19). *71 million Nigerians extremely poor*. Punch NG. <https://punchng.com/71-million-nigerians-extremely-poor-world-poverty-clock/>
- Ucha, C. (2010). Poverty in Nigeria: Some dimensions and contributing factors. *Global Majority E-Journal*, 1(1), 46–56. http://www.american.edu/cas/economics/ejournal/upload/uca_accessible.pdf
- Ugbodaga, M. (2021, June 22). *UN: Nigeria's FDI inflows increased to 4% to \$2.4bn in 2020*. TheCable. <https://www.thecable.ng/un-nigerias-fdi-inflows-increased-4-to-2-4bn-in-2020/>
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2009). *Nigeria human development report 2008–2009*. <https://www.undp.org/nigeria/publications/nigeria-human-development-report-2008-2009>
- Urama, C. E., Ezema, D. C., Obodoechi, D. N., Ukwueze, E. R., Eze, A. A., Mba, I. C., Amuka, J. I., Arazu, W. O., & Ibrahim, H. V. (2020). The effect of foreign capital inflows on economic growth in Nigeria. *Regional Economic Development Research*, 3(2), 253–266. <https://doi.org/10.37256/redr.3220221550>
- Urowoli, C. E., & Alero, T. A. (2022). *The nexus among unemployment, poverty and crime in contemporary Nigeria*. Adam Marszałek Publishing House. <https://doi.org/10.15804/rop2022108>
- Vanguard. (2010, September 30). *Radio broadcast by Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu — Announcing Nigeria's first military coup on Radio Nigeria, Kaduna on January 15, 1966*. <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/09/radio-broadcast-by-major-chukwuma-kaduna-nzeogwu-%E2%80%93-announcing-nigeria%E2%80%99s-first-military-coup-on-radio-nigeria-kaduna-on-january-15-1966/>
- World Bank. (2020, May 28). *Nigeria releases new report on poverty and inequality in country*. <https://tinyurl.com/4bc23zkc>
- World Bank. (2021). *Governance and development*. <https://doi.org/10.1596/0-8213-2094-7>