

RESOURCE DEPENDENCY AND THE NGO RESPONSE TO FAMINE: A THEORETICAL STUDY

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Abstract

The 2011 famine in the Horn of Africa resulted in the death of many thousands of people. According to the report *A Dangerous Delay*, (2012) jointly published by Oxfam and Save the Children, the Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) attempting to mitigate the emergency responded too slowly. The report states that NGOs had access to accurate information about the growing crisis provided by the early warning systems (EWS). Yet the NGOs responded too slowly reducing the effectiveness of their interventions. Issues of inadequate financial and organizational capacity and a lack of co-operation between NGOs contributed to the slow response. We argue that resource dependency underscored many of the issues faced by the NGOs.

Keywords: Resource Dependency; NGO; Africa

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1 Introduction

The Horn of Africa is a region located in eastern Africa, and home to several countries, including, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia (OCHA, 2011). During 2011, the Horn of Africa experienced the worst drought in over a decade, which affected more than 13 million people, mainly woman and children, and led to approximately 50,000-100,000 deaths. Most of the regions in the Horn of Africa as being were classified as being at crisis and emergency levels. Six regions within Somalia were classified as facing catastrophic conditions. These catastrophic conditions included high malnutrition rates, high food and fuel prices, reduced household incomes and high unemployment, difficulties accessing water, and civil conflict preventing interventions.

According to the report *A Dangerous Delay*, (2012) jointly published by Oxfam and Save the Children, Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) responded too slowly to the worsening situation resulting in a greater number of deaths and increased costs of intervention. Early Warning Systems (EWS) provided accurate and timely information about key factors contributing to famine. The EWS were designed with pre-determined trigger points at which NGOs were to intervene thereby minimizing the impact of the famine. However, the NGOs were slow to respond to the early forecasts of famine

There were specific factors that contributed to the slow response of the NGOs to the deteriorating conditions. The NGOs working in the region required approval from government agencies before implementing disaster relief strategies, and the time

lag in receiving approval contributed to the NGO's delayed response. In addition, the long-standing civil unrest limited the influence of government bodies in southern Somalia where Al Shabaab controlled territory, imposing restrictions on NGOs and preventing them from providing aid (Bajoria, 2011). However, the report '*A dangerous Delay*' states that the EWS provided accurate and reliable information and argued that the delayed response to the famine was not only because of Al Shabaab, and waiting for government approval, but also resulted from the decisions and actions of the NGOs involved in the famine relief.

The purpose of writing this paper is to examine the factors that contributed to the slow response of the NGO's to the information provided by the EWS from a theoretical perspective. Our aim is to understand how these factors impacted on decision making within the NGOs.

A description of the crisis will be given in the following section. In the remainder of paper there will be a brief explanation of the Early Warning Systems (EWS). There will be a discussion about the reports dealing with the NGO response to the Horn of Africa famine. This will be followed by a theoretical explanation for the slow response followed by a discussion and conclusions.

2 A description of the crisis

The crisis developed because of poor rainfall between October – December 2010, and March – May 2011 (Oxfam and Save the Children, 2012) resulting in, crop failure and the death of livestock, leading to inadequate food supplies and inflated food prices.

According to the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC), a United Kingdom umbrella organisation that includes the 14 leading UK NGOs such as Care, Oxfam, Save the Children and World Vision, the increase in food prices and high petrol prices created additional financial difficulties for families already living on or very close to the poverty line (DEC, 2012). The business and agricultural sectors in the countries of the Horn of Africa were already in a weakened state as a result of previous famines.

Somalia faced the worst conditions during the 2011 famine. According to DEC (2012), the catastrophic conditions faced in Somalia began to spread to surrounding countries, such as Ethiopia and Kenya due to the influx of Somali refugees. Approximately, 1.7 million Somalis sought refuge outside of Somalia, while 1.5 million had remained within Somali borders. The Kenyan refugee camp, Dabaad, hosted 463,434 refugees during November 2011, while all four Ethiopian camps were at capacity with approximately 130,000 refugees (DEC, 2011). The refugees often arrived in poor health, requiring an additional allocation of scarce resources, such as food, water, security and shelter. The increasing number of refugees led to overcrowding in the refugee camps putting increased pressure on NGOs and causing conditions throughout Kenya and Ethiopia to deteriorate. In July 2011 a large inflow of donations was received by NGOs, after the conditions in the refugee camps were shown in the media of the developed world, however the response was too late to be effective (DEC, 2012). The delay also resulted in an increase in the cost of the relief effort. The initial budget for relief work in Somalia was \$530 million however after a review in July 2011 it was increased to over \$1 billion. An earlier intervention would have allowed the use of low cost transport and cheaper bulk commodities instead of airlifts and foods high in supplements (Oxfam and Save the Children, 2012).

According to 'A Dangerous Delay' the NGOs had access to reliable information about rainfall, the condition of crops and stock and the growing malnutrition of the population of the Horn of Africa. The major NGOs had been involved in the design of the Early Warning Systems (EWS) and had agreed upon trigger points at which to provide appropriate interventions. Each of the EWS operated as planned however the information they provided was not acted upon in a timely manner. In the following section the three EWS used in the Horn of Africa famine will be examined.

3 The early warning systems

Buchanan-Smith and Davies (1995) identified the key characteristics required for Early Warning Systems (EWS) to be effective, as:

- A capability to signal sensitive changes in food security and detect food stress, not strictly warnings about potential large scale situations

- Responses should enable assistance in the beginning of the famine
- Interventions should protect livelihoods before lives are threatened.

According to Oxfam and Save the Children (2012) the EWS met the criteria listed by Buchanan-Smith and Davies (1995). The three systems in place at the time of the famine in the Horn of Africa were the:

1. Integrated food security Phase Classification system (IPC),
2. Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET),
3. Food Security and Nutrition Working Group (FSNWG).

The EWS indicated as early as August 2010 that a major famine could develop if weather conditions developed as forecasted (Oxfam and Save the Children, 2012).

The three EWS discussed in this paper were referred to in reports on the Horn of Africa famine. Oxfam and Save the Children (2012) and UNICEF & FAO 2011, stated that FEWSNET and FSNWG reports were graded as 'very good' to 'excellent' and performed as intended. The warnings were capable of signalling sensitive changes in food security and provided early indications of the likelihood of the famine which interventions could have mitigated. In the next section the NGOs' responses to the famine will be examined.

4 The NGO response

Oxfam and Save the Children (2012) examined the NGO response to early warnings during the 2011 Horn of African famine and concluded that the deterioration of conditions in the Horn of Africa had been predicted at the early stages of the famine and that if appropriate action had been taken the consequences of the emergency would not have been as severe. According to the report, an increase in deaths and cost per beneficiary resulted from the slow response to the early warnings. Oxfam and Save the Children (2012) explained that the overall cost of the relief efforts increased due to the late response. The original amount required in Somalia was approximately \$530million, however was increased to over \$1billion after a review in July 2011.

The slow response of the NGOs to the EWS has been a recurring issue, as illustrated by the NGO response to the Niger famine of 2004/05. Communities required an effective response in the early stages of the crisis, similarly to the situation in the Horn of Africa (Oxfam and Save the Children, 2012). The estimated cost per beneficiary in February 2005 was \$7, this increased to \$23 per beneficiary (Chantararat et al, 2007). Early intervention would have allowed NGOs to use more cost efficient alternatives, such as cheaper bulk commodities and low cost logistic methods. Instead, as a result of the delayed response intervention was

more urgent and therefore required more expensive measures, such as the airlifting food and foods high in supplements and vitamins.

A number of reports (See Table 1) had been compiled and released by major international NGOs that had

been involved in relief work during the Horn of Africa famine. The reports provided a frank assessment of the NGO's response and were based on the experiences of the relief agencies in the field.

Table 1 Themes discussed in reports

Report Themes	1	2	3	4	5
1.NGO Response					
Initial NGO response was slow		X	X	X	X
EWS provided reliable warnings	X#	X	X	X	
Initial budgets required upward revision		X			X
Appeals initially poorly supported	X#	X	X	X	X
NGOs performed well after initial delay			X	X	X
NGOs experienced donor fatigue	X#	X			X
Needed to manage risks not crisis		X	X	X	X
Over emphasis on food aid	X#	X	X	X	X
2 Internal Processes					
Needed contingency and flexible funding	X	X			X
NGOs needed to build on organizational learning		X	X	X	
Staff turnover among NGOs is high		X	X	X	
NGOs need to retain staff	X#	X	X	X	
NGOs need to invest in staff	X#	X	X	X	
3 Co-ordination among NGOs					
Co-ordination among NGOs was poor	X#		X	X	X
NGOs competing for scarce resource	X#		X	X	X

X indicates theme was stated in report

indicates comments made about Horn of Africa appeal 2008-2010

1. *Early Warnings – Delay Response: Lessons learned from IFRC Horn of Africa appeal 2008-2010.*
2. *A Dangerous Delay: The cost of late response to early warnings in the 2011 drought in the Horn of Africa.*
3. *Ethiopia Real-Time Evaluation report.*
4. *Kenya Real-Time Evaluation report.*
5. *Humanitarian Requirements for the Horn of Africa Drought – July 2011.*

The reports listed in table 1 above complement each other to paint a complete picture. The difference between them is their main focus and purpose. The first report was from the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC, 2011) that examined the failures of the 2008-10 international appeals and the slowness of NGOs to respond appropriately to the EWS. The second report was *A Dangerous Delay* (Oxfam and Save the Children, 2012) that focused on the pre-July, 2011 response of the NGOs at the time when the EWS was providing accurate warnings. The third and fourth reports were produced by the Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC, 2012) were real time evaluation reports for Ethiopia (3) and Kenya (4). Both reports were mainly focused on the post-July, 2011 period and the NGO's response after famine was declared. The fifth report, *Humanitarian Requirements for the Horn of Africa Drought* (HRD) published by the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2011), mentioned the slow response, concentrating on the humanitarian requirements from July 2011 onwards.

Several common themes emerged from the five reports. However, each report provides different opinions as to why the delay occurred between the

early warnings and the initial response. The IFRC (2011) suggests the delayed responses to the famine were often due to organisational capacity problems. These included; limited contingency funds, slow assessment and appeal processes, over-reliance on food aid, and poor administrative procedures. Donor fatigue and poor funding were thought to be the main contributors to these problems. NGOs had received insufficient funds in the past; limiting their ability to retain funds for contingencies, provide long-term engagement, or improve administrative procedures to improve the speed of assessments. The reports called for the NGOs to manage the risks of famine, not only the crisis itself. The Horn of Africa famine required both, an immediate response to save lives and development programs to build community resilience. Oxfam and Save the Children (2012) argued that (1) there was a general failure of earlier preventative actions from late 2010, and (2) there was a collective failure to respond with appropriate relief from the time it was needed in early to mid-2011. The Oxfam and Save the Children report (2012) also stated that donors required hard evidence before acting upon early warnings and suggested that fear of a poor allocation of resources, fear of being overly interventionist and

donor fatigue all contributed to the delay. According to DEC, (2012) and UNOCHA, (2012) the delayed response appeared to be linked to the NGO's emphasis on providing food aid.

The two real-time evaluation reports (DEC, 2012) claimed that NGOs were only allowed to operate within the parameters specified by governments therefore, placing a degree of responsibility for the delay on local councils and national governments. The long lead-time for project approval by governments was also thought to have contributed to the delay. According to the DEC reports on average, project approval took 2 months (DEC, 2012). Many NGOs had made early efforts, drawing upon contingency funds and their own resources however because they had insufficient funds they were unable to make any significant impact (DEC, 2012). The DEC reports also state however that the response provided by the NGO's after the initial delay was effective. However, they argue that appeals were unsuccessful until the media released footage of the overcrowded refugee camp in Kenya.

The UNOCHA (2012) report did not provide any reasons for the delayed response, however stated that the window of opportunity was missed. In July, 2011 the Horn of Africa was declared an emergency, after the media released footage of conditions in refugee camps. This declaration resulted in large inflows of funding, leading to an overall expansion of the relief effort. But, by the time this funding was received, the window of opportunity to mitigate the effects of the famine had been missed.

5 Factors contributing to the NGO's delayed response

The reports suggest that the NGO's slow response was in part linked to problems within the NGOs. The lack of organisational knowledge created weaknesses in the internal capacity of NGOs to effectively respond to emergencies (DEC, 2012). The DEC also suggested that a lack of institutional frameworks and standard operating procedures lead to duplication of activities and an inefficient use of resources. To overcome these problems and remain effective in unpredictable environments NGOs must develop and maintain their organizational capacity (Huysse et al, 2012, Marshall and Suarez, 2012).

Oxfam and Save the Children (2012) state that skilled and experienced staff were needed, particularly those who could adapt to rapidly changing situations. Further, DEC commented that the cost of repeatedly training new staff was frequently mentioned by NGOs throughout their evaluations. DEC (2012) believed the discontinuity of staff had caused organisational memory loss impacting upon agencies' ability to implement long-term development programs. However, the NGOs argue that training new staff uses valuable resources that could contribute to famine relief. NGOs have pointed out that emergency

responses that have been built upon and that collaborate with existing long-term development projects are more likely to have a positive impact DEC (2012).

The co-ordination between NGO's throughout the 2011 Horn of Africa famine was labelled as poor by the reports. The large number of NGOs providing famine relief during the drought meant that, the little money allocated by governments, was spread too thinly limiting the NGO's ability to cope with the crisis. The NGOs did not have the capacity to handle the crises by themselves therefore making co-ordination between NGOs essential. However, difficulties in co-ordination between NGOs had arisen in the past as a result of competition for scarce resources. The DEC reported that during the 2011 Horn of Africa famine the co-ordinated response between the field operations of the NGOs was poor. The DEC (2012) stated that competition, defensiveness and a lack of information sharing and planning had occurred during the famine. The UNOCHA (2011) report stated that conflicts between response teams, arising from competition for funds resulted in poor decision-making and impacted on the clarity and reliability of shared information (UNOCHA, 2011, DEC, 2012). The IFRC reported that co-ordination had been a continuing problem in the Horn of Africa, since 2008-10. Many NGO's were chasing funds to complete the same activities resulting in scarce resources being inappropriately used.

Many NGOs lacked the organisational capacity to intervene effectively on their own in a large scale emergency. Hence, co-ordination between NGOs was essential to enable the provision of effective famine relief. However, co-ordination between NGO's during an emergency is difficult because of the complexity of the external environment (Salmon et al, 2011). NGOs are faced with uncertainty, sudden and unexpected events, the risk of mass casualties, time pressures and resource shortages (Chen et al, 2008). These factors impact on the co-ordination of multi-agency responses, creating difficulties in determining who needs help and what help is required. Comfort et al (2004) found that the more reliable the shared information between NGOs, the more effective their responses were. However, recent studies have shown that NGOs are poor at sharing and communicating information (Dawes et al, 2004, Bharosa et al, 2010 & Salmon et al, 2011). According to Chenhall et al (2010) communication is poor between NGO's because they are forced to compete for funding from donors, consequently information is not shared. The findings of Salmon et al (2011) supported this argument since their research also found a lack of information sharing between agencies. Issues with communication included, sharing inaccurate and incomplete information, agencies misunderstanding information and poor information management.

The co-ordination of multi-agency response was not only hindered by the lack of information sharing,

but also retaining a common focus between organisations was also difficult. A clear focus and agreement among agencies was critical in providing co-ordinated response during crises situations (Comfort et al, 2004a). Ensuring each organisation was focused on achieving the same goals allows quick decisions to be made. The ability to make quick decisions is crucial in disaster relief and dealing with uncertainty (Faraj and Xiao, 2005). Four of the five reports (see Table 1) have stated that during the Horn of Africa famine there was competition among NGOs for resources inhibiting their ability to provide a co-ordinated response.

The reports have highlighted a number of problems affecting the NGOs' ability to respond to the growing crises in the Horn of Africa. The issues centre on the financial and organizational capacity of the NGOs and their competition for scarce resources. In the following section a theoretical explanation for those issues will be sought.

6 A theoretical explanation

Underlying each of the issues listed above was a lack of resources that inhibited the development of organizational capacity and the NGOs' ability to respond to emergencies. The lack of resources on one hand and the considerable demands on those resources on the other places the NGOs in a position of resource dependency. Resource dependency refers to the reliance of organisations on funding from external sources in order to finance their activities. NGOs have limited means to generate sufficient resources to fund their work and are predominantly dependent on large donors to fund their activities. Many NGO's rely upon public and private donations to fulfil their aims and achieve their stated goals and objectives (Loman et al, 2011). As a consequence, the autonomy of NGOs can be undermined, as external funding often comes with explicit conditions and expectations (Provan, 1984, & Guo & Acar, 2005). External parties can influence and control NGOs through implying terms and conditions when donating funds. The bargaining power of the NGO is reduced by the level of reliance on external funding (Bryant, 2012), therefore the greater the reliance on external funding the more control external parties have over the resources, decisions and activities of the NGO.

Resource dependence theory suggests there are two dimensions that can influence the degree of dependency of an organisation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), namely the magnitude of exchange and the criticality of resources. The magnitude of exchange is measurable by the proportion of total inputs that is contributed during an exchange (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Hence, if the donor contributes the majority of funding, the magnitude of exchange is deemed high, and increases the degree of resource dependency. The criticality of resources is measured through the ability of organisations to derive resources from alternative

sources and the consequences of an absence of the resource (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). A resource may be small in magnitude, however if this resource is critical to the outputs of the NGO, then the organisation's potential to be influenced through resource dependency is high.

Perera (1995), states that NGOs become subordinate in a power relationship when working with external donors. When donors finance NGO programs, they expect specific results to be achieved and if targets are not met future funding may no longer be available (Edwards & Hulme, 1996 & Perera, 1995). It has been argued by Edwards & Hulme, (1996) that NGOs are obligated to deliver contracted services instead of acting upon values and voluntarism. Hillman et al (2009), Davis & Cobb, (2010) argue that the influence of resource dependency builds internal pressure within NGOs, affecting decision making, as the perceived misuse of scarce resources could endanger future funding.

Resource dependency has the potential to impact the processes and activities of NGOs and provides an explanation for the slow response to the Horn of Africa Famine. While it is not being argued that resource dependence is directly responsible for the NGOs' slow response it is however, being suggested that resource dependency impacted on the capacity of NGOs and, the relationships between NGOs thereby contributing to the delay.

The slowness of the NGOs to intervene in the Horn of Africa famine may be partially explained by their limited capacity. Capacity can be defined as the ability fulfil the mission of the organization and consists of having sufficient funds to undertake appropriate activities, such as famine relief, and the skills and processes to operate effectively. Each of the five reports noted that appeals for the relief effort had been poorly supported therefore limiting the resources available for early interventions that the NGOs could have undertaken.

According to Minzer et al (2014) organizational capacity consists of skills and practices of NGO staff, and the systems developed and operated by NGO staff, allowing NGOs to operate effectively and sustainably. Strong capacity development is an essential process that NGOs must engage in so that they remain efficient and effective in unpredictable environments (Huyse et al, 2012, Marshall and Suarez, 2012). The DEC (2012) argued that a lack of frameworks and standard operating procedures lead to the duplication of activities and the inefficient use of resources. Ebrahim (2005) notes that international donors have been reluctant to pay for the overhead costs supporting field level learning and thus limiting the organizational capacity building of the NGOs. Also Ebrahim (2005) quotes Edwards (2002) stating that without experiential learning of field workers the learning in other layers within NGOs will also be defective.

The impact of resource dependency can also be seen in the accountability relationships between the NGOs and their stakeholders with consequences for both program delivery and organizational capacity. Connolly et al. (2012) argue that for the third sector accountability is particularly important reducing the possibility of scandal and promoting confidence in the organisations and sustaining donations. However, a common finding of research into NGO accountability is the predominance of the accountability relationships towards governments and donor agencies over accountability to beneficiaries (Goddard and Assad, 2006, Gray et al, 2006, Murtaza, 2012). Similarly, Ebrahim (2005) argues that the emphasis on upward accountability to donors can cause the NGO's reporting and information systems to operate at the reduction of accountability to beneficiaries or the organization's mission. Further Ebrahim (2005) goes on to argue that donors have short term timeframes that are able to influence NGO priorities towards demonstrating results over annual budget cycles rather than considering the long term impact of programs.

The NGOs' lack of capacity necessitates their co-operation in the field and the sharing of information. Comfort et al (2004a) argued that a focused and co-ordinated response was essential for effective crisis mitigation. However, the lack of focus and the unco-ordinated responses resulting from the accountability relationships between donors and NGOs and the need for NGOs to compete for scarce funds have impeded effective intervention. Barman (2007) argues that as a result of increased competition to secure funding, NGO's have become increasingly concerned with accountability sought by donors and the need to demonstrate competency. NGO's have now become more focused on ensuring they appear to have performed effectively in order to secure future funding (Sawhill & Williamson, 2001, Assad & Goddard, 2006, Chenhall et al, 2010). Co-operation between the NGOs was impeded because NGOs were concerned to maintain their relationships with their donors in order to guarantee future funding. The DEC stated that co-ordination between organizations in the field was poor and that there was competition, defensiveness and a reluctance to share information (Dec, 2012). The UNOCHA (2011) reported conflicts between response teams while the IFRC pointed out that throughout 2008-2010 many NGOs were seeking funds to complete the same activities resulting in scarce resources being used to duplicate activities.

The competition for resources between NGOs and the prioritisation of donor demands over those of beneficiaries can lead to goal ambiguity. Goal ambiguity creates difficulties for NGOs knowing how to achieve desired goals (Merchant & Van Der Stede, 2007, Nelson, 2000, Stone & Brush, 1996, Chun & Rainey, 2005). Goal ambiguity can be defined as 'the extent to which an organizational goal or set of goals allows leeway for interpretation, when the organisational goal represents the desired future state

of the organisation' (Chun & Rainey, 2005). As a result of goal ambiguity NGO's are conflicted, as the expectations of donors may be given greater priority over the goals of other stakeholders.

The stakeholders of NGOs include NGO employees, donors, other NGOs and beneficiaries. These stakeholders have a direct interest in the outcomes of NGO activity and expect to participate in decision making as a way to ensure their 'investments' are protected and used in a manner consistent with their goals (Barrett, 2001). While beneficiaries have the greatest direct interest in the outcomes of the decisions made by the NGOs they have the least ability to influence the decisions made by the NGOs. While each stakeholder has their own set of expectations, quite often mutually exclusive, NGO's must determine which stakeholder's expectations are to be met (Merchant & Van Der Stede, 2007). Consequentially, difficulties arise in setting goals that meet the expectations of the different constituencies. The influence of multiple constituencies and lack of direct control over resources, were identified as critical factors creating goal ambiguity within NGOs (Stone & Brush, 1996) impacting on an NGO's organizational capacity by reducing the clarity of its strategy and potentially reducing its effectiveness.

7 Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to understand the reason for the inadequate response of NGOs to the information provided by the EWS during the 2011 Horn of Africa famine. The Oxfam and Save the Children Fund (2012) report, '*A Dangerous Delay*' has stated that the EWS were reliable and the warnings produced were clear and accurate. However, the response from the NGOs was slow, and the window of opportunity to effectively mitigate the famine was missed. The theory of resource dependency was suggested as a possible explanation for the slow response of the NGOs to the growing crisis in the Horn of Africa

Underlying the factors that contributed to the slow response was the inadequate financial resources held by the NGOs. The lack of financial resources encouraged a dependency on donors leading to unintended consequences. Resource dependency meant that the NGOs were reluctant to make decisions that could be perceived as being outside the agreements with donors and potentially jeopardising future funding. Similarly, donors have generally been reluctant to support NGO organizational capacity development. NGOs also seem unwilling to invest funds in their own capacity arguing that they could be better used for relief programs.

The NGO's dependency on donors created competition between the NGOs for scarce resources resulting in a lack of co-operation between them. The demand for funding exceeded the supply, increasing the competitive forces within the NGO sector

impeding the sharing of information and contributing to the poorly co-ordinated responses to the Horn of Africa famine.

NGO resource dependency gave donors greater influence over NGO operations than staff or beneficiaries, and underscored the goal ambiguity that resulted from the different stakeholders' expectations. The lack of clear goals, understood by all stakeholders, impeded the NGOs' response to the crises. Goal ambiguity may have contributed to the relatively high staff turnover resulting in a loss of organisational capacity and the ability of the NGOs to respond to rapidly changing conditions. The activities of Al Shabaab and the requirement for NGOs to obtain approval from government agencies impeded the NGO's response to the Horn of Africa famine. However, the resource dependency of the NGO's also played a significant role.

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