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The purpose of the paper is to argue that although the government of the province of Alberta and the federal government have developed legislation including licensing and policies (frameworks and directives) to reduce and prevent environmental degradation, they fail to ensure compliance with the legislation and policies because the governments prefer economic gain to environmental sustainability. The lack of strong compliance enforcement suggests a lack of effectiveness and efficiency. Subsequently, a failure in the rule of law occurs because oil corporations, due to their economic impact, are treated as above the law. The bias for the corporation over the environment hinders good governance. Overall, both governments find balancing protecting the environment and gaining financial benefits challenging.

This paper aims at identifying which factors should be considered in the building of an economic evaluation model for the private label brand. In fact, some specific characteristics of private label, with respect to industrial brand, make unusable the consolidated models available. The results of the paper are the definition of some specific factors of private label, the assumptions about how these features impact on the traditional economic evaluation models and how these could be included in a model. Because of the complexity of the topic, the hypothesis is to build a model of synthesis, made of two parts: one part for a Financial-Based evaluation of Brand Equity, with the addition of some specific factors and indicators to the traditional formulas, while the other part is for a Consumer-based evaluation of Brand Equity, thanks to an index that summarizes the strength of private label brands from the consumer perspective. The private label economic evaluation has some relevant managerial implications on the retail system, on the vertical supply chain relationships and on the understanding of the strategic nature of this asset.

In 2016, India demonetized 24% of its currency notes (viz. 86% in cash value) in circulation presuming this will remove "black" (illicit) and counterfeit cash holdings, and combat money laundering. This was the largest demonetization experiment in recent history. Although demonetization has occurred several times before, no unambiguous economic argument for, or against, it exists. This was a key enabler for demonetization, yet again. This paper argues that the St. Petersburg Paradox (SPP) provides a compelling argument against demonetization. Assuming the distribution of cash is lognormal, it is shown that the probability of black cash holdings will be small. If not, the holders would: a) be irrational because they are willing to accept, contrary to the SPP, the small probability of a large loss, by effectively perceiving it as zero, without using all means to immunize themselves against it; or b) be sure their cash can be legitimized via collusion with the State; or c) be sure they can incentivize law-abiding citizens to act as agents to legitimize the cash for a reasonable fee. Assuming rationality and no bureaucratic support, large probabilities of black cash holdings imply that many more law-abiding patriotic citizens have to be corruptible than seems rational.