MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM CORPORATE SPINOFFS

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Abstract

In this paper, we study changes in the incentive structure of the CEOs in both parent and spun-off companies, and the effect of managerial incentives on operating performance due to an improved agency relationship between shareholders and managers of both firms after the spinoff. We construct a unique dataset that covers corporate spinoffs between 1992 and 2004. We find a certain level of increase in pay-performance sensitivity of the CEOs of spun-off firms as compared to the CEOs of parent firms. We find that pay-performance sensitivities of both parent and spun-off firms’ CEOs are positively related to the operating performance improvement after the spinoff. Overall, our study provides evidence that improved managerial incentive is a source of gains in spinoffs.

Keywords: Executive Compensation, Corporate Spinoffs, Pay-performance Sensitivity

How to cite this paper: Qian Li, Q., & Reis, E. (2012). Managerial compensation and firm performance: Evidence from corporate spinoffs. Corporate Ownership & Control, 9(3), 69-78. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv9i3art6