Contents

Viewed: 71Downloads: 415

SECRECY, COLLUSION AND COALITION BUILDING IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Lee Mick Swartz

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i3p1

Viewed: 621Downloads: 746

HOW TOEHOLDS BECOME FOOTHOLDS

Jean M. Canil , Bruce A. Rosser

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i3p2

Viewed: 345Downloads: 449

BONDHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS FROM DIVIDEND CHANGES

Mark S. Klock, Katherine I. Gleason

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i3p3

Viewed: 323Downloads: 458

OWNERSHIP CATEGORIES AND INVESTMENT PATTERNS AFTER MASS PRIVATIZATION IN BULGARIA AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Evgeni Peev

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i3p4

Viewed: 310Downloads: 647

THE MANAGEMENT OF INFLATION RATE, INTEREST RATE AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATE RISKS: A BUSINESS EXECUTIVE OUTLOOK

Frederik J. Mostert , Jan Hendrik Mostert

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i3p5

Viewed: 552Downloads: 495

MANAGERIAL HEDGE (EFFORT) INCENTIVE, OWNERSHIP AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM FOUNDER-CEOS AND NON FOUNDER-CEOS

Haksoon Kim

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i3p6

Viewed: 379Downloads: 442

WHY DOES ANY FIRM HAVE SEVERAL OWNERS?

Erik Strojer Madsen, Valdemar Smith , Mogens Dilling-Hansen

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i3p7

Viewed: 212Downloads: 434

ACCOUNTING STANDARDS FOR EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTION DISCLOSURE: THE CURRENT DEBATE

Geoffrey Poitras

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i3p8

Viewed: 335Downloads: 464

FAMILY CONTROL, AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE, AND AUDIT QUALITY: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE TSE-LISTED FIRMS (1999-2002)

Ching-Lung Chen , Gili Yen, Chung-Jen Fu, Fu-Hsing Chang

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i3p9

Viewed: 514Downloads: 575

THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE VOLUNTARY INFORMATION DISCLOSURE IN THE ANNUAL REPORTS OF BANKING COMPANIES: THE CASE OF BANGLADESH

Mohammed Hossain , Peter Taylor

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i3p10

Viewed: 560Downloads: 468

FIRM PERFORMANCE AND THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LARGEST SHAREHOLDER

Xiaoyue Chen, Jeong-Bon Kim , Steven Shuye Wang, Xiaodong Xu

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i3p11

Viewed: 584Downloads: 476

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FRAUD: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

Langnan Chen , Weibin Lin

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i3p12

Viewed: 807Downloads: 590

COMPLIANCE RISK AND THE COMPLIANCE FUNCTION COULD ENHANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NOT ONLY IN BANKS BUT IN OTHER KIND OF ORGANIZATIONS AS WELL

Rodolfo Apreda

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i3p13

Viewed: 372Downloads: 490