Earnings management and asymmetric sensitivity of bonus compensation to earnings for high-growth firms

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Keywords: Accrual and Real Earnings Management, Executive Compensation, Sarbanes-Oxley, Ex Post Settling Up, Asymmetric Sensitivity

JEL Classification: J33, L2, M41

Received: 10.02.2022
Accepted: 04.03.2022

How to cite: Kwon, S. S., Gélinas, P., & Waweru, N. (2022). Earnings management and asymmetric sensitivity of bonus compensation to earnings for high-growth firms. In G. M. Mantovani, A. Kostyuk, & D. Govorun (Eds.), Corporate governance: Theory and practice (pp. 30–33). https://doi.org/10.22495/cgtapp4