Volume 3 - 2006 Issue 2
Corporate Ownership and Control
https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i2p1
Viewed: 251Downloads: 391
ON THE ESTIMATION OF THE VALUE OF VOTING RIGHTS: EVIDENCE FROM TAIWAN
https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i2p2
Viewed: 165Downloads: 393
HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL TAKEOVER AND SELL-OFF ANNOUNCEMENTS: ABNORMAL RETURNS DIFFER BY INDUSTRY
Stephan K.H. Gross, Hagen Lindstädt
https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i2p3
Viewed: 503Downloads: 438
CUTTING THE DIVIDENDS TAX…AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TOO?
Dino Falaschetti, Michael J. Orlando
https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i2p4
Viewed: 253Downloads: 395
POLITICAL COSTS AND LOBBYING ACTIVITY OF AUSTRALIAN GOLD MINING FIRMS
https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i2p5
Viewed: 185Downloads: 385
DISCOUNT AND PREMIUM AWARDS IN THE CONTEXT OF PRE-EXISTING ESOP CONDITIONS
Bruce A. Rosser, Jean M. Canil
https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i2p7
Viewed: 183Downloads: 380
A REVIEW OF IPO SELLING METHODS: IS THERE A CLEAR WINNER?
Kuntara Pukthuanthong, Thomas J. Walker
https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i2p8
Viewed: 223Downloads: 406
DOES OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AFFECT FIRM PERFORMANCE? EVIDENCE FROM A CONTINENTAL-TYPE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
Carlos Fernández Méndez , Silvia Gómez-Ansón
https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i2p9
Viewed: 298Downloads: 406
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND MARKET VALUATION OF FAMILY GROUPS IN CHILE
Fernando Lefort
https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i2p10
Viewed: 249Downloads: 405
DOES OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE EFFECT IPO UNDERPRICING: EVIDENCE FROM THAI IPOS
Sundar Venkatesh, Suman Neupane
https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i2p11
Viewed: 300Downloads: 402
MORAL HAZARD, AGENCY PROBLEM AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
Seok Weon Lee
https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i2p12
Viewed: 517Downloads: 426
CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF BRAZIL
Andre Carvalhal da Silva , Flavia Mourao Graminho
https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i2p13
Viewed: 260Downloads: 406
CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE VALUATION IN BRAZIL
Ricardo P. C. Leal , Andre Carvalhal da Silva
https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i2p14
Viewed: 234Downloads: 396
INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS? SUPERVISORS? WHO SHOULD MONITOR CHINA’S BOARDS?
Margaret Wang
https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i2p15
Viewed: 202Downloads: 397