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CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE VALUATION IN BRAZIL
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Ricardo P. C. Leal 
, Andre Carvalhal
Abstract
This paper investigates the relation between the ownership structure, valuation and performance of Brazilian companies. The results show that large shareholders keep control while holding only a small fraction of cash flow rights. The evidence also indicates that non-voting shares and pyramiding are the main devices set to entrench the large controlling shareholder. There is some evidence that firm valuation and performance are negatively related to voting concentration, and that foreign-owned firms perform the best while government-owned firms perform the worst.
Keywords: Ownership, Control, Valuation, Performance, Brazil
How to cite this paper: Leal, R. P. C., & Carvalhal da Silva, A. (2006). Controlling shareholders and corporate valuation in Brazil. Corporate Ownership & Control, 3(2), 137-141. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i2p14
