THE CORRELATION BETWEEN MANAGEMENT POWER AND RISK IN THE ITALIAN COMPANIES

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Abstract

The shareholders can not directly manage the business but they have powers of pulse and control by voting right that is essential for the correct functioning of the company. In 1942 the Italian legislature, although with some exceptions, adopted One share – One vote rule. The legal framework changed significantly after the enactment of corporate law reform in 2003. The objective of this research is to examine the status of the principle of correlation between management power and risk in the context of the regulatory framework of Italian public companies, as it emerged after the enactment of above mentioned corporate law reform in 2003.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Legal Framework, Management Power, Risk

How to cite this paper: Scarabino, R. (2013). The correlation between management power and risk in the Italian companies. Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets & Institutions, 3(1), 31-33. https://doi.org/10.22495/rgcv3i1art3