THE DANCE OF DUPLICITY IN EMERGING MARKETS: USING BANK REGULATION AND DEPOSIT INSURANCE PROTECTION TO ENRICH THE ELITE

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Kurt Dew

https://doi.org/10.22495/rgcv1i1art3

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Abstract

We seek to identify the culpability of banks in resource misallocation in Mexico, Thailand and Turkey. Specifically we provide evidence of an agency problem in the government and banking systems of the three countries. Where governments pass laws and regulations consistent with modern capitalism for the purpose of deceiving investors and others, the door is opened to the use of deposit insurance and repeated promises of regulatory reform to transfer wealth from the efficient to the corrupt.

Keywords: Bank Risk Management, Value At Risk, Emerging Markets, Arbitrage, Agency Problems

How to cite this paper: Dew, K. (2011). The dance of duplicity in emerging markets: Using bank regulation and deposit insurance protection to enrich the elite. Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets & Institutions, 1(1), 37-51. https://doi.org/10.22495/rgcv1i1art3