The effect of the fast-track corporate rehabilitation program on the interest coverage ratio of the companies under court receivership

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Abstract

Given the fact that a swift rehabilitation procedure is very critical due to the risk of the collapse of business foundation (e.g. falling asset value), this paper analyzes the effect of the Fast-track program, introduced to address insolvent companies swiftly. A Differences-in-Differences model is used to analyze and compare the prior-and-post effects of the program. The analysis result shows that the effect of this program on ICR (interest coverage ratio), representing the degree of rehabilitation, is positive; but its statistical significance is low. This is because the business foundation has been undermined around the time of receivership; and even after the termination of the receivership, the program effect is limited due to the bankruptcy stigma. The same result is observed in estimations by company size and by industry. This result has following implications. First, to improve the effect of Fast-track, institutional efforts are required to reduce disadvantages induced by the bankruptcy stigma (e.g. a fall in credit rating and high-risk premiums). Next, as observed in the empirical analysis of steel and shipbuilding, the effect of the Fast-track may not be exercised to the full with weakened industrial competitiveness. Therefore, restructuring efforts such as business reshuffle are necessary.

Keywords: Corporate restructuring, Court receivership, Fast-track program, Bankruptcy stigma, Differences-in-Differences model

JEL Classification: G30, G34, G38

Received: 28.11.2017

Accepted: 16.01.2018

Published online: 30.01.2018

How to cite this paper: Choi, Y. J. (2018). The effect of the fast-track corporate rehabilitation program on the interest coverage ratio of the companies under court receivership. Journal of Governance & Regulation, 7(1), 7-25. https://doi.org/10.22495/jgr_v7_i1_p1