AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY: MARKET REACTION TO THE APPOINTMENT OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS

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Abstract

This paper examines the stock market reaction to the appointment of outside directors to the board both before and after the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002. We also examine whether the abnormal returns following outside director appointments are related to audit committee appointments, and whether the outsider has financial expertise. Results show that the market response to the announcement of an appointment of an outsider to the board of directors is mixed, and abnormal returns are not significantly different after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act compared to those announcements before the Act. Also, we find that the market reaction pre- Sarbanes Oxley is higher when the outsider is expanding the board, lower in cases of CEO/chairman duality, and lower if the outsider is appointed to the audit committee. Post- Sarbanes Oxley CEO/chairman duality has a positive impact on the abnormal returns.

Keywords: Outside Directors, Abnormal Return, CEO/Chairman Duality

How to cite this paper: Uzun, H., & Webb, E. (2006). After Sarbanes-Oxley: Market reaction to the appointment of outside directors. Corporate Ownership & Control, 3(3-1), 190-198. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i3c1p3