AGENCY CONFLICTS AND THE WEALTH EFFECTS OF PROXY CONTESTS

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Abstract

We examine the shareholder wealth impact of proxy contests and find that over the three years preceding the contest, target stock prices significantly underperform their industry peers. In addition, consistent with the monitoring role of proxy contests, the announcement and full contest periods result in a positive stock price reaction suggesting that the market views the initiation of a proxy contest as good news. Interesting differences emerge between firms in which dissidents win seats and those where they do not win seats. While target firm stock prices appreciate for all firms at the announcement, such wealth gains are permanent only for the subsample of targets which not only are afflicted with elevated levels of agency problems but also make significant reduction in discretionary expenditures. When dissidents do not win seats, no attempt to reduce agency costs is apparent, and as a result, these firms experience a sustained wealth loss over the years surrounding the contest. The steps taken to reduce agency costs primarily in firms in which dissidents win seats suggests that proxy contests fulfil their intended role of disciplining the board and improve firm performance.

Keywords: Agency Conflicts, Shareholder Wealth Impact, Agency Costs

How to cite this paper: Bhabra, G. S., & Wood, C. (2014). Agency conflicts and the wealth effects of proxy contests. Corporate Ownership & Control, 12(1), 8-30. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv12i1p1