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AGENCY CONFLICTS IN BRAZILIAN STOCK FUNDS: CATEGORIZING FUNDS IN CLIENTELE AND FEE TYPES
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Flávio C. Sanematsu, Ricardo P. C. Leal 
Abstract
This article investigates the behavior of equity mutual funds at calendar semester ends in Brazil between 2004 and 2013. Results suggest that the sampled funds present positive abnormal returns on the last trading day of calendar semesters, followed by negative abnormal returns on the subsequent day. Funds oriented to retail investors and those that charge incentive fees are more likely to display this abnormal return behavior. Exclusive funds present the smallest incidence of abnormal returns. There seems to be evidence of portfolio pumping.
Keywords: Agency Conflicts, Portfolio Pumping, Equity Mutual Funds, Brazil
How to cite this paper: Sanematsu, F. C., & Leal, R. P. C. (2016). Agency conflicts in Brazilian stock funds: Categorizing funds in clientele and fee types. Corporate Ownership & Control, 13(4-3), 458-469. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv13i4c3p5
