ARE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS TYPOLOGIES RELEVANT? EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN TRANSFERS OF OWNERSHIP RIGHTS

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Abstract

Corporate governance systems vary considerably across Europe, reflecting the differences in the financial and legal systems, and in corporate ownership structures. The purpose of this paper is to identify the relevant governance system typologies. To test the robustness of the typologies, we study transfers of ownership rights that may be an important determinant of corporate governance in the largest European economies. Results overall invalidate the expectations induced from the theoretical analysis of national corporate governance systems. They suggest that the classical typologies are insufficient to distinguish between governance systems as they miss to capture institutional complementarities and political differences. Our unexpected results could also suggest a convergence of the systems, not towards the Anglo-American model, but towards a new model.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Market-Based Economy, Bank-Centred Economy, Investor Protection, Ownership Structure, Mergers and Acquisitions, Leveraged Buyouts, Initial Public Offerings, Transfers of Minority Stakes, Private Equity

How to cite this paper: Abdesselam, R., Cieply, S., & Le Nadant, A.-L. (2008). Are corporate governance systems typologies relevant? Evidence from European transfers of ownership rights. Corporate Ownership & Control, 5(2), 87-99. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i2p7