BRAZILIAN ELECTRIC SECTOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CONTROL VERSUS MANAGERS MOVEMENTS

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Abstract

The present work aims calling attention to the cultural dynamics of a deflagrated conflict within the new institutional environment of a privatized electric sector company in São Paulo, opposing those who defend the company’s democratization among the entire manufacture community viewing the stakeholders’ collective rights (managers, Non-Governmental Organizations, local community, the State, regulatory and certificating agencies, consumers etc…) against those who defend the company’s democratization, but just among its shareholders (GRÜN, 2003), central in the individuals rights discourse. This article presents the results of a research carried through 55 managers of privatized company within São Paulo’s electric sector. These results indicates these monetarized actors’ movements within the re organizational process analyzed have set limits towards managerial actions, whose, in order to legitimize themselves and make prevailing their symbolic power (BOURDIEU, 2000) in the present organizational scene, impose concurrent constructions to the shareholders, either upon the valid company definition, as upon the better management approach to be adopted, both extracted from their world views, each of whom, interested in guaranteeing their divergent expectative.

Keywords: Сorporate Governance, Brazil, Institutional Investors

How to cite this paper: Saltorato, P. (2007). Brazilian electric sector corporate governance: institutional investors control versus managers movements. Corporate Ownership & Control, 5(1-2), 270-281. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i1c2p3