BRAZILIAN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS, UNDERWRITERS, AND PREMIUM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SEGMENTS LISTING

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Vinicio de Souza e Almeida ORCID logo, Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal ORCID logo

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv13i1c11p12

Abstract

We examined 89 offers in the most recent Brazilian IPO wave between 2004 and 2007, all listed in premium segments of the exchange that demand better corporate governance practices. Two non-US underwriters dominated the market, often acting as co-leaders and rarely as second-tier underwriters. Twenty-eight percent of issuers received pre-IPO loans from underwriters, which may constitute a conflict of interest. Syndicate membership increased with offer size, suggesting that distribution risk was relevant. Underwriter compensation increased with offer size, but percentage fees suggested scale effects. There was no evidence in favor of the relevance of underwriter reputation, certification, and price discovery roles. The study brings a portrait of underwriter relationships in this unique period of the Brazilian capital market.

Keywords: Investment Banks, Syndicate, Initial Public Offering

How to cite this paper: de Souza e Almeida, V., Leal, R.P.C. (2015). Brazilian initial public offerings, underwriters, and premium corporate governance segments listing.Corporate Ownership & Control, 13(1-11), 1410-1418. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv13i1c11p12