CAN AGENCY THEORY RECOMMENDATIONS AFFECT PERFORMANCE OF FAMILY FIRMS? EVIDENCE FROM THE ITALIAN MARKET

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Abstract

Using data on all family owned firms listed on the Italian Stock Exchange for the entire period between 2001 and 2005, it is shown that agency theory prescriptions and monitoring activities differentially impact the market value and profitability of family owned firms. Specifically, nonfounder family firms benefit from a low level of board and insider stock ownership and a high level of stockholder and foreign investor ownership, because these firms necessarily face high agency costs. Conversely, founder family firms benefit from a high level of board and insider ownership, and a low level of stockholder and foreign investor ownership, owing to their lower agency costs.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Family Firm, Ownership Structure, Performance

How to cite this paper: Caselli, S., & Gatti, S. (2007). Can agency theory recommendations affect performance of family firms? Evidence from the Italian market. [Special Issue]. Corporate Ownership & Control, 4(4-4), 9-17. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i4c4p1