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CEO SUCCESSION AND PROPRIETARY DIRECTORS: EVIDENCE FROM SPANISH LISTED FIRMS
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Guido Stein, Manuel Gallego 
, Marta Cuadrado
Abstract
This study advances research on CEO succession and board monitoring of senior executives by examining how proprietary directors can affect the probability of CEO dismissal. Drawing on our newly developed database covering all CEO successions occurring in all Spanish listed firms during the period 2007–2010, we propose that proprietary directors may increase the board’s monitoring efforts over the chief executive, forcing him to resign in situations of poor performance. Hypotheses are tested longitudinally, using CEO succession data taken from 111 publicly-traded firms in the Spanish ‘mercado continuo’ over a four-year period.
Keywords: Proprietary Director, Board of Directors, ROA, Corporate Governance
How to cite this paper: Stein, G., Gallego, M., & Cuadrado, M. (2013). CEO succession and proprietary directors: evidence from Spanish listed firms.
[Conference issue]. Corporate Ownership & Control, 11(1-2), 140-146. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv11i1conf2p5
