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CHANGES IN COMPENSATION STRUCTURE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND SHORT-RUN OPERATING PERFORMANCE IN IPO FIRMS
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Amani Khaled Bouresli 
, Wallace N. Davidson III
Abstract
The IPO process may potentially introduce or increase agency costs. The newly public firm must deal with these agency problems. We find that following an IPO, the CEO compensation structure on average becomes more pay and performance-sensitive, and the board of directors becomes more independent. Venture capitalist participation seems to positively influence these findings. However, these post-IPO changes do not lead to better short-run operating performance.
Keywords: Compensation, Corporate Governance, IPO
How to cite this paper: Bouresli, A. K., Davidson III, W. N. (2008). Changes in compensation structure, corporate governance, and short-run operating performance in IPO firms. Corporate Ownership & Control, 5(4-3), 328-344. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i4c3p1
