CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND VOLATILITY IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS: BRAZIL CASE STUDY

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Pablo Rogers ORCID logo, José Roberto Securato ORCID logo

DOI:10.22495/cocv7i1p4

Abstract

In 2001, with the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) creation of the “New Market and Governance Levels I and II”, Brazil became a unique country for corporate governance studies. From this date on it became possible to distinguish, in the same macroeconomic and institutional environment, companies that formally adopt good practices of corporate governance from those that don’t. This article objective, considering Brazil as a case study, was to assess the impact of higher levels of governance on the volatility term structure of the stocks. In methodological terms, it were developed two indexes of daily returns in the Brazilian stock market called IEPG-I and IEPG-S, and it was analyzed the volatility term structure with adjustments on the GARCH family models. The results were statistically surprisingly, highlighting: 1) higher levels of governance had positive effect in the reduction of the short and long term volatility; 2) the volatility of the companies with the worst practices of corporate governance seems to be more reactive to the market; 3) the persistence of the volatility of the companies with good practices is higher than that of the companies with worse practices; 4) the convergence speed of the volatility of the companies with good practices is lower than that of the companies with worse practices; and 5) the presence of information asymmetry or leverage effect in companies with worse practices of corporate governance and absence in companies with better practices of governance.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Volatility, GARCH

How to cite this paper: Rogers, P., Securato, J. R. (2009). Corporate governance and volatility in the capital markets: Brazil case study. Corporate Ownership & Control, 7(1), 43-54. http://doi.org/10.22495/cocv7i1p4