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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PROPENSITY TO SHARE INFORMATION: THE LONG-RUN EFFECT
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Anna Blajer-Gołębiewska 
, Leszek Czerwonka
Abstract
The optimal corporate governance system aims to give shareholders confidence that a company is managed efficiently, to create the highest possible profit and to preserve a firm’s reputation. The aim of the research is to find out if the lower level of information asymmetry in corporate governance systems in the Polish listed companies implies higher rates of return for shareholders in the future. We put forward a hypothesis that the impact of lower information asymmetry on company’s performance is overestimated and in reality no long-run effect on the higher abnormal returns occurs. Taking into consideration the initial level of propensity to share information index we analysed future buy-and-hold abnormal returns achieved by 61 companies during the next 3 years.
Keywords: Corporate Finance and Governance, Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies Asymmetric and Private Information
How to cite this paper: Blajer-Gołębiewska, A., & Czerwonka, L. (2012). Corporate governance and propensity to share information: The long-run effect. Corporate Ownership & Control, 10(1-4), 399-407. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv10i1c4art1
