CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM VALUATION – THE CASE OF CHINA

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Abstract

We examine the determinants and implications of Chinese corporate cash holdings in the 1993- 2006 period. Agency theories assert that firms with a large controlling shareholder have relatively large cash holdings because of the greater ability of the controlling shareholder to extract private benefits from the cash holdings. Our findings show a very strong inverse relationship between cash holdings and firm valuation in high government ownership firms. Also, we find that in firms with high government ownership, dividend payouts are highly valued. We conclude that Chinese investors see government ownership as a factor that reduces firm value. They prefer relatively higher dividends from firms having high government ownership. Conversely, investors assign much higher value to firms with relatively low government ownership and they tend to be neutral about the dividends payouts of such firms. Also, investors value highly the presence of foreign investors in Chinese firms and tend to be neutral about dividend payouts of firms with high foreign ownership concentration.

Keywords: Cash Holdings, Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, Chinese Firms, Dividend Policy, Government Ownership

How to cite this paper: Paskelian, O. G. & Bell, S. (2009). Corporate governance and firm valuation – the case of China. Corporate Ownership & Control, 7(2), 21-29. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv7i2p2