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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THEORIES OF EXECUTIVE PAY

Kuntara Pukthuanthong, Eli Talmor, James S. Wallace

DOI: 10.22495/cocv1i2p8

Abstract

This study performs an in-depth look at the corporate governance, voting and ownership structure of the companies selected using a relatively homogenous data of the U.S. financial sector. Variables that proxy for managerial strategic discretion and task complexity are found to best explain CEO compensation. Corporate governance, including board characteristics and ownership structure, is the second leading determinant of pay variation, while firm performance and CEO specific characteristics seem to play the least role. In accord with studies on managerial stock ownership and Tobin’s Q, the pay-for-performance relation appears to be curvilinear in CEO stock ownership.

Keywords: Executive Compensation, Voting Structure, Ownership Structure, Financial Sector

How to cite this paper: Pukthuanthong, K., Talmor, E., & Wallac, J. S. (2003). Corporate governance and theories of executive pay. Corporate Ownership & Control, 1(2), 94-105. http://doi.org/10.22495/cocv1i2p8

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