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Domingo Javier Santana-Martin ORCID logo, Inmaculada Aguiar-Diaz ORCID logo


In this paper we analyse the structure of ownership in non-financial Spanish listed companies in the period 1996-2002, focussing on the control chain methodology. The results obtained show that the main shareholder’s control threshold stands at about 29% of the voting rights and that in 2002 families were the ultimate owners in 52.7% of the firms. On the other hand, the use of pyramid structures continues to increase. In 2002, 29.1% of the companies were controlled in this way, which means that the ratio of voting rights to cash flow rights for this year was 0.89.

Keywords: Ultimate Owner, Civil Law, Pyramid, Family Firm, Corporate Governance

How to cite this paper: Santana-Martin, D. J., & Aguiar-Diaz, I. A. (2007). Corporate ownership in Spain [Special issue]. Corporate Ownership & Control, 5(1-4), 322-331.