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CROSS OWNERSHIP AND INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES BETWEEN BANKS AND LISTED FIRMS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS ON DEBT LEVERAGE AND COST OF DEBT IN THE ITALIAN CASE
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Francesca di Donato 
, Riccardo Tiscini
Abstract
Cross-ownership and interlocking directorates are two typical features of Italian capitalism involving both banks and non-financial companies. It is possible to refer to this phenomenon as “bank-firm connection”. The paper investigates the effects of “bank-firm connection” on the conditions of credit relationship. In particular, we find that the “bank-firm connection” lowers the leverage ratio of non financial companies, while it increases their cost of debt.
Keywords: Bank-firm Connection, Interlocking Directorates, Cross Ownership, Leverage, Cost of Debt
How to cite this paper: Di Donato, F., & Tiscini, R. (2009). Cross ownership and interlocking directorates between banks and listed firms: An empirical analysis of the effects on debt leverage and cost of debt in the Italian case. Corporate Ownership & Control, 6(3-4), 473-481. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i3c4p6
