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Ling Mei Cong, Qinggang Wang, John Evans



This study examines determinants of excessive executive compensation in PRC firms using 8,100 firm-year observations from 2003-2009. Employing an industry benchmarked excessive pay proxy, this study finds that CEO duality and ownership dispersion have significant positive associations with the probability of overpaying the executives. The presence of a large outside shareholder is negatively associated with the likelihood of excessive executive compensation. Results from this study have important implications for various stakeholders. For example, the PRC authorities need to further strengthen the corporate governance and constrain the power of management over the pay-setting process. More institutional investors could be encouraged to enter the PRC market to play a bigger role in monitoring managers. This paper makes an original contribution to the PRC executive compensation literature by providing unique insights into drivers of excessive executive compensation.

Keywords: Determinants; Excessive Executive Compensation; PRC

How to cite this paper: Cong, L. M., Wang, Q., & Evans, J. (2012). Determinants of excessive executive compensation. Corporate Board: role, duties and composition, 8(1), 32-47.