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ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC NEGOTIATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY: THE CASE OF VENTURE CAPITALISTS
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Edwin H. Neave 
, Lewis D. Johnson
Abstract
This paper uses the theory of transactions economics to model the process whereby venture capitalists and financiers negotiate the terms of financing. We show that the process has both static and dynamic elements, and involves incomplete information in a world of uncertainty. Central to the arrangement is the alignment of borrower attributes and lender capabilities.
Keywords: Governance, Venture Capitalists, Transaction Economics
How to cite this paper: Neave, E. H., & Johnson, L. D. (2009). Elements of strategic negotiation under uncertainty: The case of venture capitalists. Corporate Ownership & Control, 6(3-4), 429-436. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i3c4p2
