EQUITY-BASED INCENTIVES: WEALTH TRANSFERS, DISRUPTION COSTS AND NEW MODELS

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Michael Nwogugu ORCID logo

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i1c2p5

Abstract

This article seeks to: a) introduce new models of incentives, including those that completely solve the problems of “Back-dating” and “Re-pricing” of employee stock options and equity-based incentives; b) introduce new theories of unwarranted wealth-transfers and Disruption Costs inherent in the use of Equity-based Incentives (“EBIs”). Several recent detailed studies found that there is widespread ESO/EBI-related fraud and non-compliance, which could have damaging effects on public confidence in financial systems and increase market volatility.

Keywords: Employee Stock Options, Equity-Based Incentives, Willingness-To-Comply, Complexity, Corporate Governance

How to cite this paper: Nwogugu, M. (2007). Equity-based incentives: wealth transfers, disruption costs and new models. Corporate Ownership & Control, 5(1-2), 292-304. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i1c2p5