INFLUENCES OF PROPRIETARY AND POLITICAL COSTS ON DISCLOSURE OF DIRECTORS’ AND EXECUTIVES’ REMUNERATION AND OWNERSHIP

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Abstract

Remuneration to, and ownership by, directors and top executives (D&Es) of listed companies have been subjected to calls for transparency as part of the corporate governance movement. Using the annual reports of 161 Australian listed companies, this study investigates the comparative impacts of proprietary and political information costs on management ‘s voluntary disclosure decisions concerning D&Es’ cash-based and equity-based remuneration, termination benefits, related-party transactions, shares held, and changes in ownership in their company. A firm’s investment opportunity set (using both market-based and accounting-based measures) is treated as a proxy for proprietary costs, while media attention and shareholder activism are used to proxy for political costs of voluntary disclosure. Results of this study provide evidence of the relative importance of two major types of information costs, proprietary and political, in influencing management’s (i.e., D&E’s ) decision concerning the extent to which they disclose sensitive details of their remuneration and ownership.

Keywords: Director and Executive Remuneration, Proprietary Cost, Political Cost, Investment Opportunity Set, Media Attention, Shareholders’ Activism

How to cite this paper: Taylor, D. (2008). Influences of proprietary and political costs on disclosure of directors’ and executives’ remuneration and ownership. Corporate Ownership & Control, 5(4-1), 173-185. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i4c1p2