ON INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE, VALUE CREATION, MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE FRENCH CASE

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Abstract

This paper studies corporate governance, investment, value creation and their effects on corporate performance in some European countries and in particular in France. It accounts for specific aspects of investment performance, governance, management and entrepreneurship. Corporate governance systems can be identified by the degree of ownership and control and the identity of controlling shareholders. In outsider systems characterized by wide dispersed ownership as in the U.S and UK, the main specificity is the conflict of interest between strong managers and widely-dispersed weak shareholders. In insider systems characterized by concentrated ownership or control as in Germany and Japan, the main specificity is the conflict of interest between controlling shareholders (or block holders) and weak minority shareholders. There are several models of corporate governance since each country has developed a variety of mechanisms to overcome agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and control. Some results are reported using a data base conceived by IPAG students.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Investment, Performance, Management, Legal View

How to cite this paper: Bellalah, M. (2004). On investment performance, value creation, management and corporate governance: The French case. Corporate Ownership & Control, 1(4), 72-80. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv1i4p6