PROTECTIONISM WITHIN DISCLOSURE REGULATION: EVIDENCE FROM NATIONAL TRANSPARENCY AND GAAP CHOICES

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Abstract

The arguments used thus far in the literature to justify disclosure regulation are that it increases global economic efficiency and that it redistributes wealth among investors. In this paper, we depart from this view and propose that disclosure regulation may also be used by national authorities as a protectionist mechanism to indirectly charge for access to national scarce resources and thereby extract economic rents from resources-needy entities. This increases national welfare, but is inefficient globally. We find empirical support for our proposition through a cross-sectional analysis of financial reporting standards of 62 countries. Results suggest that national objectives in implementing disclosure regulation represent a major obstacle for the global convergence of accounting standards and that disclosure regulation’s purpose may not be limited to solving the separation of ownership and control dilemma.

Keywords: Disclosure Regulation, Protectionism, Disclosure Theory, International Accounting Standards, Government Policy, Corporate Governance

How to cite this paper: Gélinas, P., & Baillargeon, L. (2009). Protectionism within disclosure regulation: evidence from national transparency and GAAP choices. Corporate Ownership & Control, 6(4-1), 234-242. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i4c1p7