-
Journal menu
- General information
- Editorial Board and External Reviewers
- Journal Policies
- Publication Ethics and Malpractice Statement
- Instructions for authors
- Paper reviewing
- Article processing charge
- Feedback from stakeholders
- Journal’s Open Access statement
- Order hard copies of the journal
- 50 most cited papers in the journal
PUBLIC CONTRACTING AND CORRUPTION: A MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR
Download This Article
Maria Belén Lozano 
, Maria del Pilar Murillo
Abstract
In this work, a first microeconomic approach is developed concerning the role firms play in the public contracting process and the problem of managerial corruption in this context. We thus outline a first analysis of the choices taken by firms when contracting with the public administration, considering the existence of both legal and corrupt contracts and the sustituibility or not of both. We then show a financial model justifying the choice of a contract portfolio based on the uncertainty and risk involved. The conclusions allow us to both offer some performance directives in order to control the phenomenon of corruption, and to understand the persistence of corrupt contracts.
Keywords: Public Contracts, Managerial Behavior, Bribes, Microeconomic
How to cite this paper: Lozano, M. B. & Murillo, P. (2009). Public contracting and corruption: a microeconomic analysis of managerial behavior. Corporate Ownership & Control, 7(2-3), 343-357. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv7i2c3p2
