Political institutions and investor protection

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Gabriel Geller, Maria João Guedes ORCID logo

DOI:10.22495/cocv17i4siart11

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Abstract

This study examines how political institutions are associated with investor protection. Our results show that consensual political institutions have higher creditor protection but lower minority shareholder protection. Further, the system of government (parliamentary vs. presidential) and the level of democracy are the two dimensions of political institutions that best explain investor protection. The study presents some recommendations that add to the debate that shows that there is no single political theory or set of factors that fully explain the range of outcomes across OECD countries, and that looking to other dimensions of political institutions are useful to explain investor protection.

Keywords: Political Institutions, Investor Protection, Creditor Protection, Ownership

Authors’ individual contribution: Conceptualization – G.G. and M.J.G.; Methodology – G.G. and M.J.G.; Formal Analysis – G.G. and M.J.G.; Investigation – G.G. and M.J.G.; Software – G.G. and M.J.G.; Writing – Original Draft – G.G. and M.J.G.; Writing – Review and Editing – G.G. and M.J.G.; Visualization – G.G. and M.J.G.; Validation – G.G. and M.J.G.; Supervision – G.G. and M.J.G.; Project Administration – G.G. and M.J.G.

Declaration of conflicting interests: The Authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

Acknowledgement: The authors acknowledge the financial support from FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Portugal) through the Advance Research Centre (project UIDB/04521/2020).

JEL Classification: C33, C38, H11, H63, N2, N20, D02

Received: 21.06.2020
Accepted: 13.08.2020
Published online: 14.08.2020

How to cite this paper: Geller, G., & Guedes, M. J. (2020). Political institutions and investor protection [Special issue]. Corporate Ownership & Control, 17(4), 339-352. http://doi.org/10.22495/cocv17i4siart11