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SHAREHOLDER COALITIONS, VOTING POWER, AND DIVIDEND POLICY: NEW EVIDENCE FROM TUNISIA
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Moncef Guizani 
, Ezzeddine Abaoub, Mondher Kouki
Abstract
This paper examines the possible association between the voting power of large shareholders and dividend payout policy for a panel of Tunisian firms over the period 1998-2004. The results show a negative relationship between the control stake of the dominant shareholder and payout rates. In contrast, the presence of another large shareholder affects the payout ratio positively. Our results also indicate that different owner types in control influence dividend policy differently. In particular, the control stake of families is associated with a significant negative impact on the dividend distributed whereas the voting power of financial institutions has a positive effect. We conclude that different owner classes have different role in corporate governance.
Keywords: Dividend Policy, Ownership and Control, Coalitions, Voting Power, Agency Conflicts, Banzhaf Power Indices
How to cite this paper: Guizani, M., Abaoub, E., & Mondher, K. (2008). Shareholder coalitions, voting power, and dividend policy: New evidence from Tunisia. Corporate Ownership & Control, 6(1-4), 433-442. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i1c4p2
