STATE OWNERSHIP, AGENCY CONFLICT AND EFFECTIVE TAX RATES: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

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Abstract

Agency conflict between minority and controlling shareholders in state owned firms has to be considered in order to examine the variability on effective tax rates. In China, state ownership helps the government to achieve its social objectives by optimizing corporate income tax. We provide a significant result to prove that state owned firms paid higher corporate income taxes than private firms. Our results also indicate that corporate effective tax rates are positively associated with firm sized and inventory intensity. However, we have no strong evidence to support the association with leverage, return on assets and capital intensity.

Keywords: Corporate Income Taxes, State Owned Firms, Agency Conflict, Effective Tax Rates

How to cite this paper: Jianfu, S., & Sudibyo, Y. A. (2016). State ownership, agency conflict and effective tax rates: Evidence from China. Corporate Board: role, duties and composition, 12(1-1), 109-114. https://doi.org/10.22495/cbv12i1c1art4