THE PERFORMANCE OF SHARI’A SUPERVISORY BOARDS WITHIN ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COUNTRIES

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Samy Nathan Garas ORCID logo

https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv8i1c2p1

Abstract

This study evaluates the role and performance of Shari’a Supervisory Boards (SSB) within Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates). Although the SSB has a significant impact on an IFI’s performance, there has been little empirical research on the SSB performance. This study is unique in measuring empirically the relation between five variables and SSB performance. Data has been collected through a questionnaire from 76 Shari’a Supervisory Boards, 73 Boards of Directors, and 59 shareholders of IFIs in the GCC countries during 2009. The researchers found three variables that have a positive impact on the performance of SSBs: the number of SSB meetings, the qualifications of SSB members, and the evaluation of each member. Furthermore, the work of the Shari’a control department was found to have a negative impact on SSB performance. There was no statistically relationship between SSB performance and SSB position within the IFI organization structure. This study fills a literature gap in corporate governance by evaluating the impact of a religious board upon the performance of financial institutions. The study provides a theoretical framework for measuring SSB performance using internal variables. This study offers insights to GCC regulators, central banks, and other IFI stakeholders concerning SSB performance. In addition, it provides guidance to SSB members in improving their performance and strengthening their relations with other governance organs.

Keywords: Supervisory Board, Management Board, Annual Meeting, Gulf States, Shari’a

How to cite this paper: Garas, S. N. (2010). The performance of Shari’a supervisory boards within Islamic financial institutions in the Gulf cooperation council countries. Corporate Ownership & Control, 8(1-2), 247-266. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv8i1c2p1