THE VALUE-RELEVANCE OF FUNDAMENTAL SIGNALS AND THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL REGULATIONS ON SECURITY VALUATION AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT

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Sung S. Kwon

DOI:10.22495/cocv16i3art7

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Abstract

This article investigates the value-relevance of earnings and financial analysts’ fundamental signals, as identified by prior research. We document four primary findings. First, consistent with the claims in the accounting literature, the value-relevance of ‘bottom line’ earnings has declined over time. Second, the combined value-relevance of earnings and financial analysts’ fundamental signals have also declined over time. Prior studies in this line of research have generated mixed evidence. In other words, some previous studies support an increase and some others find a decrease in the value-relevance of book values of net assets (common equity) over time. This study focuses on the financial analysts’ fundamental signals, not the book values of net assets, and the change in the degree of the value-relevance of those signals over time. Third, we find a negative correlation between firms’ excess returns and regulations, such as Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) and Dodd-Frank, which are consistent with the claims of some prior studies that the implementation costs of the regulations may exceed their benefits for shareholders of the corporations affected by the regulations. Finally, we also report that the levels of opportunistic earnings management, reflected in some of those fundamental signals, have declined following these regulations.

Keywords: Fundamental Signals, Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), Dodd Frank, Earnings Management, Value-Relevance

JEL Classification: D80, G38, M41

Received: 22.02.2019

Accepted: 07.05.2019

Published online: 08.05.2019

How to cite this paper: Kwon, S. S. (2019). The value-relevance of fundamental signals and the impact of financial regulations on security valuation and earnings management. Corporate Ownership & Control, 16(3), 73-88. http://doi.org/10.22495/cocv16i3art7