The managerial entrenchment: The paradox of law and acts in state-owned enterprises in Cameroon

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Abstract

In Cameroon’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs), a number of managers have succeeded in maintaining their positions as the head of the corporation, paradoxically with disappointing results. Based on this unorthodox practice, this study strives to understand and explain the strategic levers used by these managers to maintain their positions at the top of the company, based on 12 cases in SOEs. The results corroborate existing knowledge and make it possible to identify the singular contingencies in the instrumentalization and instrumentation practices of governance bodies and structures that enable manager entrenchment.

Keywords: Governance, State-Owned Enterprise, Entrenchment, Manager, Cameroon

Authors’ individual contribution: Conceptualization — V.L.L. and J.R.F.; Methodology — V.L.L., J.R.F., and F.Z.; Validation — J.R.F. and F.Z.; Formal Analysis — V.L.L.; Investigation — V.L.L. and J.R.F.; Writing — Original Draft — V.L.L., J.R.F., and F.Z.; Writing — Review & Editing — F.Z.; Visualization — V.L.L. and F.Z.; Funding Acquisition — F.Z.

Declaration of conflicting interests: The Authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

JEL Classification: G34, H83, M12, O16

Received: 04.09.2022
Accepted: 27.01.2023
Published online: 30.01.2023

How to cite this paper: Lagmango, V. L., Feudjo, J. R., & Zogning, F. (2023). The managerial entrenchment: The paradox of law and acts in state-owned enterprises in Cameroon. Corporate Ownership & Control, 20(2), 127–137. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv20i2art10