Transparency and disclosure practices of Italian state-owned enterprises: A critical analysis

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Abstract

National and international accounting literature and established accountancy laws now agree that the nature of invested resources, and — above all — pursued objectives, can modify the accountability of state-owned enterprises. This accountability is characterised as being of public interest, and the efficacy of the statutory accounts model derived from the chosen business plan is consequently reduced. Based upon this hypothesis, the present work proposes an evaluation of the mandatory accounting regulations for Italian state-owned enterprises via an evaluation of compliance with the OECD guidelines regarding “disclosure and transparency” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2015). Although the work substantially evidences compliance with the majority of OECD recommendations, it also highlights a concentration of non-compliance in areas regarding company performance statements. Italian regulations appear to be excessively bound to a measurement of economic-financial earnings and these data are often unsuitable for expressing the effective achievement of the objectives that companies should pursue.

Keywords: State-Owned Enterprises, Disclosure, Transparency, Quality, Financial Reporting

Authors’ individual contributions: Conceptualization — F.C., M.S., and M.S.; Methodology — F.C., M.S., and M.S.; Data Curation — F.C., M.S., and M.S.; Writing — Original Draft — F.C., M.S., and M.S.; Writing — Review & Editing — F.C., M.S., and M.S.

Declaration of conflicting interests: The Authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

JEL Classification: M41, M42, M48

Received: 01.04.2022
Accepted: 02.12.2022
Published online: 05.12.2022

How to cite this paper: Capalbo, F., Smarra, M., & Sorrentino, M. (2022). Transparency and disclosure practices of Italian state-owned enterprises: A critical analysis. Corporate Board: Role, Duties and Composition, 18(2), 19–26. https://doi.org/10.22495/cbv18i2art2