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LARGE SHAREHOLDERS AND MARKET DISCIPLINE IN A REGULATED INDUSTRY: A CLINICAL STUDY OF MELLON BANK
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Joseph G. Haubrich 
, James B. Thomson
Abstract
The change in control at Mellon bank in 1987 sheds a unique light on several aspects of corporate control, as Mellon was one of few banks with a large shareholder. The bank underwent a management change earlier than most peer banks; contrary to some theoretical models, this happened without the large shareholder acquiring a majority stake to effect the change. Mellon’s rapid recovery relative to peer banks reveals the inability of regulatory intervention to fully substitute for market based forms of corporate control.
Keywords: Corporate Control, Large Shareholders, Regulations
How to cite this paper: Haubrich, J. G., & Thomson, J. B. (2003). Large shareholders and market discipline in a regulated industry: A clinical study of Mellon bank. Corporate Ownership & Control, 1(1), 156-169. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv1i1p2
