RATIONALE OF SECURITIES AND COVENANTS IN VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTS: AN APPLICATION TO SOUTH AFRICA

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Abstract

Venture capitalists are investing their money in portfolio enterprises and hence are putting their capital at risk. As portfolio enterprises may pursue different objectives than those of their financiers, venture capitalists may perceive agency problems as an important risk factor. Venture capitalists can limit the scope of these risks by specifying the form of financing that they provide to portfolio enterprises and/or by inserting particular covenants in their financial contracts. This paper first briefly reviews the various contractual provisions that can be used to decrease the extent of venture capitalists’ exposure to agency problems. Next, the importance of various securities and covenants is examined in the context of South Africa, where the venture capital market is still relatively young, but growing. Overall, it is concluded that venture capitalists in South Africa limit their exposure to risk, but in a different manner than is typically done in the USA.

Keywords: Venture Capitalists, Financial Contracts, Agency Conflicts, Securities, Covenants

How to cite this paper: Huyghebaert, N., Mostert, F. J. (2008). Rationale of securities and covenants in venture capital contracts: an application to South Africa. Corporate Ownership & Control, 5(4), 15-25. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i4p2